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ABSTRACT 
 
 In this project, I expose conceptual and moral difficulties with the concept of 
rational suicide. After offering a comprehensive list of criteria used to define rationality 
in the bioethics literature, I turn to the scholarship of Susan Sherwin, Susan Wolf, 
Rosemarie Tong, Lisa Ikemoto and others to apply feminist critiques regarding the 
privileging of the liberal individual and claims of value neutrality in bioethics generally 
to the rational suicide literature specifically. Further, using the work of Genevieve Lloyd, 
I argue that just as definitions of rationality have been used to marginalize vulnerable 
populations (e.g., women and minorities), a similar marginalization of suiciders occurs in 
the rational suicide literature. In order to rectify this marginalization, I call on Jean 
Améry’s account of his own suicidality, and through exegesis of On Suicide: A Discourse 
on Voluntary Death, I argue that Améry’s account reveals that suicidality is neither 
rational nor irrational, but arational. Given that in some instances of the lived experience 
of suicidality, discussions of rationality are not applicable, I question the efficacy of 
“rational suicide” as the concept upon which to ground arguments for the moral 
permissibility of suicide and assisted suicide. Finally, having established both conceptual 
and moral difficulties with the concept of rational suicide, I argue for a new concept upon 
which to base arguments for the moral permissibility of suicide, appropriate death. 
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INTRODUCTION 	  
When considered in the abstract, suicide is undoubtedly ontologically interesting. 
Human beings are the only creatures that not only can question life and its purpose, but 
that may also choose to self-annihilate. What does it say about the human condition that 
one million people a year worldwide take their own lives (that is, approximately one per-
son every 40 seconds) and that up to 20 times more individuals attempt to do so? (World 
Health Organization 2014). 
  Yet considering suicide in this abstract way misses something. It is the undeniably 
complicated nature of suicide and the lived experience of suicidality that originally alert-
ed me to an oddity in the bioethics literature on rational suicide. Much of Western bioeth-
ical thought on physician assisted suicide is devoted to establishing the possibility of ra-
tional suicide and to establishing its moral permissibility. It is widely held by bioethicists 
that if circumstances can be found in which suicide could be rational, then there is neither 
moral reason to prohibit a person from committing suicide, nor to prohibit another person 
from providing the means by which that person might commit suicide. In other words, a 
considerable number of bioethicists assert that establishing the rationality of suicide is the 
first and best step to arguing for the moral permissibility of assisted suicide. 
  But there is something intuitively odd about the phrase “rational suicide.” For 
those who have first-hand experience with the suicidal, pairing the world “rational” with 
“suicide,” an act that can seem impossible to justify and hard to contain, may be an af-
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front. For those with experience of suicidal persons, or who are themselves suicidal, the 
phrase seems cold, without empathy, and lacking all nuance.  
 To introduce the complexities of a suicidal individual’s situation, consider the fol-
lowing case study:  
 “Cathy,” a 59-year-old woman, was hospitalized for her first suicide attempt at 
15. Although her doctors suggested therapy, Cathy came from a blue-collar family who 
did not believe in “head doctors.” Cathy’s physically and emotionally abusive mother 
suffered from undiagnosed bipolar and borderline personality disorder, and insisted her 
daughter’s suicide attempt was an attempt to get back at her, refusing to recognize the 
sincerity of her daughter’s attempt. This young woman was released to her parents, and 
she continued to live with them until she was 21. She experienced bouts of what would 
later be recognized as clinical depression and mania, with recurrent suicidal ideation, 
but did not attempt suicide again while living with her parents.  
At the age of 26, Cathy married, and she had children when she was 28 and 30. 
She started making non-lethal suicidal gestures again in her mid-thirties, and exhibited 
symptoms of both borderline personality and bipolar disorder. She was formally diag-
nosed as borderline and bipolar at 50. From the age of 45 until the present day, she has 
attempted suicide no fewer than six times. At 52, Cathy’s sister took over her power of 
attorney and became her legal guardian. Two of her suicide attempts, made at 55 and 57, 
were severe enough that she was admitted to the critical care unit at her local hospital. 
At 56, Cathy was diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic, and she continued to have recur-
ring bouts of delusional thinking. In addition to suffering from mental illnesses, she had 
COPD which causes acute bronchitis and pneumonia, frequent debilitating migraines, 
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diabetes, as well as several other physical ailments that required occasional surgeries 
and hospitalizations. She lived alone and received in home care every day of the week.   
Cathy had a do not resuscitate order (DNR) and an advanced directive (AD) that 
specified no extraordinary measures be taken to save her life (including the express re-
fusal of the use of ventilators, and defibrillators).  Although both documents were en-
dorsed by her primary psychiatrist and her legal guardian as required by the laws of the 
state in which she resided, during all of the hospitalizations for her suicide attempts, her 
DNR and AD were ignored. 
  Cathy now comes to her psychiatrist and explains that she wants to kill herself 
with help from her doctor. She is lucid (not experiencing a schizophrenic episode), her 
bipolar and borderline are currently well regulated by medication, and she expresses this 
wish articulately. This is not the first time she has expressed a desire to kill herself when 
lucid and when her bipolar is well controlled. She is afraid that like the last few times she 
attempted suicide, her caretakers will intervene, so she wants her doctor to prescribe her 
medications that will quickly and painlessly kill her. Although the correct combination of 
the psychiatric medications she currently takes could do this, her sister keeps her medica-
tions for her, and gives her only two days of medication at a time. Furthermore, Cathy 
does not have the knowledge to figure out lethal dosing. She has known her doctor for 
almost 20 years: this doctor is acutely aware of the daily suffering Cathy experiences, 
and knows her well enough to know when her suicidality is directly tied to her bipolar, 
borderline personality disorder, or schizophrenia. He also knows her family has suffered 
alongside Cathy for years, and is in support of her DNR and AD. The doctor is inclined 
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to prescribe her the drugs. Putting aside legal considerations, what should the doctor 
do? 
This case highlights the potential complexity of individual cases of suicidality and 
is the kind of situation that motivates this dissertation. There are many details in this case 
that might affect one’s moral reasoning about the decision with which the doctor is faced. 
Although the question at hand is a moral question and sets aside legal problems, the mor-
al framework with which one starts will determine what facts “matter.” Moreover, the 
opinions about suicide with which one starts will lead to very certain conclusions. The 
vast majority of the rational suicide literature does not address cases like this, and as I 
will argue, the criteria for rational suicide would not permit such a case to be considered 
for assisted suicide. The purpose of this dissertation is to bring more nuance to the dis-
cussion of suicidality in the philosophical bioethics literature on suicide and assisted sui-
cide in order to allow for serious consideration of situations faced by individuals like 
Cathy.  
  This is not to say that the rational suicide literature purposefully lacks empathy 
for suiciders. In fact, as will be explained in this dissertation, one can understand the ra-
tional suicide literature as an attempt to explain how suicide can be a good death for a 
particular population of people, specifically, those faced with terminal illness. The suffer-
ing of the terminally ill demands a response. The response offered by those writing on 
rational suicide is to argue for the moral permissibility of suicide and assistance in suicide 
by appealing to reason and rationality, foundational concepts in philosophy with which 
philosophers are often very comfortable. Yet however noble the motivation may be, there 
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are considerable problems with speaking about suicidality and suicide in terms of ra-
tionality. This dissertation will examine those problems. 
Before giving an overview of what will be explored in the coming chapters, some 
brief terminological considerations are in order. The terms I will define and use through-
out this work include suicide, suicider, suicidality, assisted suicide, appropriate death, and 
the “good death.” 
Suicide is a remarkably hard term to define. There have been entire books written 
on its very definition (c.f., Durkheim 1997, Fairbairn 1995, Fernandez 2001, Hill 2011, 
Jamison 1999, Kupfer 1990, Lebacqz and Engelhardt 1977), so while I will adopt a defi-
nition for my purposes, it is well beyond the scope of this dissertation to argue for it. I 
will adopt the definition offered by Gavin Fairbairn in his Contemplating Suicide: The 
Language and Ethics of Self Harm. According to Fairbairn, suicide is, “the act of deliber-
ate, intentional and wished-for self destruction...” (Fairbairn 1995, 7). In order for an act 
to be considered suicide, a person must purposefully commit the act and be committed to 
her own death. Moreover, the death must be self-initiated and completed. That her self-
destruction be “wished-for” means wishing for her death given the circumstances at 
hand. For instance, the self-destruction of a terminally ill person can be considered 
wished-for, even if the terminally ill person would desire to live given different circum-
stances (for example, the absence of a painful terminal illness).  
The benefit of this definition is that it allows for an examination of many types of 
suicidality. Suicidality is the experience of the inclination to suicide (Shneidman 1996, 
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7),1 and it comes in varying degrees. The experience of suicidality can include suicidal 
gesturing (mimicking acts of suicide without the lethality of suiciding) and having sui-
al thoughts and fantasies (cf. Cholbi 2011, Fairbairn 1995, Shneidman 1996). One need 
not attempt suicide in order to experience suicidality, or to be considered a “suicider,” but 
instead suiciders are “people who suicide or gesture at suicide or who otherwise deliber-
ately act in self injurious ways that could conceivably end in their deaths” (Fairbairn 
1995, xiii). This understanding of suicidality and suiciders is important for my project 
because, as will become evident, I will be extensively considering two very different ex-
periences of suicidality. These experiences of suicidality exist on opposite “poles” of this 
concept.  
The first experience of suicidality that will be at issue is the suicidality of those 
who are terminally ill and who wish to suicide. In some sense, those who are terminally 
ill, as described in the rational suicide literature, want to suicide given their circumstanc-
es, but do not want to suicide because they wish for death in and of itself. This is the per-
son with pancreatic cancer and a terminal diagnosis who does not wish to put herself 
through palliative chemotherapy, but wishes instead to control the circumstances of her 
death. Under other circumstances, that is, if she did not have a terminal illness, she would 
not wish for her own self-destruction; but in such a situation her wish to suicide is a way 
of dealing with her circumstances as they present themselves. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It is an established convention in the suicidology literature to avoid using the phrase “to commit suicide” 
and to use the term “to suicide” instead. The word “commit” is thought to bring with it connotations of ille-
gal and immoral activity. Insofar as possible, many suicidologists and researchers in suicide look to use the 
more neutral term “to suicide” (c.f., Bolton 1987, Cholbi 2011, Clements 1986, Dunne and Dunne-Maxim 
1987, Edwards 1997, Fairbairn 1995, Humphry 1986, Litman 1996, Motto 1980, Schneidman 1996). My 
dissertation will follow this convention.  
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The other sort of suicidality I will explore at length in this project is what I will 
call “extreme suicidality,” and is described by Jean Améry in his On Suicide: A Dis-
course on Voluntary Death. This is an experience of suicidality as a primordial conflict 
about a suicider’s existence in the universe. Much more detail will be offered about this 
experience in Chapter 3, but in brief, Améry speaks of this sort of suicidality as an incli-
nation towards death that takes root in the suicider before all rational discourse. This sort 
of suicider experiences suicidality viscerally, and the pull toward death is present regard-
less of the circumstances. Suicidality is not situational for these sorts of suiciders, but is 
constitutive of their identities. 
Assisted suicide occurs when the means of suicide are supplied to a person by an 
outside actor. Physician assisted suicide is a specific type of assisted suicide in which a 
physician offers these means. Usually this involves a physician prescribing a lethal drug 
to her patient. Several cases of non-physician assisted suicide will be considered in Chap-
ter 2, with the prototypical case involving a loved one helping a suicider kill herself by 
providing the means by which to do so. 
Appropriate death will be spoken of extensively in Chapter 4, but in short, an 
“appropriate death” is a death one might choose for himself if given the choice (Weisman 
1979, 1993). It is a death that fits with the lifestyle of the person who is dying. Whereas 
in the philosophy literature “rational suicide” is an attempt to explain suicide as a good 
death for some terminally ill people, appropriate death is an attempt made by psychia-
trists to offer criteria for establishing what good deaths might look like for all individuals. 
Appropriate death is based on two primary factors: the subjective experience of the per-
son dying and the concrete circumstances surrounding a death. “Appropriate death” dif-
 8 
fers from “rational suicide” in a number of ways that will be discussed later on, but most 
importantly it is a concept that is geared toward helping anyone die a better death. 
Finally, some consideration of “good death” is in order. It is well beyond the 
scope of this dissertation to determine absolutely the grounds for a good death, so this 
discussion will not be pursued at great length. The operating notion of a good death that 
guides my work is heavily informed by feminist and narrative ethics. Indeed, my guiding 
ethic behind this project is best summed up by Margarit Shildrick in her work Leaky Bod-
ies and Boundaries: Feminism, Postmodernism, and Bioethics: 
There is no final and absolute answer to moral dilemmas, no self-complete 
system which can satisfy all the demands made of it, nor which can speak 
with authority across time and place...the point is that a feminist ethics 
asks different questions of itself. It seeks to understand the specificity of 
meanings and the particularity of participants, with the result that its an-
swers must always be held open to modification at least, and possible to 
radical change...Openness should not be interpreted as weakness, nor as 
indecision, but rather as the courage to refuse the comforting refuge of 
broad categories and fixed unidirectional vision (1997, 3). 
  
When situations arise that call for moral resolution, one must remain sensitive to the par-
ticularities of the situation as well as to the circumstances of the individuals’ lives that are 
affected by the moral discussion. This is especially true in end-of-life discussions. Facing 
one’s own death is a point in a human life where a person is uniquely confronted with her 
own deep preferences, desires, and fears. Thus, attention to particularities of circum-
stance is essential to rich discussions of end-of-life issues. In this dissertation I will use 
Hilde Lindemann’s notion of counterstory to help develop this sensitivity to particularity 
in my discussion of suicidality. I will argue that an unintended lack of sensitivity on the 
part of bioethicists has created moral and conceptual problems in the bioethics literature 
on rational suicide. This lack of sensitivity has caused some bioethicists to deny that sui-
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cide may be a good death in situations in which I argue that it could, in fact, be a good 
death.  
The aim of my dissertation is to find ways in which the suffering of people who 
struggle with suicidality can be reduced. In some instances, this is going to involve grant-
ing suicidal people assistance in suicide. I will argue that it becomes morally appropriate 
to assist in suicide when appropriate death criteria have been met. In order for a person to 
live a good life, she must be able to die a good death whenever possible. The conclusion 
to this dissertation will argue that in some cases (like the case of Cathy that started this 
introduction), a good death might include suicide and a suicider might require assistance 
to achieve that good death. 
In order to argue for the superiority of the concept of appropriate death over the 
concept of rational suicide for determining when suicide and assisting in suicide is moral-
ly appropriate, considerable attention must be paid to the concept of rational suicide. I 
have already mentioned that there is a sense in which rational suicide literature can be 
understood as lacking empathy, but this is a symptom of the more general foundational 
problems in the rational suicide literature. While the first chapter will offer an exhaustive 
overview of the criteria used by bioethicists to define rationality in the rational suicide 
literature, the bulk of this dissertation will offer specific critique of this literature.   
After a thorough examination of the rational suicide literature, my second chapter 
will apply feminist critiques of bioethics and feminist critiques of rationality to the crite-
ria for rationality identified in the first chapter. I will argue that the rationality literature 
unjustifiably privileges the concept of the liberal individual over more social conceptions 
of the self. It also promotes the myth of value neutrality on the part of doctors, which 
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negatively affects the doctor/patient relationship and allows doctors and ethicists to ig-
nore the social realities of the medical enterprise and the ways in which these social reali-
ties change the nature of the interactions doctors have with their patients. In addition, as 
some feminists point out, medical training brings with it values that may run contrary to 
patient desires at the end of life. I will give general consideration to the way in which de-
nial of rationality has been used to marginalize certain populations in the past, and will 
argue that a similar marginalization happens to suiciders in the rational suicide literature.  
The third chapter will address this marginalization by bringing to bear a suicidal 
voice on this debate. I will offer an exegesis of Jean Améry’s On Suicide: A Discourse on 
Voluntary Death, which is an extended reflection on his experience of suicidality and the 
phenomenon of suicidality generally. I will frame this reflection in terms of Lindemann’s 
notion of counterstory, and present Améry’s account as a counterstory that stands op-
posed to the story told about the terminally ill by bioethicists in the rationality literature. 
While it is possible to understand bioethicists’ attempts to establish the possibility of ra-
tional suicide as trying to do the work of counterstory, ultimately this work turns into 
what Lindemann calls a hostage narrative, insofar as the terminal illness narrative devel-
oped by bioethicists further marginalizes the type of people who experience suicidality as 
Améry describes it. I will argue that as a hostage narrative, the terminal illness narrative 
developed by bioethicists must be rethought.  
The marginalization of suiciders also causes conceptual problems. If the ethical 
literature written on a population does not engage with the population it purports to serve, 
it becomes possible that the concepts used to speak about this population are inappropri-
ate to their lived experiences. The rational suicide literature has not actually considered 
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the testimony of many suiciders, and certainly not the testimony of a suicider who is 
not terminally ill. Since the experience of suiciders has not been given proper considera-
tion in the development of the concept of rational suicide, bioethicists have not recog-
nized that the ascription of rationality to suicidality is problematic. As examination of 
Améry’s narrative will show, extreme suicidality is rooted in an affective stance towards 
being in the world. This conceptual difficulty further reinforces the marginalization of 
certain types of suiciders.  
The fourth and final chapter of this dissertation will focus on the repercussions of 
what was discovered in the first several chapters. Rational suicide is too problematic, 
both conceptually and morally, to be the base upon which arguments for the moral per-
missibility of assisted suicide are made. The question becomes whether there might be 
another concept out there that might serve as this base. I will examine a similar move-
ment in the psychiatric literature that centers on the concept of appropriate death. I will 
outline what is meant by appropriate death and explain how, like rational suicide, it is an 
attempt to define the circumstances under which a person might die a good death. The 
concept and formation of appropriate death avoids the criticisms to which rational suicide 
falls prey. I will argue that suicide can be considered an appropriate death, and suggest 
that bioethicists should begin to look at appropriate death as a possible alternate founda-
tion upon which to base arguments for the moral permissibility of assisted suicide.  
This dissertation is concerned with questions of the possibility of a good death 
under non-ideal circumstances. It is motivated by the belief that many people can die 
good deaths, and that dying a good death is an important part of living a good life. Ulti-
mately, I suggest that a vision of the good life can include the practice and social ac-
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ceptance of suicidality and suicide. Anyone interested in questions surrounding the 
good life must deal with the fact that one choice human beings have in the face of life is 
to end it. It would be a hasty mistake to conclude that Cathy, in the case study above, is 
incapable of experiencing a good death through suicide. My dissertation will thus argue 
against the use of rational suicide as a guiding ethical concept in the bioethics literature, 
with the hope of applying the concept of “appropriate death” to help determine how the 
circumstances of a good death might be found for individuals like Cathy.	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CHAPTER ONE 
THE CONCEPT OF RATIONAL SUICIDE 
 There is no shortage of bioethics literature devoted to establishing the possibility 
of rational suicide, to defining what rational suicide is, or to establishing its moral per-
missibility. It is widely held that if some cases of suicide can be rational and it can be es-
tablished that a rational person might want to suicide, then it is possible that there might 
be neither moral reason to prohibit a person from suiciding, nor to prohibit another per-
son from providing the means by which that person might suicide. In most circumstances 
involving a rational adult, s/he is able to choose to act in a variety of different ways with-
out interference from others, even if that adult’s actions would seem reckless to most oth-
er people. For instance, since I am an adult, if I want to jump out of a plane with nothing 
but a backpack full of silk and find licensed professionals willing to help me do so, it 
would not be permissible for another person to prevent me from doing so. If I want to 
smoke a pack of cigarettes a day, never exercise, and avoid eating any fruits or vegetables, 
no one has the right to force me to make other, definitely healthier, decisions. In both of 
these instances, my loved ones are entitled to try to persuade me to do other than I wish. 
My friends might remind me that I am not a fan of heights, or tell me about the number of 
people killed skydiving every year. They might provide me with scientific evidence of 
the connection between a shortened lifespan and cigarette use. They might extol the bene-
fits of eating well and exercising. At the end of the day, however, if I want to visit the 
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McDonald’s drive-through while chain-smoking cigarettes on the way to a skydiving 
appointment, no person is morally justified in forcing me to do otherwise. In fact, my 
loved ones might very well run afoul of the law if they tried to force me to stop.  
If the principle of non-interference holds in most circumstances, even when 
someone is acting as recklessly as described above, we must ask about the limits to this 
principle. A number of bioethicists argue for what might initially seem like an extreme 
limit: even in cases of suicidality, no one is justified in interfering as long as the person 
who is suiciding is rational and the act of suicide itself can be established as rational giv-
en the person’s specific circumstances. Much like the other circumstances described, the 
only justification these bioethicists see for interfering in a rational adult’s life is if her ac-
tions bring harm to those around her. Some thinkers argue that, given the right circum-
stances and proper planning, a person’s suicide might not bring harm to others. Moreover, 
if a person meets certain criteria and can be shown to be rational, others might be morally 
permitted (or even required) to assist in the act of another person’s suicide. There is a 
great volume of bioethics literature devoted to establishing the moral permissibility of 
suicide and assisting in suicide based on establishing that the suicider and the particular 
act of suicide enacted by that suicider is rational.  
Yet there is something intuitively odd about the phrase “rational suicide.” For 
those who have had first-hand experience with suicide or the suicidal, pairing the word 
“rational” with “suicide,” an act that can seem impossible to justify and hard to contain, 
is almost an affront. This dissertation looks to explore this original intuition, and to 
ground and justify it. I contend that holding rationality as the foundational criterion for 
the moral permissibility of suicide or assistance in suicide is flawed. I believe this is the 
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case for three reasons. First, some of the criteria identified by bioethicists to establish 
rationality are flawed. Using the work of feminist thinkers, I will show how specific crite-
ria identified in the rationality literature are problematic. Second, building off of the work 
of Genevieve Lloyd and others, I will argue that the application of the concept of ration-
ality has been used to marginalize suicidal knowers and knowing in the rationality de-
bates, much like the concept of rationality has been used to marginalize women, minori-
ties and the disabled in other literature. Finally, even when understood in light of this his-
torical critique, there are conceptual issues with the ascription of rationality to the act of 
suicide or the person who wishes to suicide. In the face of suicide, rationality is rendered 
meaningless. 
Before expounding upon these critiques, however, we must establish how “ration-
ality” has been defined in the literature. It is helpful to have a cursory understanding of 
the origins of and the motivations behind the contemporary resurgence of discussions of 
the possibility of “rational” suicide before defining rational suicide. Although the project 
of identifying rational justification for suiciding has famously been around since the an-
cient stoics, it is best to understand the bioethical interest in the possibility of rational sui-
cide in terms of a reaction to two contemporary considerations. 
The bioethical discussion of rational suicide in part comes about as a reaction to 
the scientific model of suicide that views attempting suicide or suiciding as indicative of 
and caused by mental illness. The creation of the “suicidology” movement in the 1950s 
and 1960s brought on by the research of Edwin Shneidman, Norman Farberow, and Rob-
ert Litman, among others, brought with it an increased reliance on this “mental illness 
model” of suicide (Litman 1996, 2). Simply put, the mental illness model of suicide holds 
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that suicidality is a product or symptom of mental illness. The key to understanding 
and treating the phenomenon of suicide is understanding and treating the mental patholo-
gy of the suicidal person (cf. Shneidman 1996 and 2004, Edwards 1997, Biggar 2004). 
Although the empirical connection between mental illness and suicide cannot be 
denied (it has been estimated that up to 90% of suiciders were clinically depressed at the 
time of death, and some studies estimate that up to 10% of schizophrenics will suicide 
(Hewitt 2009)), many bioethicists point out that this does not exclude the possibility that 
some suicides are not caused by mental illness. As David M. Clarke reminds us, “the im-
portance of these observations [that is, the observation that mental illness is very often 
present with suicidality] does not lie in concluding that psychiatric illness ‘causes’ sui-
cide, but in that suicide rarely occurs in the absence of some persistent disturbance of 
mental functioning” (Clarke 1980, 457). Suicide, in the majority of cases, happens along-
side some mental irregularity, but this is not enough to prove that suiciding is always a 
result of mental illness. Empirical correlation does not necessarily mean that mental ill-
ness can “explain away” all instances or types of suicide.  
Even though suicides that are not directly attributable to mental illness may be ra-
re, these sorts of suicides are possible and garner a lot of attention when they occur. For 
instance, a recent case in England involving David Arnold and Elizabeth Arnold has 
sparked much controversy. The couple entered into a suicide pact five years earlier. 
When Elizabeth was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease and started to exhibit symp-
toms, the couple chose to enact their pact and overdosed on medication on July 13, 2012 
(Marsden 2014). In another highly publicized story, married couple Vladimir Fiser and 
Marika Ferber took their lives by jumping out of the window of their apartment building 
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in order to put “an end to [Ferber’s] chronic pain” (Oved 2013). This story gained 
much press because both Fiser and Ferber were holocaust survivors with an imagination-
capturing love story. In both of these cases, the communities each couple were from re-
acted sympathetically, and there are no shortage of comparable stories covered in a simi-
larly sympathetic fashion (c.f., McCormack 2013, Hughes 2014, Donaldson James 2010, 
Smith 2014, Chawkins 2013, Levinson 2013.) In a field that relies heavily on autonomy 
in its discussions of morality, stories like these, which establish that suicidality can be 
exhibited in persons whose judgment is not impaired by mental illness, leave room for 
the possibility that suiciding might be an option open to an autonomous person (cf. Bar-
nard 1980, Cohen-Almagor 2001, Colby 2006). 
The second motivating factor in the discussion of rational suicide stems from con-
sideration of a much broader population than the mentally ill. People are living longer 
and under conditions that could not have been imagined fifty years ago. The need for un-
covering whether there might be cases in which the act of suicide might be rational be-
came especially pressing because of medical advancements that occurred around the 
same time that the mental illness model of suicide was taking hold. Advances in medical 
technologies in the early and mid 20th century (e.g., the cultivation of penicillin and other 
antibiotics, the development of artificial respirators, etc.) created a number of questions 
surrounding the way human beings die. An increased life span does not necessarily bring 
with it a similar quality of life, and worries about people being kept alive too long and 
under circumstances they found objectionable became an issue. There was a practical 
need to decide what might be considered suicide and what might not, as well as to estab-
lish whether doctor assistance in suicide might ever be permissible. Many new ethical 
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questions came from the advent of these life-sustaining technologies. Is refusing life-
sustaining treatment suicide? Is withdrawing life-sustaining treatment suicide? Are doc-
tors morally culpable for the death of a patient who is taken off a respirator or who refus-
es water and nutrition? Is there a significant moral difference between stopping life-
sustaining treatment and providing drugs that will end a patient’s life? (c.f., Baergen 
2000; Barnard 1985; Beauchamp 1996; Biggar 2004; Brock, 1993; Callahan, 1973, 1993; 
Cohen-Almagor 2001; Dworkin 1993; Dyck 2002; Falconer 2009; Gorsuch 2006; Hendin 
1998; Kaplan 2007; Keown 1995; Lachs 1994, 1998; Lester 2006; Loewy and Springer 
Loewy 2000; Matthews 1998; McMahan 2002; Novak 1975; Rachels 1986; Ramsey 
1980; Rosenfeld 2004). 
With these developments, determining exactly what constitutes suicide and if sui-
cide could ever be a rational act chosen by a rational person became a timely and im-
portant project. The mental illness model of suicide justifies acting paternalistically when 
someone expresses the wish to suicide. However, if it can be established that suicidality 
is not always indicative of mental illness, that is to say that some suicidal people are not 
mentally ill, and if it can be established that there might be some situations in which sui-
cide might be a rational response, many bioethicists argue that we must then take serious-
ly the need to establish the conditions under which suiciding might be rational. Although 
a particular act of suicide’s being rational does not guarantee that it is moral, many think-
ers hold, implicitly or explicitly, that establishing rationality is necessary in order to en-
tertain the possibility that suiciding or assisting in suicide can be moral (cf. Battin 1980, 
1998, and 1999; Beauchamp 1999; Brandt 1975; Brock 1999; Davis 1998; Diekstra 1986; 
Dworkin et al. 1998; Goldfarb 1983; Lebacqz and Englehardt 1977; Maris 1986; Mat-
 19 
thews 1998; Mayo 1986; Werth 1995). This chapter will address the varied ways in 
rationality is defined in this literature.  
 Margaret Battin (1982) provides a useful starting point in her Ethical Issues in 
Suicide. She explains that there are two categories under which the criteria to establish 
rationality in the bioethics literature fall. These categories come about as a result of “ra-
tionality” being ascribed to different parts of the issue at hand, and can be mapped onto 
the factors that motivated the development of this literature. The first category of criteria 
looks to determine the rationality of the person who wishes to suicide (Battin 1982, 132). 
The criteria in this category stand in direct opposition to the prevalent and influential 
mental illness model of suicide, and provide a foundation for establishing that not all sui-
cidal people are irrational. Although Battin identified three criteria that fall under this 
grouping, my research has uncovered five criteria in the literature that fall into this cate-
gory: the person looking to suicide must have the ability to reason, have a realistic 
worldview, be adequately informed, not display high amounts of ambivalence, and be 
free in the decision making process. 
The second category of criteria establishes the rationality of the act of suicide. 
These criteria are heavily shaped by the second motivating factor in the creation of the 
bioethics literature. After establishing the rationality of the person who wishes to suicide, 
these criteria establish that the particular details of the life of the person who wishes to 
suicide are such that the act of suicide could be a rational act for that person (Battin 1982, 
132). Again, although Battin identifies two criteria in this category, I have found five cri-
teria in the literature that meet the stipulations for inclusion in this category: the act must 
not bring harm to the person who wishes to suicide, the act must be in his interest, he 
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must find himself in a hopeless condition, he must consider the impact of his actions 
on those around him, and finally, the act must be understandable according to the com-
munity in which he finds himself.  
Rationality of Person 
As noted above, the first group of criteria looks to establish the rationality of the 
person who wishes to suicide. These criteria show that the person has the cognitive ca-
pacities necessary for rationality, the motivation to be rational, and exists in a mental and 
emotional climate conducive to the exercise of rationality. Although I will discuss five 
separate criteria the rationality literature uses to speak to the rationality of persons, it is 
helpful to think of these criteria as a “breakdown” of a more colloquial understanding of 
what it is to be a rational person. When one says a person is rational, what one normally 
means by this is that the rational person is calm, is desirous of understanding the situation 
in which she finds herself in order to make an appropriate decision regarding the situation, 
and that she is not mentally impaired in any way. Many people meet this received defini-
tion much of the time. The five criteria provided by bioethicists are simply an attempt to 
codify this definition and show that it is possible that a person who wishes to end her life 
can still meet these same standards. 
Ability to Reason 
Perhaps the most common criterion in the literature used to establish rationality, 
and typically the one that is most associated with rationality, is the requirement that the 
person who wishes to suicide has the ability to reason. Against critics like Devine (1998), 
many bioethicists hold that the ability to reason is achievable by someone who is inclined 
toward death (c.f., Barry 1994; Cholbi 2011; Choron 1972; Decker 1977; Dunshee 1994; 
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Edwards 1997; Francis 1980; Hewitt 2010; Humphry 1986; MacDonald 1999; Malts-
berger 1994; Marker 1999; Mayo 1980, 1983, and 1986; Motto 1980, 1981, 1994, and 
1999; Nelson 1984; Pipel and Amsel 2011; Siegel 1986; Slater 1980; Saunders and 
Valente 1988; Sullivan 1980; Werth 1999).  
Battin (1999) explains that, “For a person to be able to reason implies at least two 
distinct things: that moving from the premises from which she begins to the conclusion 
she reaches, she maintains good logical form (that is, does not make mistakes in logic), 
and that she can foresee the consequences of the positions she adopted or the actions she 
plans to undertake (that is, she knows what will probably happen because of what she is 
doing)” (13). 
 Following Battin (1980, 1982, 1994, 1999), other bioethicists explain the ability 
to reason according to her requirement that a person’s thinking “maintains good logical 
form.” Slater (1980) holds that we must respect someone’s decision to die when that de-
cision “has been reached on sound principles” (200-201).  Pipel and Amsel (2011) echo 
this when they explain that many rational suicide proponents require there to be nothing 
“technically wrong” with the suicidal person’s reasoning, and although the authors are 
critical of those thinkers who hold this criterion in itself to be sufficient for establishing 
the ability to reason, they recognize the importance of this criterion as a starting point in 
the discussion of rational suicide. 
Cholbi (2011) briefly mentions the need for a person to have the “ability to reason 
about what she perceives, making appropriate inferences, etc...” (91). Previously in the 
text, however, Cholbi also implicitly expands upon this requirement by describing it neg-
atively. He explains that many would not hold it to be morally permissible for children to 
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suicide because children are incapable of adult levels of rationality. He holds that chil-
dren often do not have the formal reasoning abilities required to decide what is dictated 
by the child’s interest, and that a child’s ability to move from the consideration of her in-
terests (premises) to a decision about the best way to achieve those interests in action 
(conclusion) is lacking (89). 
Werth (1999) and Werth and Cobia (1995) present a particularly interesting voice 
in the bioethics debate on rational suicide, as they draw the criteria necessary for a sui-
cide to be considered rational from two national studies that gathered data on how practi-
tioners define rational suicide. One of the defining characteristics of rational suicide that 
remained consistent in both studies was that the person “has engaged in a sound decision-
making process” (Werth 1999, 5). Although the components of this decision-making pro-
cess extend beyond the simple ability to move from premises to conclusions soundly, that 
ability serves as the basis for the other components (discussed below). 
Asking whether such a thing as rational suicide exists, Marker (1999) breaks this 
question down into four separate questions. Three of these questions he identifies explic-
itly speak to the suicidal person’s ability to reason, and two touch upon “reason” in terms 
of good logical form. Marker believes that a suicide can be rational if logical conclusions 
are drawn from the starting “premises” of a person’s particular situation, and that the de-
cisions about actions based on these conclusions are “reasoned” (xxi). 
Edwards (1997) lists several criteria for rationality that flesh out Battin’s under-
standing of the ability to reason as logical thinking, but refrains from using the phrase 
“ability to reason.” He writes that being labeled “rational” often requires,  
...thinking logically and avoiding logically contradictory beliefs; having 
factual beliefs which are largely supported by empirical evidence, or at 
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least avoiding factual beliefs which are plainly falsified by experience; having 
and being able to give reasons for one’s behavior and beliefs; thinking 
clearly and intelligibly, and avoiding confusion and nonsense; having and 
exhibiting a capacity for impartiality or fair-mindedness in judging and 
adopting beliefs... (55).  
 
His list of criteria is helpful. Although it moves us slightly beyond the strict logical valid-
ity Battin requires, this more common use of the term “logical” and the other criteria 
listed by Edwards follows the sentiment of many of the thinkers discussed above. It is not 
only the case that proper logical form in thinking must be achieved in order for a person 
to be considered rational, but also that thinking is clear. Plenty of valid syllogisms could 
be formed that are nonetheless unsound.  
Edward’s list also begins to point us to Battin’s second explanation of the ability 
to reason. Reason requires that one be able to foresee the consequences of actions. In  
addition to the items on his list already presented, he also includes, “being able to distin-
guish means from ends and being able to identify processes and manifest behaviors 
which likely will result in the realization of consciously envisioned goals” as necessary to 
establish a person’s rationality (55). While this is certainly more extensive a requirement 
than merely being able to predict possible consequences of actions, the spirit is similar. 
Part of foreseeing consequences involves being able to distinguish between the actions 
designed to bring about an event or state of affairs (means), and the event or state of af-
fairs desired (ends/consequences). Blending means and ends can be indicative of magical 
thinking.  
Marker (1999) echoes Battin closely when she explains that rational suicide 
would require that a person has, “reasonably considered current and probable future con-
ditions...” and “...considered the impact that such action would have on one’s self and 
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others” (xxi). “Foreseeing” consequences here is broken down into two steps: consid-
eration of possibilities of different conditions that might affect decisions and consequenc-
es, and consideration of the impact of the decisions when made. 
Prado (2010) requires that a very particular consequence be foreseen. “I make 
clear that to be rational, reasoning and enactment of suicide must be done in full under-
standing that death may be and most likely is personal annihilation” (10). He requires a 
very specific understanding of the relationship between action and consequences based 
on skepticism about the afterlife and a restriction of reasoning to that which is bound by 
the observable world. 
A move as common as offering an explanation of what “reasonable” or “the abil-
ity to reason” means is simply listing “the ability to reason/being reasonable” among their 
criteria for a rational suicide without an attempt to define this criterion. Physician Richard 
MacDonald (1999) appeals to dictionary definitions of rationality, which usually require 
that an action or person, “has reasoning or understanding, and is, therefore, reasonable...” 
(108-109). Clarke (1999) requires that the suicidal person have “good reasons” for sui-
ciding in order for it to be rational (458). Motto (1999) explains that for a suicide to be 
rational, the person suiciding must be “capable of forming reasoned judgment” (124). 
Choron (1972) requires that “the reasoning of the suicidal person is in no way impaired” 
(96-97). Prado (2010) requires that a “self-killing” be “soundly reasoned” (10). Hewitt 
(2010) lists the criterion of coherence in thought, which offers us a bit more information 
than the term “reasonable,” but not much. For many bioethicists, a person being labeled 
“reasonable” is self-explanatory.   
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Mayo (1980) expands the criteria of the ability to reason by insisting that one 
not only be able to reason, but that one must be committed to reasoning. Unlike Brandt 
(1975), who is concerned that depression might make reasonable decision making more 
difficult, Mayo explains that,  
an integral feature of acute despair is often that such a commitment is to-
tally lacking. The person in such a condition is one of the most obvious 
examples of someone for whom being reasonable may have no appeal 
whatsoever. Worse yet is the fact that there seem to be situations which 
not merely incline people to be unreasonable, but virtually require it (134).  
 
So not only is it the case that some situations incline or require someone to be unreasona-
ble, but that in instances of despair or acute depression, a person might abandon the de-
sire to be reasonable. For Mayo, then, in order for the person considering suicide to be 
considered rational, he must want to be reasonable in addition to actually being reasona-
ble. Motivation must be present. 
Although Mayo is the only bioethicist found in this literature review to explicitly 
state the need for a person to be committed to being reasonable in order to be considered 
rational, we see a similar, although implicit, call for such a commitment in Humphry 
(1986). Humphry requires that a number of parameters be met in order for a suicide to be 
rational. Many of these parameters go above and beyond what other bioethicists require 
(e.g., leaving notes of apology to hotel staff if a person kills herself in a hotel room). Re-
quiring of a suicidal person this level of attention to detail also implicitly requires a 
commitment to reason (173). Planning your death becomes much like planning any other 
major event--a wedding, a party, or a vacation. A number of other bioethicists obliquely 
mention this requirement (e.g., Werth 1999, Clarke 1999, Goldblatt 1999, Jamison 1995, 
Siegel 1986, Diekstra 1986, Mayo 1993, Prado 1990). 
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Rationality also includes a “negative” requirement closely connected to the 
positive ability to reason. A person must be free from illness, disability, or even strong 
emotion, that would affect her ability to engage in a sound decision making process. Je-
rome Motto (1999) calls this “a clear sensorium,” which, “implies that any cognitive def-
icit present...does not interfere with perception or reasoning” (124). A suicidal person 
cannot have any mental impairment that would affect her ability to engage in a clear rea-
soning process.  
A great deal of the literature requires that no mental illness be present in a person 
who wishes to suicide in order for that person and her request to be considered rational. 
Most bioethicists only list mental illness or psychological disorders as their concern, but 
some forms of specific illness are considered. Widiger and Rinaldi (1983) are particularly 
concerned with the presence of psychotic disorders. Several thinkers are concerned spe-
cifically with depression and the effects it has on a person’s ability to reason. Brandt 
(1975) famously claims that a person’s suffering from depression rules out the possibility 
that she can rationally choose to suicide because depression “primitivizes” mental capaci-
ties and makes it difficult to reason about probabilities (5).  
Many more thinkers mention the absence of general mental illness as a require-
ment for the possibility of rationality. Goldblatt (1999) questions the possibility of ration-
al suicide because he claims that mental illness is present in “nearly all cases of suicide” 
(115). Jamison (1999) argues that a “person’s mental health treatment history, including 
prior diagnoses for depression and other conditions” as well as that person’s “response to 
treatment recommendations” need to be evaluated before a person can be declared ration-
al (134). 
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Some thinkers’ requirements for a “clear sensorium” are even more stringent 
than the absence of mental illness or a history of mental illness. In an early paper, Motto 
(1980) proposed what many would consider an extreme criterion. He claims that all “in-
tense emotional conflicts” would conflict with a person’s ability to reason and that one 
cannot consider a person with intense emotional conflicts to be rational (216). 
Cholbi (2011) echoes Motto’s concerns about strong emotion. He writes, 
A second worry is that suicidal thinking is sometimes triggered by crises 
or stressful situations that tend to distort our thinking. For some suicidal 
individuals, their preoccupation with dying is sparked by a specific stress-
or, such as a professional setback, the end of a romantic relationship, or 
the death of a loved one. Such evidence produces powerful emotions, in-
cluding grief, loneliness, or anger (93). 
 
The connection between the ability to reason and the absence of strong emotion is seen 
clearly when considered along with the fact that some bioethicists require a commitment 
to reason. In the moments a person experiences intense emotion, such commitments are 
often forgotten (on absence of mental illness and strong emotion, also see Barry 1994; 
Battin 1982; Choron 1972; Clements 1980; Decker 1977; Diekstra 1986; Dunshee 1994; 
Francis 1980; Kjervik 1984; Lebacqz and Engelhardt 1979; Mayo 1993; Motto 1983 and 
1994; and Sullivan 1980).  
Realistic Worldview 
        Another common criterion for establishing the rationality of the person who wish-
es to suicide is the requirement that the person have a realistic worldview (c.f., Barry 
1994; Battin 1982, 1999; Cholbi 2011; Decker 1977; Devine 1980 and 1998; Francis 
1980; Graber 1981; Kjervik 1984; Martin 1980; Motto 1980, 1981, 1999; Saunders and 
Valente 1988; Siegel 1986; Sullivan 1980; Werth 1996, 1999). Most thinkers merely list 
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“realistic worldview” or “realistic assessment” of the individual world of the suicider 
as a criterion necessary to establish rational suicide without delineating that which consti-
tutes “realistic” and without defining “worldview” (e.g., Barry 1994, Decker 1977, Fran-
cis 1980, Sullivan 1980, Graber 1981, Kjervik 1984, Martin 1980, Saunders and Valente 
1988, Siegel 1986, Barry 1994, Werth 1999, and Cholbi 2011).  Generally, in the cases 
where thinkers do not carefully explain what they mean by realistic, they mean having a 
non-delusional worldview. 
Other thinkers spend considerable time defining what they mean by “realistic” 
and specifying what is captured in a “worldview.” One might think that because of the 
assumption of the transparency of this criterion by a large number of bioethicists, those 
thinkers who chose to define what they mean by realistic worldview would offer defini-
tions that are quite similar. This is not the case, however. In the thinkers who do work to 
establish the defining characteristics of this criterion, the realistic worldview criterion 
contains both weak and strong versions, from very lax ideas on what is required for a per-
son to have a realistic worldview to very rigid ideas. 
        One of the most extreme versions of an “unrealistic worldview” criterion is the 
worldview of a schizophrenic. Battin (1999) writes, “Most extreme is that of the person 
with schizophrenia, based on the bizarre beliefs about the nature of the world” (15). Be-
lief in hallucinations or paranoid thoughts about the world makes it impossible for a (cur-
rently psychotic) schizophrenic to be expected to perceive the world realistically enough 
to be able to make assessments about her current life circumstances and her place in the 
world, and then to render a judgment about whether she should kill herself. There would 
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be too much risk that she would be making the decision to suicide based on an under-
standing of her world that is incorrect (i.e., based on a paranoid delusion). 
        That the worldview of a schizophrenic is unrealistic is not a remarkable view to 
hold, though calling a worldview realistic based solely on the absence of positive schizo-
phrenic symptoms is. More than the absence of delusions and hallucinations is needed to 
establish that a person has a “realistic” worldview. On the opposite extreme of the defini-
tions of “realistic,” we find very strict and demanding versions of a realistic worldview. 
For instance, as mentioned above, Prado (2010) takes a strong approach to what it means 
to have a “realistic” worldview. He explains that, “…suicide must be done in full under-
standing that death may be and most likely is personal annihilation,” in order for it to be 
considered rational (10). According to Prado, then, in order for a person to have a realis-
tic worldview (and a realistic view on suicide), she must hold very particular metaphysi-
cal beliefs, or at least be willing to renounce the beliefs she does hold. A religious person 
who believes in the afterlife who was unwilling to deny this belief, or at least write it off 
as unlikely, would not meet Prado’s standards for having a realistic worldview, and thus 
be too irrational to meet the standards of a rational suicide. Given how common religious 
faiths are that bring with them a belief in an afterlife, this requirement effectively bans a 
significant portion of the living from meeting the standards of rationality in place for ra-
tional suicide. 
        Prado exemplifies an extreme view, however. Most philosophers walk a much 
more culturally sensitive line. When talking about religious suicides, Battin (1982) ex-
plains that, 
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In order that a suicide to count as rational, it is only necessary that it be based 
on a worldview which is consonant with the surrounding culture; we do 
not consider whether the worldview of the culture as a whole is realistic or 
not. There may of course be considerable variation in world views within 
a culture; contemporary western culture, for instance, includes both those 
whose view of the universe is materialistic and those whose view includes 
spiritual entities; individuals of neither sort would be counted irrational in 
a suicide predicated upon such beliefs, though adherents of the opposite 
view would surely regard them as foolish (136-137). 
 
According to Battin, then, in order to decide that a person’s worldview is realistic, one 
must take into account the cultures and subcultures in which that person finds herself, 
even if the person considering suicide happens to be part of the same dominant culture as 
oneself. For example, one would have to account for religious diversity among the mem-
bers of their culture. Although I might be an atheist materialist, this would not mean that I 
could label a Christian who believes in the afterlife irrational, especially if the way she 
conducts her daily life shows she is rational. For example, a Christian suffering from ter-
minal cancer who wanted to save her family the expense of further treatment and the pain 
of watching her die slowly would not necessarily need to be labeled irrational, even if she 
was comforted by her firm belief that her death would not mean her personal annihilation. 
        There remains a problem, however: not all cultures have realistic worldviews, and 
not all people within cultures hold the beliefs of that culture in the same way. For in-
stance, how are we to distinguish between the Branch Davidians and run-of-the-mill 
Protestants? These sorts of questions are especially problematic for practitioners. Motto 
(1980) believes psychiatrists who are trying to determine whether to provide the means 
by which a patient might suicide must have more specific standards than Battin’s call for 
cultural sensitivity would allow. According to Motto, the psychiatrist must make it a pri-
ority, whether or not suicide is a consideration, to determine whether a patient’s 
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worldview is realistic. Motto admits, however, that the only standard by which he has 
to judge other people’s perceptions of reality is his own. 
Some persons have a view of reality so different from mine that I do not 
hesitate to interfere with their right to suicide. Others’ perceptions are so 
like mine that I cannot intercede. The big problem is that large group in 
between. 
 In the final analysis, then, when a decision has to be made, what a 
psychiatrist calls “realistic” is whatever looks realistic to him. At the mo-
ment of truth, that is all any person can offer. This inherent human limita-
tion in itself is a reality that accounts for a great deal of inevitable chaos in 
the world; it is an article of faith that not to make such an effort would 
create even greater chaos... (214). 
 
Motto is acutely aware of the fallibility that is part of human existence. As limited, per-
spectival creatures, it is impossible to understand the entirety of reality. In some very ex-
treme circumstances (e.g., a schizophrenic patient), it is simple to justify calling a pa-
tient’s worldview unrealistic. In many cases concerning “that large group in between,” 
however, it becomes more difficult. 
        This “large group in between” probably constitutes a number of different sorts of 
cases, but Battin gives us a particularly troubling example of the sort of  individuals who 
might fall into this group. Battin (1999) points out that, “an individual may have a rela-
tively realistic picture of the world as a whole but fail to have a realistic conception of his 
own life situation, including his identity, position in the world, and on his particular tal-
ents, abilities, and disabilities” (15). This is the distorted “worldview” of the egomaniac 
or the person who suffers from cripplingly low self-esteem. Although these sorts of peo-
ple may have a realistic view of the outside world (e.g., they do not believe the President 
of the United States is secretly an alien), their self-conceptions and understandings of the 
places they occupy in that realistic world are so skewed, that it distorts their understand-
ing of the network of relationships which make up the world. For example, a lonely per-
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son suffering with the effects of chronically low self-esteem might be aware of the av-
enues by which she could make friends (karate class, church group, hanging out in the 
dog park) and even be aware that other people are actively seeking friends, but because of 
how she views herself, she might believe any attempt to make friends would be futile. 
Adequate Information 
Many bioethicists require that the person looking to rational suicide be adequately 
informed (c.f., Battin 1980, 1982, and 1999; Brandt 1975; Cholbi 2011; Clarke 1999; 
Decker 1977; Devine 1980 and 1998; Dunshee 1994; Edwards 1997; Humphry 1986; 
Jamison 1995 and 1999; Kjervik 1984; MacDonald 1999; Maltsberger 1994; Marker 
1999; Motto 1981; Nelson 1984; Prado 2010; Sullivan 1980; Werth 1996). This criterion 
walks the line between specifying that a person have particular internal capacities and 
requiring something of the factual situation of the person. As such, we can understand 
being adequately informed in two ways. First, there is the actual state of being adequately 
informed. Being adequately informed happens when a person has the information they 
need to make a decision. Second, there is the desire and the requisite effort that goes into 
becoming adequately informed. An example might be helpful here. 
About a year ago, when I was visiting faculty at a small school in the South, I 
made the move from faculty housing into an apartment not owned by the college in order 
to save money. I decided to plan this move at the end of my first semester, which re-
quired me to conduct the apartment search while I was teaching full-time for the first 
time. Salem, Virginia was not a renter’s market, so my options were limited. When I vis-
ited the apartment I eventually ended up moving into, it seemed to suit my needs well. It 
was small, cheap, bright, and less than a mile from campus. It just so happened, however, 
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that when I went to visit the apartment, all of the windows were open. Although I 
asked the questions I was used to asking of the building managers who had shown me my 
apartments in the past, and I looked at every nook and cranny of the apartment, when I 
moved in, I was shocked to discover it reeked of stale cigarette smoke. The temperature 
had dropped twenty degrees and the windows were closed. Having just moved six months 
before from a city in which it was exceedingly rare to find an apartment building that al-
lowed smoking indoors, and where all leases I had ever signed stipulated smoking was 
forbidden, I did not think about the reality of moving to a new, southern, small town 
without a real rental market, and I paid the price. By my understanding of the situation, I 
paid this price, not because I did not want to be adequately informed, but because I hap-
pened to lack an important piece of information about which I did not know I needed to 
ask. I had done what I thought was an adequate amount of research, and what certainly 
would have been an adequate amount of research in Chicago. Despite my desire, however, 
I lacked information necessary to make a totally rational (that is, adequately informed) 
decision. I did not, however, lack the brute reasoning skills necessary for rationality.  
There is a second read of this event, however, given to me by a close friend. 
While I was complaining to her about my situation, she asked me a very pointed ques-
tion: did I “miss” the smell because some part of me did not want to find anything wrong 
with the apartment? I was tired and stressed during my apartment search, hoping to move 
with little fuss. Was it possible that I did not actually want to be adequately informed? 
This question gave me pause. It is possible that I ignored certain facts  (namely, the ciga-
rette hanging out of my building manager’s mouth as I walked up to visit the apartment 
for the first time) in order to paint a picture of the apartment I wanted. I admit I may not 
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have wanted to be adequately informed, nor did I realize how much my desire to save 
money outweighed my desire to avoid living in a dumpy apartment. As mentioned above, 
one way of understanding being adequately informed is having all information pertinent 
to a situation. Although it is not common to see it listed explicitly, some bioethicists do 
expressly require that a person be adequately informed about her own desires and how 
they affect her understanding of a situation (e.g., how my desire to save money would 
affect my first visit to the apartment), in addition to being adequately informed of the 
facts of a situation. 
The most well known expression of the first of these requirements, that a person 
be adequately informed about her own desires, comes in Brandt (1975): 
The basic question a person must answer, in order to determine which 
world-course is best or rational for him to choose, is which he would 
choose under conditions of optimal use of information, when all of his de-
sires are taken into account (4). 
 
A person must be aware of the desires she has regarding all facets of her life in order to 
make a rational decision about something that would impact the fulfillment of desires in 
all areas of her life, and the decision to suicide is perhaps the extreme example of this sort 
of decision. Suiciding cuts off all future possibilities--it renders all future world-courses 
null because it is an action taken to eliminate the possibility of a future. Even if the re-
quirement that a subject be informed about her own desires is not explicitly mentioned by 
other thinkers, a case could be made that this is assumed given the extremeness of the 
consequences brought about by this sort of decision. This is especially true for those 
thinkers who also require that in order for an act to be rational, it must work for the ful-
fillment of the desires and interests of the person who acts (discussed below). For in-
stance, Battin (1999) explains that the rationality of a person’s choices regarding suicide 
 35 
requires that a person be aware of “likely reactions to deprivations and losses” (18). 
Being able to gauge reactions to what is lost during illness or because of reduced func-
tioning implies that a person knows how she would like her future world to unfold (the 
desires she has for the world she lives in) and that she be able to reasonably assess how 
she might react to the thwarting of those desires brought on by illness.  
This awareness of subjective desires and how the thwarting of these desires might 
affect a subject points to the much more common way in which a person is required to be 
adequately informed in order to be considered rational. To understand one’s desires, if 
those desires are to realistically reflect the subject’s current situation, also necessitates 
adequate information regarding the facts of the particular state a person finds herself in at 
present, as well as adequate information about how her situation might change and what 
opportunities might be open or closed to her in the future because of these changes. In the 
case of the apartment example, in order to be adequately informed, I would have needed 
to have asked and have had answers to all relevant questions about the terms of my lease. 
Even if none of my neighbors currently smoked, the fact that they were allowed to do so 
because the lease did not prohibit it should have been factored into my decision. A person 
must be adequately informed about the current reality of her situation, as well as potential 
future outcomes of her situation. 
The need to be adequately informed about present circumstances is of vital, real-
world importance in the case of suicide. Given that several people suicide every year who 
believe they have a terminal illness, but are posthumously shown not to not be ill, the im-
portance of being adequately informed about the basic facts of the situation in which a 
person finds himself cannot be overestimated (Battin 1982, 137). Edwards (1997) ex-
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plains that rationality involves “having factual beliefs which are adequately supported 
by empirical evidence” (55). If a person believes that he has terminal cancer, but does not 
have that suspicion confirmed by a doctor, any decision he makes based on the mistaken 
belief he has cancer is not a rational decision.  
Moreover, a person must be adequately informed about not only big-picture con-
siderations regarding present circumstances, such as whether he has the disease he as-
sumes he has, but also the details of that situation. In the case of a person with a terminal 
illness who is considering suicide, she must know what disease she has, the current 
treatments and technologies used to combat that illness, and perhaps the status of her fi-
nancial situation. As Motto (1999) writes, in order for a suicide decision to be rational, it 
must be, “based on a thorough understanding and realistic assessment of all of the availa-
ble and pertinent facts” (124). This sentiment is echoed by many other bioethicists (c.f., 
Battin 1980, 1982 and 1999; Brandt 1975; Clarke 1999; Devine 1980 and 1998; Edwards 
1997; Humphry 1986; Jamison 1995 and 1999; Kjervik 1984; MacDonald 1999; Marker 
1999; Motto 1981; Nelson 1984). 
Additionally, a person must make attempts to become informed about how her 
current situation might change. Marker (1999) explains that a person must have “reason-
ably considered current and probable future conditions” (xxi) for her suicide to be labeled 
“rational.” Clarke (1999) speaks of this requirement as “‘imagining’ all possible conse-
quences” (458), and thus adds an active, imaginative element to the task. Motto (1999) 
requires not only that a person consider future alternatives, but also that they consider the 
effect of “temporizing” (124). That is to say, a person must consider not only what her 
 37 
future might look like, but also what effect time might have on the seeing or imagining 
itself.  
Even more common than the (explicit) requirements that a person be adequately 
informed about her own desires and the present situation in which she finds herself is the 
requirement that she be aware of alternatives regarding possible future actions and the 
outcomes of those actions. Brandt (1975) labels these possible “future world-courses.”  
The person who is contemplating suicide is obviously making a choice be-
tween future world-courses: the world-course that includes his demise, say, 
an hour from now, and several possible ones that contain his demise at a 
later point. One cannot have precise knowledge about many features of the 
later group of world-courses, but it is certain that they will all end with 
death some (possibly short) time from now (4). 
 
In order to choose suicide as a rational alternative to life, one must consider the possible 
paths (the possible “future world-courses”) one’s life might take. Even if he has a termi-
nal illness, if a person kills himself without taking into account that the last few months 
of his life might allow him to mend rifts with loved ones or to finish a project he had 
been working on for years, this would not be considered rational suicide.  
Some bioethicists explicitly require that a suicidal person speak with a physician 
about future possibilities. For instance, Jamison (1999) requires that the,  
person’s understanding and response to his or her condition, diagnosis, 
and prognosis, including efforts to obtain a confirming medical opinion, 
and to discuss with his or her physician unresolved symptoms and discom-
fort, quality of life concerns, and treatment options and alternatives (134).  
 
This sort of information-gathering requirement is often also accompanied by a require-
ment that alternatives to suicide are considered. Nelson (1984) writes that only “after a 
thorough and concerned search for life-enhancing alternatives” can a person say that they 
have nothing for which to live and thus be in a position to consider suicide rationally 
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(1330). This is required by a number of thinkers (c.f., Barry 1994, Dunshee 1994, 
Francis 1980, Humphry 1986, Mayo 1983, Motto 1981, Sullivan 1980).   
There can be a difference between having a conversation with a physician and be-
coming adequately informed, however. Every day, people have conversations with their 
physicians that they they do not understand. Anyone who has been friends with a physi-
cian knows that they sometimes speak their own expert language. Cholbi (2011) brings to 
the fore the difficulty non-experts might face in becoming adequately informed about cer-
tain situations. He provides us with helpful analogies by which to understand the differ-
ence between being adequately informed and merely gathering information. He distin-
guishes between knowing and appreciating the facts of a situation, and offers another 
level of nuance to the requirement that a person be adequately informed in order to be 
considered rational. As he claims: 
To know a fact is to stand in a particular cognitive relationship to it, to 
acknowledge or recognize its truth. But to appreciate a fact is to stand in a 
particular evaluative relationship to the fact, to know why that fact is im-
portant and to utilize that fact appropriately in her subsequent thinking. 
Thus, a person can often be said to know a certain fact without actually 
appreciating it. For example, I may tell a friend that I received a 1952 Wil-
lie Mays baseball card as a birthday gift. After I relate that fact to my 
friend, he knows it. But he may not appreciate it because he does not know 
other facts which, if known, would convey the significance of this fact. He 
may not know, for instance, that Mays is my favorite player or that the 
1952 card, being his rookie card, is rare and expensive. He knows that I 
received the card, but he does not fully appreciate the significance of that 
fact. This example suggests that appreciating a fact, as contrasted with 
merely knowing it, can involve knowing other facts with which it is logi-
cally related and which explain the significance of that fact. In other in-
stances, lack of relevant experience can block appreciation of a fact. Sup-
pose that my neighbor is a renowned connoisseur of fine wine and tells me 
that he recently tried a vintage whose nose reminded him of Beluga caviar. 
I have never tried Beluga caviar, and in fact have almost no experience 
with the taste of caviar. For me, the comparison of the wine's nose to Be-
luga caviar simply fails to register. Since I trust my neighbor’s expertise in 
wine tasting, I could be said to know that the wine’s nose suggests Beluga 
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caviar. Yet I do not appreciate that fact, for I do not quite know what it is that I 
know. My own lack of experience with the relevant facts precludes my 
understanding of the significance of the comparison. Hence, we can fail to 
appreciate a fact when our inexperience blocks an understanding of that 
fact’s significance (94-95). 
 
These examples make clear what is at stake. In the first example, a friend might need to 
do a little bit of work to do more than simply know that his friend has a baseball card. He 
must become adequately informed to appreciate the true nature of his birthday friend’s 
windfall. In this case, it requires some knowledge of Willie Mays’ career, the baseball 
card market, as well as particular information about the card his friend received as a gift. 
It also requires that he become more informed about his friend, as well. He must learn 
something about his friend’s “relationship” with Mays to fully appreciate the significance 
of his receiving the card. Even in this simple example, multiple types of information are 
necessary to adequately appreciate the significance of what could be understood as a 
small piece of cardboard. 
 The second example makes the requirement of adequate information about a par-
ticular, present situation even more stringent. In order to really appreciate something like 
a fine wine, considerable experience, and perhaps expertise, is necessary. A glass of wine 
is not an object that stands on its own for an expert. It hails from a particular region, it 
resembles other wines, and it may have a peculiar history. Additionally, in the tasting, the 
connoisseur has access to different dimensions of taste, as well as the words by which to 
label them. Although a wine expert might tell me why the particular glass I am drinking 
is of high quality, all I will be capable of saying is whether I like it. Not only must I be 
adequately informed of my desires regarding drinking wine and know what wine I am 
drinking and some basic facts about the wine (the region from which it comes, or its vin-
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tage, for example), but I must also have the knowledge necessary to appreciate the 
wine. Just as a chess master sees a chessboard differently than a novice (she sees the tra-
jectories and outcomes of hundreds of important games, as wells as famous strategies), so 
the wine connoisseur tastes the wine differently.   
Must I then be an expert to be considered adequately informed about a situation? 
Would a suicide only be considered rational if and only if the person deciding to suicide 
had the expertise of a doctor or thanatologist? Perhaps not. Perhaps Cholbi’s example 
points to the need not to only possess information, but the need of the suicidal person to 
reach out to those around her and actively seek out the information and analyze the in-
formation gathered. A person must not only be technically informed (i.e., be able to re-
peat back information), but display a commitment to becoming appreciative of what the 
facts they know mean. A person who wishes to rationally suicide must make a substantial 
attempt to become adequately informed and assured that the information she gathers is 
accurate and that she understands, insofar as she is able, the situation in which she finds 
herself. This may include talking with multiple healthcare professionals, attorneys, other 
people who have suffered through (or are suffering through) a similar situation, and her 
loved ones. A person must use the faculties she has to engage with others and inform her-
self. But this still leaves us with the question of how to respond to the example of 
Cholbi’s expert. 
Our answer might come from an unlikely source. Devine (1980, 1998) famously 
argues that speaking of suicide in terms of rational choice is misleading, because normal-
ly when a choice is considered “rational,” the person choosing has knowledge of the al-
ternatives presented by the choice. This cannot be the case for suicide, however, since 
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death is “logically opaque” (Devine 1980, 140). Not only do we have no witness testi-
mony telling a person what it is like to be dead, but our own deaths present us with the 
most extreme limit of our possibilities. My death is the boundary of my thought, and 
while I might be able to think up to that boundary, I cannot think through or past that 
boundary. Yet Devine offers a solution to resolve the dilemma presented by Cholbi’s 
wine expert example. As he explains, “We are dealing, that is, not with a situation con-
cerning which rational men will exhibit a range of estimates, but with a situation in which 
one man’s estimate is as good as another, because what is being done is a comparison 
with an unknown quality” (1980, 139-140). Perhaps no one can be an expert in situations 
involving a particular, individual end of life. Even a thanatologist would not be able to 
make an informed decision about her own death to the extent a chess master would make 
an informed decision about a particular chess move, since there is no way for a person to 
become informed about her own death. The best we can do in these situations, then, is 
desire to gather the information we can, work towards gathering it, and then make a deci-
sion. This is, after all, how we make many important decisions. We have no guarantees 
that the person we marry will remain the same thirty years into a marriage; we do not 
know how a change in career will turn out. Most of our important decisions involve less 
than perfect information and we make those decisions without the appreciation of an ex-
pert. The requirement that one must have expertise in order to be adequately informed is 
too high for most people to meet in most situations. Nonetheless, Cholbi’s distinction 
does bring to light the need for a certain, if not expert, appreciation of the facts of a situa-
tion in order to make a rational decision. 
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Non-Ambivalent and Free 
 The last two principles that fall under the “rationality of person” group of criteria 
for establishing rationality are less prevalent in the literature, but important nonetheless. 
These criteria are related to the first three insofar as they speak to the quality of the deci-
sion made by the person who suicides. The rationality of the person, then, is premised 
upon her decision-making capabilities, as well as her ability to gather and weigh infor-
mation, have a realistic view of the world, and have the cognitive capacity necessary to 
reason.  
The first of these criteria requires that the person wishing to suicide should not be 
ambivalent about her decision to die, or at least display a minimal level of ambivalence 
(c.f., Clarke 1999; Martin 1980; Motto 1972; Werth 1999; Widiger and Rinaldi 1983). 
This criterion is spoken of in two ways, either explicitly in terms of ambivalence, or in 
terms of a persistent wish to die. Motto (1972) requires that the “degree of ambivalence 
regarding the act must be minimal” (195). As a psychiatrist, Motto believes that a person 
seeking his help regarding suicide indicates ambivalence. Clarke (1999) agrees with Mot-
to (1980) (458), noting that a lack of ambivalence is a criterion for rational suicide.1  
 Another requirement is that a person’s wish to die be persistent and expressed 
consistently over time (c.f., Diekstra 1986; Humphry 1986; Lebacqz and Engelhardt 
1977; Motto 1972, 1980; Werth 1995). For instance, while Diekstra (1986) does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 Another reason that lack of ambivalence is an important criterion to mention is because it is a response, 
wittingly or unwittingly, to the American suicidology movement. Many suicidologists, especially Edwin 
Schneidman, reject the possibility of rational suicide in large part because of the claim that all suicidal peo-
ple who have not yet killed themselves are ambivalent. The basic argument asserts that if suicidal people 
were not ambivalent about dying, they would kill themselves. No discussions would be necessary, and they 
would never come to the attention of a doctor. Thus, part of the suicidal person wants to live, even if part of 
the suicidal person desires to die. As a result, preference must be given to the part of the suicidal person 
who wants to live (see, for instance, The Suicidal Mind (1996)).	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speak in terms of ambivalence, he does require that the person’s wish to die should be 
“enduring” (14-15). Humphry (1986) expands on this notion by requiring that a consider-
able amount of time (six months) exists between the person’s expressed wish to die and 
her acting on said wish.  
 The final criterion for the achievement of the label of “rationality of the person” 
also revolves around decision quality. Many bioethicists claim that a person’s decision 
must be freely made (c.f., Barry 1994; Battin 1982, 1994; Diekstra 1986; Francis 1980; 
Lebacqz and Engelhardt 1977; Mayo 1983; Motto 1981; Prado 2010; Sullivan 1980). 
This requirement is expressed using both positive and negative langugage in the literature. 
The positive expression speaks of freely made decisions. Marker (1999) explains that a 
“decision [being] freely made” is required for it to be rational (xxi). Similarly, Diekstra 
(1986) requires that a decision is made of a person’s “own ‘free-will’” (14). Werth (1995) 
walks the line between the positive and negative versions of this requirement. He ex-
plains that the person making the choice to suicide, “makes the decision as a free choice 
(i.e., is not pressured by others to choose suicide)” (62). This criterion is expressed nega-
tively, though to the same effect, in the insistence that the decision to suicide is made 
without coercion. Motto (1999) explains that in order for any decision to be considered 
rational, “no external coercion is present” (124). 
Rationality of Act 
 As mentioned above, there is a second set of criteria found in the literature. These 
criteria look to establish the rationality of a particular act of suicide. That is to say, they 
do not establish whether suicide, as a general act, is rational, but rather determine the cir-
cumstances that might make a particular act of suicide performed by a specific person 
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rational. There are five criteria in the literature that contribute to establishing the ra-
tionality of suicide as an act. The first requires that suiciding does not do harm to the ac-
tor, or at least does less harm than other actions might. The second is that suiciding is in 
the interest of the actor. The third criterion relates closely to and explains how the first 
two principles can be met in the case of suicide. It requires that the person wishing to sui-
cide find herself in a hopeless condition. The fourth criterion requires that persons look-
ing to suicide consider the impact of the act on the significant people in their lives. The 
last criterion requires that the suicidal person’s community is understanding of the act of 
suicide. 
Harm 
        One of the most common means for establishing the rationality of suicide is that 
suicide does not do more harm to the suicider than the harm that would come to the per-
son if she continued to live (c.f., Battin 1980, 1982, 1999, and 2005; Bogen 1980; Cholbi 
2011; Choron 1972; Davis 1998; Decker 1977; Dunshee 1994; Francis 1980; Hewitt 
2010; Humphry 1987; Jamison 1999; Lebacqz and Engelhardt 1977; Marker 1999; 
Maltsberger 1994; Motto 1980, 1994; Nelson 1984; Slater 1980; Werth 1999). As stated 
at the beginning of this chapter, in most circumstances interfering with a rational adult’s 
actions that bring no direct harm to others takes considerable justification. This is true 
even if the act brings harm to the actor. That does not mean, however, that those actions 
that bring harm to the actor would be considered rational. As Hewitt (2010) explains, “Ir-
rationality is evidenced through incongruence and/or behaviors which are self-defeating 
or self-harming” (64). Work must be done, then, to show how killing oneself might not 
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bring (additional) harm, despite killing normally serving as the prototypical example of 
bringing harm. 
The skydiver example at the beginning of this chapter involves a number of irra-
tional actions done by someone who might otherwise show all signs of having the cogni-
tive capacity for rationality. Eating a steady diet of junk food, taking up smoking, and 
jumping out of a plane can all be construed as self-harming. These actions are easily un-
derstood as irrational according to Hewitt’s definition. Yet, there is also a case to be 
made for understanding these actions as self-preserving, rather than self-harming. For 
instance, if no healthier food was available, and the skydiver found himself locked in the 
Cheetos factory for weeks, it would not be irrational to eat Cheetos, and only Cheetos, in 
order to stay alive. Similarly, one might argue that skydiving is a life-affirming exercise, 
and that the “rush” experienced during skydiving represents living life to the fullest. 
There might be a way to similarly understand suicide. If it can be established that in some 
instances, suicide would bring a person less harm than continuing to live, then an act of 
suicide might not be irrational.  
At first glance, the claim that suiciding would cause someone less harm than stay-
ing alive seems entirely counterintuitive. How could an actor bringing about her own 
death not be bringing harm to herself, and in fact, not be bringing the most grievous harm 
possible? Would not suicide-- the possibility of an actor bringing to end the possibility of 
all future action (action by which she could gain goods)-- be inherently harmful? After all, 
it cuts off the possibility of any future goods at all. Some bioethicists respond to these 
questions negatively, arguing that suiciding might allow someone to avoid harm. Accord-
ing to the literature, there are two different ways that this is the case.  
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        The most common way of understanding the avoidance of harm is the avoid-
ance of inflicting pain and suffering. If a person finds herself in a situation that causes 
much pain and suffering, it is possible that a quick end to life might cause her less harm 
than continuing to live. An extreme example might be helpful here. Imagine a captured 
spy with a cyanide capsule hidden in a fake tooth. She knows that if she chooses to stay 
alive, she will be brutally tortured and beaten for information. Even if there is a chance 
that she might survive interrogation and eventually escape or be rescued, very few people 
would label the spy irrational if she chose to use the cyanide.  
 But now let us assume that the spy is never captured. Instead, she lives a long life, 
retires to the shore with three dogs and her husband and at 67, she is diagnosed with late-
stage pancreatic cancer. Her doctor tells her that she will deteriorate quickly and that 
there will be pain. Instead of a capturing enemy, that which holds her captive and threat-
ens her with torture is her own body. Could we not similarly label the action of taking her 
life in this situation rational? Several bioethicists think so, and list severe pain and suffer-
ing as justification for labeling a particular act of suicide as being rational.  
Jamison (1999) explains that, “the amount of intolerable, irreversible physiologi-
cal suffering” (134) must be taken into consideration when deciding on the rationality of 
suicide. Jamison also speaks of the need to consider other forms of suffering outside of 
the physical (such as emotional, psychological, etc.), as well as  “social factors [and] 
quality of life concerns” more broadly (134). Being diagnosed with a painful and degen-
erative illness comes with social side effects, which can cause much harm and suffering. 
Moreover, having a painful and degenerative terminal illness can dramatically impact a 
person’s quality of life and her ability to work towards a better quality of life. 
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The infliction of pain and suffering is not the only way in which harm is dis-
cussed in the literature, however. Harm is also conceptualized in terms of deprivation. In 
“Can Suicide Be Rational? Yes, Sometimes,” (1999), Battin extends the definition of 
harm past bodily suffering and injury, and explains that we also must understand harm, 
“…in terms of deprivation of pleasures, satisfactions, and other goods, or what we call 
the praemium vitae” (18). Harm, then, is not only caused by an infliction of pain, but also 
by deprivation of the things that make life good. This is closely connected to quality of 
life issues. It is not only that particular situations will inflict suffering on a person (e.g., 
the pain that comes to a person who sees how much her spouse is suffering seeing her 
dying), but also that some situations make it impossible for a person to maintain the type 
of life she is used to living. If a person lives her life deprived of the basic things that 
make it worthwhile (relationships, pleasure, etc.), then she is being harmed. 
Cholbi (2011) adds a temporizing element to the discussion of harm and suicide. 
He expands on this aspect of the harm of living outweighing the harm of suicide out-
weigh by explaining,  
This condition [suicide being less harmful for a person than continuing to 
live] being met thus hinges not only on how harmful it would be for the 
person to continue to live (how much suffering, hardship, etc. her future 
life would portend), but also how painful her death would be and the bene-
fits she would enjoy in her future life. A young person could fail to meet 
this condition if, for instance, she was suffering from a painful but treata-
ble medical condition and had a long, worthwhile life to look forward to 
should she continue to live (91).  
 
The amount of harm done to a person, then, cannot only be assessed by looking at the 
pain and suffering a person is currently experiencing, but must also include an assessment 
of future circumstances which weighs potential goods (time with family, possibility of 
recovery, finding meaning in suffering) against the harm an illness brings with it. If it can 
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be established that the harm caused by a particular situation outweighs current and po-
tential goods, suicide may be rational. 
Interest 
Closely connected to the harm criterion is the requirement that suicide be in the 
interests of the person who wants to suicide (c.f., Barry 1994; Battin 1980, 1982, 1994, 
1999, 2005; Boer 2007; Brandt 1975; Cholbi 2011; Clarke 1999; Cowley 2006; Edwards 
1997; Hewitt 2010; Humphry 1999; Jamison 1995, 1999; Kjervik 1984; Marker 1999; 
Martin 1980; Mayo 1983, 1993; Motto 1972, 1981, 1983, and 1994; Nelson 1984; Pipel 
and Amsel 2011; Prado 1990; Werth 1996, 1999; Widiger and Rinaldi 1983).  Much like 
the harm criterion, the “interest” principle seems counterintuitive. How could an action 
that eliminates all possibility of an actor meeting any future interests be in her best inter-
ests? In fact, paternalistic intervention into a suicider’s life is often justified by the claim 
that death cannot be in the interest of suicidal persons and that the suicidal are actually 
unable to determine their own interests. Many suicidologists, most notably, Edwin 
Shneidman (1996), believe that suicidality is always accompanied by ambivalence, that is, 
experienced as conflicting interests and desires. According to Shneidman, suicidal people 
feel equally compelled to both to suicide and to continue living (55). Shneidman argues 
that if a suicidal person has two sets of conflicting interests that are equally weighted in 
her mind, there is no way she can determine which set of conflicting interests is worth 
satisfying. Thus, we are justified in intervening with her attempts to kill herself because 
we, the non-suicidal, are capable of identifying the life-affirming interests. 
 As Martin (1980) points out, however, there is at least one problem with asserting 
that such an intervention is justified: the assumption undergirding the intervention (144). 
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As the first example in this chapter indicated, it is difficult to justify interfering with an 
adult’s decisions, even if they will result in a lower quality of life. We can see how a per-
son’s interests can be thwarted by a lifestyle that involves needless risk taking and un-
healthy habits, but no one would be justified (or legally permitted) to force an adult into 
living otherwise without substantial efforts to prove that the adult in question was inca-
pable of making decisions on her own.2  
There is an additional problem when we root justification of intervention in am-
bivalence: the moment a person chooses to kill herself, her desires are no longer compet-
ing (Martin, 1980, 146). Moreover, even if some ambivalence remains, we still might not 
be justified in intervening. Many of our most important decisions are colored by ambiva-
lence. For instance, when I made the decision at twenty-one to pursue my doctorate in 
philosophy, I was certainly ambivalent. I knew I would be giving up some very particular 
life paths if I chose to do doctoral work. I knew I would work as hard as or even harder 
than my friends who went into the workforce, and that I would not be equally compen-
sated for it. I knew pursuing an advanced degree of this sort might require me to put cer-
tain social goals on hold. I was not entirely sure I wanted to make those sacrifices. Does 
this mean someone should have intervened and forced me to do otherwise, or that mem-
bers of my family, who wholeheartedly disagreed with my decision to pursue the degree, 
would have been justified in trying to coerce me to choose to do otherwise?3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Moreover, many of the habits described in this example can accompany depression, but still, more than 
the presence of depression would be needed to justify the forceful intervention often used to prevent sui-
cides. 	  
3 Martin goes on to argue that it is precisely because suicide eliminates the possibility of a future for the 
suicidal person that we are not justified in intervening. A person’s interests are determined by looking at 
her future and whether an action works in accordance with those future interests and her ability to pursue 
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Most bioethicists discuss determining interests under the assumption that it is 
possible for (at least some) people who want to suicide to determine their own interests. 
As Cholbi (2011) explains, “the rationality, and perhaps the moral permissibility, of sui-
cide might hinge on a person having sufficient knowledge of her own interests to know 
that suicide is in her interest” (84). Battin echoes this sentiment in several works (e.g., 
1980, 1996, 2005). She writes,  
The rationality or irrationality of a given choice of suicide is in part a 
function of the individual’s circumstances: his health, his living conditions, 
the degree of comfort or discomfort his daily life involves, his political 
environment, his opportunities for enjoyable and fulfilling activities and 
work, and so forth. Thus, when a person’s circumstances change, so does 
the rationality or irrationality of his committing suicide: what may have 
been an unsound choice becomes, in the fact of permanently worsened cir-
cumstances (say, a confirmed diagnosis of painful and incurable deteriora-
tive illness) a reasonable one (1980, 171).  
 
Battin’s point is that determining one’s “interests” is a complex process that involves in-
timate knowledge of both the “big” and “little” parts of a person’s life. Generally, then, 
the person best equipped to judge her interests is the person who knows best the particu-
lar circumstances of that individual’s life. Usually, this is the person living that life. In 
another article, Battin (1994) goes as far to say that some suicides might even be under-
stood as self- and interest-preserving acts.  
One might consider whether some self-deaths could not be understood 
paradoxically, as a kind of ‘self-preservation,’ a kind of self-respect and 
protection of one’s fundamental interests. ‘I am what I have been,’ sui-
cides sometimes seem to say, ‘but cannot be any more.’ They are based, as 
it were, on a self-ideal: a conception of one’s value and worth, beneath 
which one is not willing to slip (294-295). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
those interests. Since suicide cuts off the possibility of a future, there is no way to gauge whether a person’s 
interests are met or not: she will simply no longer have any interests.  
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A person accustomed to a high level of control over her life, and whose self-identity is 
rooted in maintaining control, might have an interest in preserving the self-identity she 
had before a disease takes hold. An eminent professor diagnosed with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease might consider suicide to leave her legacy intact before the disease firmly over-
comes her mind. Davis (1998) puts this far more starkly when she explains that suicide 
might be a rational decision to put an end to harms when, “[m]y body’s continued capaci-
ty to pump blood and oxygen is no longer a good for my life but rather a threat to my 
values and interests in how the final chapter of my life is written (114).” Sometimes our 
body’s functioning threatens the interests we hold closest. The example involving the spy 
above shows this. 
Humphry (1999) echoes Battin’s and Davis’ points when he writes that,  
Quality of life is far too intimate, too personal, and too individual for oth-
ers to be involved in. It is the quintessence of the meaning of life in the 
human species. It is what makes our lives so varied and interesting, dis-
tinct from robots. It is far too glib to pass this factor off as ‘depression’ in 
the ready parlance that is so fashionable nowadays (xvii).  
 
Although he couches this in terms of quality of life issues, we can read quality of life in 
terms of an actor being able to pursue and, at least to some extent, meet her interests. 
Humphry looks to validate the desires experienced by a person who finds herself in cir-
cumstances that will dramatically alter her life. Quality of life issues are so fundamental 
and individual that we must not easily dismiss a person’s reaction to news that she may 
no longer be able to work towards improving or maintaining her quality of life. 
It is also common in the literature to list the interest criterion without defining it. 
Mayo (1986) explains that one of the conditions necessary for any action to be considered 
rational is that it is in “keeping with one’s fundamental interests” (145). Motto (1980) 
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speaks of this similarly when he writes that the action must be consistent with a per-
son’s “longstanding and fundamental values” (217). Werth (1995), Clarke (1999), Pipel 
and Amsel (2011), Dunshee (1994), and Kjervik (1984) make similar claims. 
 Interest considerations are also referenced in the literature on suicide in terms of 
having the ability to act on one’s values. The connection between values and interests is 
established by Battin (1999) when she writes,  
In general we regard an act as rational if it is in accord with what we might 
call one’s ground-projects or basic interests, which themselves arise from 
one’s most abiding, fundamental values...An act that conflicts with the sat-
isfaction of one’s ground-projects or fundamental interests and goals is ir-
rational; an act intended to satisfy them is rational, in the sense that it is an 
attempt to achieve one’s own ends (20). 
 
This way of defining interest renders clear what is at stake. For example, I have a number 
of interests: finishing my degree, developing and maintaining relationships with family 
and friends, eating breakfast, and attending an upcoming festival. Obviously, some of 
these are integral to my fundamental values, and some are not. What makes an act more 
or less irrational, then, is how it addresses my core interests and values. This sort of dis-
tinction must be made when we look at how actions meet the interests of a person. RL 
Barry (1994), Brandt (1975), Mayo (1983 and 1993), Motto (1972, 1981, 1983, and 
1994), Kjervik (1984), Nelson (1984), Jamison (1999 and 1995), Hewitt (2010), Edwards 
(1997), and Prado (1990) likewise speak of an act allowing someone to enact her values 
as important for establishing the rationality of that act.  
Hopeless Condition 
 The difficulties of understanding how suicide might not bring harm to a person 
and how suicide might be in someone’s interests are made less difficult when we consider 
a third criterion in the literature for establishing the rationality of an act of suicide: that 
 53 
the person wishing to suicide must be suffering from a hopeless condition (c.f., Bogen 
1980; Battin 1980, 1982, 1999, and 2005; Cholbi 2011; Choron 1972; Decker 1977; Dun-
shee 1994; Francis 1980; Goldfarb 1983; Hewitt 2010; Humphry 1986; Jamison 1995, 
1999; Kjervik 1984; Lebacqz and Engelhardt 1977; Maltsberger 1994; Motto 1994; 
Marker 1999; Nelson 1984; Slater 1980; Siegel 1986; Werth 1996, 1999; Widiger and 
Rinaldi 1983). As Battin (1980) explains, there is one clear case that would explain how 
an actor would be harmed less and how her interests might be served more by killing her-
self than by living: “extreme and irremediable pain in terminal illness” (174). If a person 
is inevitably going to die of an illness, and the illness will bring with it much suffering, 
one can see how suiciding might help a person avoid harms (e.g., continued and protract-
ed pain) and be in a person’s interest (e.g., financial interest, interest in maintaining a cer-
tain self-identity). The discussion of what constitutes a hopeless condition in the literature 
is fairly nuanced. 
For the majority of thinkers, having a hopeless condition is explicitly defined in 
terms of having a terminal illness. For example, Dunshee (1994), the former President of 
the Board of Directors of Compassion in Dying, states that a person must be terminally ill, 
and goes as far to explain that an illness is determined to be terminal when “two physi-
cians expect death reasonably soon, usually within 6 months” (5). 
Some thinkers require that not only a terminal illness be present, but also that suf-
fering is experienced as a result of that illness. For instance, Humphry (1987) requires 
that the person wishing to receive assistance to rationally suicide have an “advanced” 
terminal illness that causes suffering or “a grave physical handicap” (336).  
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Other thinkers do not require the presence of a terminal illness. Jamison (1999) 
includes consideration of an, “incurable illness, and the amount of intolerable, irreversi-
ble physiological suffering experienced,” among his list of criteria to establish the ration-
ality of suicide (emphasis mine, 134).  
Werth (1995) expands the definition of hopeless condition. He explains that 
“‘[h]opeless’ conditions include, but are not necessarily limited to, terminal illnesses, se-
vere physical or psychological pain, physical or mental debilitation or deteriorating con-
ditions, or a quality of life no longer acceptable to the individual” (62). Dikestra (1986) 
says something similar in noting that a hopeless condition entails “unbearable physical 
and / or emotional pain” and no hope of improvement (15). Kjervik (1984), on the other 
hand, focuses more on the “amount of physical or mental debilitation” a person faces in a 
hopeless condition (1984), but he does not specify that the person wishing to suicide nec-
essarily be terminal. Motto (1994) requires that the person wishing to suicide have an un-
bearable condition, and he holds it might be rational to suicide even when one is not ter-
minal. Nelson (1984) explains that, “the assertion of a right to die is based upon the prop-
osition that a person should be allowed to end his or her life when a deteriorating quality 
of life appears to be inevitable” (1330). Note that this assertion is not based on the fact 
that a person’s life will end within a prescribed amount of time even if she chooses not to 
suicide. Cassell and Rich (2010) argue similarly about deteriorating quality of life, the 
complex nature of suffering, and the use of terminal sedation and physician assisted sui-
cide. These authors offer comment on the American College of Physicians stance articu-
lated in a 2001 position paper on physician assisted suicide. In this paper, the College dis-
tinguishes between clinical suffering and psychological and existential suffering. The 
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College ultimately argues that clinical suffering can offer justification for offering as-
sistance in suicide, but other forms of suffering cannot. Cassell and Rich refute this posi-
tion on the grounds that it is based on a discredited dualistic account of the human person. 
They write, 
…suffering is a specific distress that occurs when an impending destruc-
tion of the person is perceived and continues until the threat is gone or 
the integrity of a person is restored. A person is an embodied, purpose-
ful, thinking, feeling, emotional, reflective, relational human individual 
existing through time in a narrative sense. Generally, all of these parts 
are consistent and are harmoniously accordant. Suffering, in which all of 
these parts are affected, variously destroys the coherence, cohesiveness, 
and consistency of the whole. It is in this sense that the integrity of the 
person is threatened or destroyed (436). 
 
Thus, although some thinkers argue that a hopeless condition must be defined by a termi-
nal prognosis, the definition of “hopeless condition” is not uniformly based on the inevi-
table demise of a person in the literature (c.f., Cassell 1998, Cassell 2004).   
Consideration of Loved Ones 
The literature would be remarkably short sighted if it treated suicidal people as if 
they existed in a vacuum. The potential harm that comes from a suicidal person’s actions, 
as well as the interests served by those actions, do not belong solely to the suicider. While 
the literature does tend toward the liberal ideal of the protection of self-determination, 
with these last two criteria, there is a recognition that even autonomous and rational peo-
ple are part of larger communities that need to be taken into account, even if the interests 
of those communities do not necessarily outweigh the interests of the individual looking 
to kill herself. In order for a suicide to be considered rational, most thinkers require that 
the suicider give due consideration to the significant people in her life. The details of this 
criterion differ somewhat from thinker to thinker, but generally, bioethicists call for the 
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person wishing to suicide to think about the impact of her action on those around her 
and to determine that the impact of his suicide is not so great as to outweigh the ways in 
which suicide is in the suicider’s interests. 
        Werth and Cobia (1995) list among the criteria compiled from two national sur-
veys of psychologists the “consideration of the impact on significant others” (62). 
Jamison (1999) explains that one of the factors that distinguishes suicide from what he 
calls rational assisted dying is “a lengthy process of decision making involving signifi-
cant others” (128). A willingness to discuss emotional concerns, as well as the decision to 
suicide, is essential for a suicide being considered rational, according to Jamision. He 
writes, 
the person’s plans for suicide and efforts made to respect emotional needs 
of significant others and minimize the possible negative effects on others 
through selection of the means to die, provision of warnings, absence of 
efforts to coerce unwanted involvement of others in death, and attempts to 
prevent accidental discovery by those who might be adversely affected 
(134). 
 
Not only must a person take into consideration his loved ones when deciding whether to 
suicide, but he must also plan the act accordingly. Not only the whether, but the what, 
where, how, and when must be answered about the act of suicide such that the least harm 
is inflicted on those surrounding the suicider. In his book written for those considering 
rational suicide, Jamison (1995) speaks of the importance of considering the impact on 
loved ones in a few ways. For instance, not only are people to consider “obligations to 
family and friends” (12-13) and emotional impact on their loved ones (41-42), but also 
the financial impact on loved ones (38). Many other thinkers proclaim not only the need 
to consider the impact one’s suicide might have on one’s loved ones, but also that the 
person considering suicide speak with those loved ones about a variety of aspects related 
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to the decision to commit the act (c.f., Battin 1982, Diekstra 1986, Dunshee 1994, 
Humphry 1987, Kjervik 1984, Maris 1986, Mayo 1983, Motto 1983, Nelson 1984, Prado 
2008, Slater 1976). 
In addition to the need to speak with loved ones regarding his decision to suicide, 
some bioethicists also require the suicider to speak to his treating physician regarding his 
suicidal desire. For instance, Humphry (1986) writes: 
…The treating physician has been informed and his response taken into 
account. What his response will be depends on the circumstances of 
course, but we advise our members that as autoeuthanasia (or rational sui-
cide) is not a crime there is nothing a doctor can do about it. But it is best 
to inform him and hear his response. You might well be mistaken—
perhaps you misheard or misunderstood the diagnosis. Usually you will 
meet a discreet silence (173). 
 
In this instance, Humphry suggests speaking with the treating physician in order that the 
person wishing to suicide can confirm that he is adequately informed.  This is required by 
a number of other thinkers as well (Dunshee 1994, Lebacqz and Engelhardt 1977, Malts-
berger 1994, Maris 1986, Martin 1980, Slater 1976). 
 Interestingly, Jerome Motto (1981) takes the obligation to inform significant oth-
ers so seriously that he extends this obligation to those treating the suicidal person. Motto 
argues not only that the patient has an obligation to tell his loved ones about his plans to 
suicide and to discuss those plans with them, but that if a physician knows the patient 
wishes to kill himself, and does not want to speak to his loved ones regarding that deci-
sion, then the physician has an obligation to let the patient’s family members know (204).  
Understandable According to Community 
        Closely related to the criterion that a rational suicidal person must take into ac-
count her significant relations, is the requirement that the suicide and the context in 
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which it happens be understandable to the community in which the suicider finds her-
self (c.f., Battin 1982; Choron 1972; Edwards 1997; Matthews 1998; Motto 1999; Siegel 
1986; Stack 1999; Werth 1996, 1999). 
 Choron (1972) writes,  
Rational here implies not only that there is no psychiatric disorder but also 
that the reasoning of the suicidal person is in no way impaired and that his 
motives would seem justifiable, or at least ‘understandable,’ by the majori-
ty of his contemporaries in the same culture or social group (96-97). 
  
Choron points to a distinction that must be made regarding “community.” There are two 
ways in which “community” can be understood. There is first the society-level sense of 
community. This is what most bioethicists mean when they use the term “community.” 
The community that makes laws and mandates public morality must, in some way, be on 
board with the circumstances surrounding a person’s decision to suicide if they are going 
to provide legal protection for those providing the means with which to suicide. Stack 
(1999) explains this clearly when he writes that,  
“the term rational suicide refers to a class of suicides that receive some 
cultural support given the special circumstances motivating the suicide. 
Although a clear line cannot be drawn between rational and nonrational 
suicides, it is assumed that the greater the cultural support for a class of 
suicides (e.g., suicides in the case of terminal illness) the greater the pre-
sumed rationality of the suicides (41).  
 
Lebacqz and Engelhardt (1997), Prado (1990), Decker (1977), and Saunders and Valente 
(1988) also all speak to this level of community. 
The second level of “community” refers to the more immediate social circles of 
which the person who wishes to suicide is a part. This is community that is close to the 
person who wishes to suicide (family, friends, loved ones), as well as communities that 
might have some say in the actions of the person (church communities, educational 
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communities, etc.). In some ways, we can understand this as a more stringent formula-
tion of the last criterion, which specified that the person wishing to suicide consider, and 
sometimes speak with, significant others when considering suicide. Not only must these 
others be considered and consulted, but they also must in some way find the suicidal per-
son’s actions understandable.  
Some bioethicists hold that many of those closest to the person wishing to suicide 
must be in agreement with the act. Dunshee (1994), for instance, contends that the suicid-
al person’s significant others must have accepted her decision to suicide. A suicide is 
“understandable according to the community” in the sense that it is consented to and sup-
ported by the community. Siegel (1986) explains that, “the motivational basis of [the sui-
cider’s] decision would be understandable to the majority of uninvolved observers from 
his community or social group” (407). Edwards (1997) requires that the suicider repre-
sent “values which have been (or would be) adopted under conditions of freedom, en-
lightenment, and impartiality” (55). This list of conditions represents what one very spe-
cific culture has identified as rational, namely a liberal democratic culture. When bioethi-
cists include this criterion in their list to establish rational suicide, it usually means that an 
act of suicide is in accordance with the values of the dominant culture of which the sui-
cidal person (or the bioethicist) is a part. 
Conclusion 
 These ten criteria detailed above represent a comprehensive list of the criteria 
used by bioethicists to determine whether a person wishing to suicide is rational. Alt-
hough not all the criteria I outlined in this chapter are required by all bioethicists in order 
to establish the rationality of suicide, all the bioethicists I addressed appeal to at least 
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three of the criteria mentioned, and most, especially in the more recent literature, re-
quire several more. 
 Now that I have enumerated the criteria used to define rational suicide in the bio-
ethics literature, I can begin to explore the deeper problems associated with its applica-
tion. The phrase “rational suicide” would appear an oxymoron to anyone with any first-
hand experience with suicide or the suicidal. That a suicide be “rational” seems an im-
possible requirement. The rationality described by bioethicists is a capacity experienced 
by ordinary people. Most people are rational in the ways bioethicists describe a majority 
of the time. Yet the phenomenon of suicidality is extreme, both ontologically and psycho-
logically. Psychologically, a person must find himself in pretty dire or distressing circum-
stances to consider ending his existence. Ontologically, suicide is the most extreme reac-
tion a human being can have toward the fact of her general existence. It is a concrete re-
jection of the value of existence and existence itself. Suicide is an act that guarantees the 
impossibility of all future action. To ask that a person determine whether a particular sui-
cidal person or a particular act of suicide is rational, then, seems misguided. 
 As this chapter noted, the criteria in place for rational suicide are themselves con-
tested and problematic. The next chapter will critique some of the individual criteria dis-
cussed in this chapter. I will examine the application of these criteria and argue that any 
account of suicide is deeply problematic if it does not include consultation with suiciders, 
the very individuals whose interests are at stake. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FEMINIST CRITIQUE AND RATIONAL SUICIDE 
 In her now-canonical work Feminism and Bioethics, Susan Wolf (1996) begins by 
observing that traditional bioethics has often ignored feminist observations. Although the 
anthology largely addresses the positive contributions feminist perspectives can bring to 
bioethics as a field, the introductory chapter serves as a diagnostic of what is lacking in 
current bioethical approaches. Wolf queries why a relatively diverse interdisciplinary 
field like bioethics has not taken advantage of the myriad insights provided by feminists, 
while other fields in the humanities and social sciences have done so. Wolf writes:	  
...[I]t is no accident that bioethics has largely ignored gender feminism, 
long after the rest of the humanities and law have found such work to be 
important. Nor is the explanation to be found in the demography of mod-
ern bioethics, for women have played an important part in the field from 
the start. Instead, the answer is to be found in the deep structure of bioeth-
ics--in its early embrace of a liberal individualism largely inattentive to 
social context; in its emphasis on deduction from ethical principles rather 
than induction from concrete cases; in its tendency to view ethical prob-
lems either dyadically as problems between individuals, or nationally as 
problems for the entire society, but rarely at an intermediate level attentive 
to the moral significance of groups; and in the failure of bioethics to be 
sufficiently self-critical by examining whom the field serves and how (5).	  	  
Bioethicists’ failure to take up gender feminism has involved no malicious plot: It reflects 
instead the dearth of disciplinary reflection. The insight Wolf provides here is critical, 
both because it is a needed corrective for the field of bioethics, and because it offers an 
understanding of the thread that runs through the feminist critiques which this chapter 
will explore. Wolf’s critique explores issues at the heart of the structure of bioethics and 
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exposes foundational blind spots. Her work brings to light the lack of consideration of 
the ethical commitments with which bioethicists begin, as well as a lack of reflection on 
methodological starting points.	  
         These blind spots identified by feminists have done more than cause the exclusion 
of feminist voices from the field, though. These larger issues identified by feminists are 
an indictment of the field of bioethics as a whole and provide much insight into the 
treatment of specific debates in bioethics. These critiques show how the structure of bio-
ethics itself can cause minority voices to be overlooked, as well as procedural issues in 
the consideration of particular bioethical problems. When subjected to the feminist cri-
tiques that will be outlined in this chapter, bioethical discussions of rational suicide will 
be shown to exhibit some of the problematic patterns identified by feminists. 1 Some of 
the critiques mentioned by Wolf and other feminists apply quite readily to the bioethics 
literature on rational suicide. Addressing the critiques provided by a number of important 
feminist bioethicists, this chapter will argue that these bioethical “blind spots” identified 
by feminists have had repercussions in the literature on rational suicide.	  
         Thus, the fundamental goal of this chapter is to critique the concept of rationality 
as it has been presented in the bioethics literature on assisted suicide. In the previous 
chapter I established how rationality has been defined by a number of bioethicists and the 
lengths to which they have gone to codify this conception of rationality such that it can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Note that my goal in this chapter is not to render critique against bioethics as a field. While I will be ref-
erencing feminists who take on this larger project, my concern is limited strictly to the ways in which the 
specific critiques feminist thinkers make are applicable to the rational suicide literature. I am using the 
works of these thinkers to organize discussion of issues I have identified within the rational suicide litera-
ture, and to highlight a common thread in these issues. The goal of this chapter, therefore, is not an explicit-
ly feminist goal. My goal is to borrow from and build off the insights feminists have explored regarding 
philosophical and bioethical analysis and to apply these same insights to a very particular body of literature. 
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used as the conceptual ground upon which to establish the moral permissibility of as-
sisted suicide. In this chapter, I will address feminist critiques of bioethics generally, as 
well as feminist critiques of both the traditional conception of rationality and the ways in 
which it has historically been ascribed to or denied individuals. I will argue that many of 
the critiques made by feminist ethicists apply to the more specific work being done to 
establish rationality. By exploring feminist critiques one begins to notice weaknesses in 
the definition of rationality as it is presented by bioethicists in the literature on rational 
suicide. This chapter will look at three specific feminist criticisms of bioethics, all of 
which condemn the narrowness of bioethics and its failure to consider the social and po-
litical context within which bioethical analysis happens.         	  
         First, I will consider the tendency in traditional bioethics to uncritically embrace 
liberal individualism, and the pride of place given to the liberal individual within bioethi-
cal discussions. Feminists and medical sociologists alike have criticized the field of bio-
ethics for wholeheartedly embracing liberal individualism, and in doing so, casting the 
moral agent as an atomistic, liberal individual (c.f., DeVries and Subedi 1998; Friedman 
1987, 1991, 2005; Griffiths 1995; Grimshaw 2005; Hollway 1998; Kukla 2007; Shim 
2010; Sherwin 2005). This not only narrows the sorts of problems identified by bioethi-
cists, but it also restricts what might be considered morally relevant facts in bioethical 
discussions. As Wolf indicates, it is the adoption of such a liberal framework that has al-
lowed for the dyadic understanding of the nature of bioethical problems. As I will 
demonstrate, the moral landscape set up by bioethics has made it such that only people 
living up to the standards set for the liberal individual are considered full moral agents. 
This unthinking adoption has unjustifiably limited the sorts of persons considered to be 
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full moral agents and has ignored certain social realities that are at work in the issues 
examined by bioethicists. One can see this conception of the ideal liberal individual at 
work in some of the individual criteria used to define rational suicide, specifically in the 
criterion regarding the freedom of the person wishing to suicide. In addition to problems 
found in the freedom criterion, these critiques show us that bioethicists have established 
an understanding of the ability to reason that is entirely shaped by an overly-idealized 
conception of the liberal individual.   	  
         After exploring how the adoption of this liberal framework affects the enterprise 
of bioethics, I will explore feminist critiques of value neutrality in bioethics. It is difficult 
to present these critiques as totally separate from one another because together, liberal 
individualism and its ideal of the liberal individual lay the foundation for belief in the 
possibility of value neutrality. Yet for the purposes of this chapter, I will consider them 
separately. Feminists specifically critique the expectation on the part of doctors and bio-
ethicists that they will enter into discussion about medical ethics as value neutral actors. 
The expectation is that as long as doctors and ethicists are making decisions solely with 
an eye to improving or maintaining a patient’s health, their personal values will not im-
pact discussions about a patient’s situation, and that this sort of value neutrality is possi-
ble and desirable.  Yet there are myriad examples of the ways in which values that may 
not be patient values inform and direct treatment. For instance, although there is no medi-
cal benefit derived from regular ultrasounds during pregnancy, regular ultrasounds have 
become part of prenatal care. This is one small way in which medical values (e.g., em-
phasizing the collection of data over avoidance of unnecessary medical intervention) 
have shaped a practice thought to be value neutral (Kukla 2005). Feminists claim that not 
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only is neutrality with regard to values impossible because the understanding and 
judgments of individuals are inherently perspectival, but also that claims of value neutral-
ity are potentially harmful because they run the risk of obscuring the value-ladeness of 
the bioethical system as a whole (c.f., Ainsworth-Vaughn 1992; Baier 2005; Davis 1991; 
Kukla 2005; Roberts 1996; Sherwin 1992; Shim 2010; Tsai 2014; Wolf 1996).  I will ar-
gue in what follows that it is impossible to achieve value neutrality when it comes to es-
tablishing rationality. This becomes clear in considering the harm and interest criteria in 
the rational suicide literature. Moreover, the requirement that the suicider have a “realis-
tic” worldview can in no way be established without reference to some set(s) of values. 
         My third and final critique in this chapter concerns the feminist critique of the his-
torical application of rationality. Feminists point out that the labels of “rational” and “ir-
rational” have been used in the past to marginalize certain types of knowers and knowing. 
Feminist thinkers demonstrate that historically, women have tended to be viewed as irra-
tional as a class, or at least to have access to a more emotional, less stable form of ration-
ality (c.f., Anderson 1995; Antony and Witt 1993; Bordo 1986; Code 1991; Harding 
1982; Lloyd 1983, 1984, 1989; Nagl-Docekal 1999; Rooney 1991; Walker 1992). Men 
used this claim that women were less rational or differently rational to justify depriving 
women of rights and to claim that women were incapable of performing certain societal 
roles, while never reflecting on who was defining rationality (or the personality character-
istics associated with rationality) and what ends this definition served. A parallel move-
ment can be seen in the rational suicide literature. Something similar has happened re-
garding suicidal “knowing” in the bioethics debates on rational suicide. Although I do not 
claim the suicidal have been oppressed in the same ways or at the same level as the wom-
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en and minorities of which feminists speak, I will argue that suicidal people, because 
of the way rationality is described and demanded by bioethicists, have been excluded 
from conversation about the moral permissibility of assisted suicide. In some sense, re-
searchers have been talking about rational “suicide,” while also excluding those who are 
most clearly suicidal. How can a thorough and exacting discussion about a phenomenon 
occur if those who most clearly embody or live that phenomenon are excluded from the 
conversation?	  
Liberal Individualism 
         Perhaps it is the unreflective adoption of liberal individualism by bioethicists that 
most clearly testifies to the lack of reflection that Wolf identifies. The central role of the 
liberal individual in ethical calculations in much of bioethical thinking has led to the con-
sideration of bioethical problems in terms of abstract rights and competing moral theories, 
and this has had considerable effect on the ways in which bioethicists conceptualize mor-
al relationships and the self that enters into moral relationships. When one starts from the 
presumption that the most ethically important “unit” is the rights bearing individual, one 
ends up working within a very particular moral landscape in which public relationships 
are understood in terms of individuals who enter into (mostly) contractual relationships. 
It is a landscape where moral debate is cast in terms of the conflicting rights of individu-
als (or societies made up of rights bearing individuals). There is a lack of attentiveness to 
differences between individuals or communities that make up nations and to nuances in 
types of relationship.	  
         Feminists critique not only the unthinking embrace of liberal individualism, but 
also the effects this embrace has had on moral debate in bioethics. I will outline three of 
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these effects. First, it leads to a misunderstanding and misrepresentation of the thera-
peutic relationship. Second, it allows bioethicists and doctors to ignore the social reality 
of institutional authority, the cultural capital held by doctors, and how these realities af-
fect medical relationships and decision making within these relationships. Finally, there 
is a fundamental anthropological misstep made by bioethicists that undergirds the first 
two effects: persons are cast as atomistic individual rights-bearers and the social reality of 
the self is denied or not noticed.	  
Distortion of the Relationship between Doctor and Patient	  	  
         Feminists contend that when bioethicists unreflectively operate within a frame-
work of liberal individualism, they run the risk of distorting the relationships considered 
in bioethical reasoning. Of specific interest is the doctor-patient relationship. As Susan 
Sherwin  writes, “In the bioethics literature this classic power struggle between patients 
and their physicians is defined as a moral conflict between the patient’s right to autonomy 
and the physician’s responsibility for paternalism” (1992, 137). Someone who begins 
from liberal principles sees interpersonal interactions in one of two ways. Either the ther-
apeutic relationship involves the meeting of two fully realized, autonomous individuals 
who have come to discuss the issues at hand and struggle for the ability to fully exercise 
their autonomy, or it involves meeting of one fully realized liberal individual who needs 
to take care of another individual until that individual is capable of fully exercising au-
tonomy. In order for this conceptualization of the doctor-patient relationship to work, the 
patient has to remain “perceived as separate, independent, and fully rational” (Sherwin 
1992, 137) or be understood as in need of a paternalistic overseer.	  
         When the relationship between doctor and patient is cast in either of these ways, 
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the understanding of the relationship, what happens in that relationship, and the possi-
bilities of that relationship are fundamentally distorted. When a paternalistic understand-
ing of the relationship is adopted, a patient is cast as unable to make informed decisions 
about her care. This is usually justified by claims that patients, because of illness and lack 
of technological medical training, are weak, afraid, and unable to make rational (unemo-
tional and distanced) decisions. Sherwin continues,	  
Because physicians are well-informed on medical matters and because 
they are obliged by their professional code to act beneficently toward their 
patients, they are commonly thought to be well-qualified to make medical 
decisions on their patients’ behalf. Patients’ need for care, however, can 
leave them particularly vulnerable to excessive degrees of paternalism; ill-
ness (or the threat of illness) sometimes leads to patients’ loss of rightful 
authority, by making them too weak or too frightened to protest against 
unjustified interference (Sherwin 1992, 139).	  	  
Although the view of doctor as benevolent overseer and as the person best able to make 
treatment decisions for his patients is common and not always inappropriate, deference to 
this view is problematic. Casting the therapeutic relationship in terms of a benevolent pa-
ternalism runs the risk of fundamentally undermining a patient’s ability to exercise her 
will. This casting also runs the risk of operating within too simple an understanding of a 
patient’s abilities to make decisions on her own, and a doctor overestimating his need to 
make decisions for patients.	  
         Legal scholar Lisa Ikemoto (1992) explores the other side of the coin. She cri-
tiques the view of the therapeutic relationship in terms of an interaction between fully 
autonomous individuals. In her article “Furthering The Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture 
in the Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women” she explains the standard narrative 
regarding what happens when people make medical decisions and enter into medical rela-
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tionships, and how this narrative draws from the larger political narrative of the liberal, 
rights bearing individual. She writes,	  
The standard legal story acknowledges a conflict between certain indi-
viduals and formal government. The story’s beginning, the individual 
right to choose the course of one’s medical treatment, describes society as 
a stronghold of individuals. The invocation of compelling state interests 
describes a society in which there is significant consensus (512).	  	  
Ikemoto explains that this language and this conception of how medical relationships are 
constituted are problematic. The demand that a patient be autonomous and maintain real 
independence in this relationship is a fiction. The effects that this understanding has on 
the treatment of minorities and women (or anyone with interests that compete with either 
doctors’ or the state’s and who belongs to classes who have often been denied full stand-
ing as autonomous, liberal individuals) can be devastating. Ikemoto is particularly con-
cerned with pregnant women of color and considers the rise of legal court battles as an 
extreme consequence of casting this relationship in terms of two actors competing for 
ascendancy. She documents numerous cases in which forced medical intervention has 
been ordered by the courts to protect state or “fetal” interests (c.f. Annas 1986, Andrews 
1986, Duden 1993, Hartouni 1997, Kukla 2005, Roberts 1997). Only because the , rela-
tionship is initially cast in terms of autonomous moral actors can medical decisions be 
thought justly and appropriately made by legal judges. Given the fact that incredibly in-
timate and life-altering personal decisions are made in the context of a therapeutic  rela-
tionship, legal intervention to settle conflicts in that relationship should give us pause. 
When the doctor-patient relationship is cast in terms of two moral actors with equal ac-
cess to resources and similar capacities for navigation of the relationship, the reality of 
the relationship is obscured. Doctors come to this relationship with years of training, so-
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cial status, access to resources a patient has no access to, and likely a history of rela-
tively compliant patients. Most patients have none of this. The claim that a working class, 
single mother who graduated high school can enter into a non-hierarchical relationship 
with a doctor who carries with him the authority his medical position and social class of-
fer him is a difficult one to make (c.f., Ainsworth-Vaughn 1992, 1994, and 1995; Davis 
1991; Fisher 1986; Friedman 1991; Hunter 1996; Scritchfield 1987; Shim 2010; Tsai 
2014). Ethical dilemmas in the context of this relationship run the risk of being posed in 
terms of how far a physician is obliged to go in order to fulfill the requests of her patient 
or how a physician can avoid infringing on the rights of her patient. Thus, on a liberal 
individual model, settling questions of medical treatment in the courts becomes an appro-
priate recourse.	  
Social Reality	  	  
         Ikemoto points out another issue at hand in the legal cases she addresses: the crys-
tallization of power and authority. This issue helps explain how some of the distorting of 
the doctor-patient relationship happens, and addresses a second effect of the unthinking 
adoption of liberal individualism by bioethics. Ikemoto writes,	  
This depiction [of the doctor-patient relationship as the meeting of auton-
omous actors] ignores institutionalized authority or authority to which we 
defer because of a reputational status not based on any one individual and 
whose sway is greater than the combined weight of the individuals who 
form the institution. Medicine has become an institutional authority pre-
sumed to be a source of valuable knowledge and truth. And it is an institu-
tion of privileged knowledge; doctors, the institutional representatives, are 
presumed to know best. Medicine is also hierarchical. Patients are ex-
pected to defer to the greater authority of the doctor. In addition, it reflects 
the dominant culture in that the privileged few in medicine generally come 
from the privileged tier of society; it is largely white and male (512-513).	  	  
Any talk about doctors and patients as two autonomous actors thus misunderstands the 
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social reality at play in this relationship. There is not only considerable authority grant-
ed to individual doctors, but also to the medical institution generally. One would be re-
miss, then, if one did not take into account that having the label “doctor” attached to 
one’s person entails a certain amount of authority and cultural capital.  There is a rever-
ence around the label “medical doctor” that extends beyond simple respect for the train-
ing a doctor has, and the idea that a patient can always fight against that reverence and 
assert her autonomy when making decisions ignores multiple levels of social reality. A 
doctor is more than someone who enters into a contractual relationship with an equal. If 
researchers do not take into account the physician’s cultural capital, gained largely be-
cause of the authoritative position he occupies (in addition to his training), researchers 
risk fundamentally obscuring the reality of the relationship between patients and physi-
cians.   One only need think of the infamous Milgram experiment (Milgram 1963) to un-
derstand the power of an individual in a lab coat, even if he does not claim to be a doctor. 
Similar studies have shown deference to people who are assumed to be in positions of 
medical authority (c.f. Blass 1999, Burger 2009, Hofflin 1966, Shim 2010). This is not to 
deny the importance of the specialized knowledge and specialized training had by doctors, 
but merely to point out that doctors have a very particular power that comes to them by 
virtue of more than just the knowledge they accumulated in training.	  
         Moreover, this conception of the doctor-patient relationship ignores the fact that 
the institution of technological medicine itself wields institutional power, and that by be-
ing a gatekeeper to that institution’s services, and by being part of (and implicitly sup-
ported by) a community that exercises the sort of influence the medical institution does, 
the doctor is in a position of immense power.	  There is an expectation that the medical 
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field brings knowledge and truth and that doctors are the bearers of this knowledge and 
truth; doctors become the holders of knowledge that brings life, or secular priests (Sher-
win 1992, 5). In some sense, then, when a doctor presents treatment options and offers 
his patient an opinion on how best to proceed when making a medical decision (or, worse, 
when he simply insists that one option, without presentation of others is the best way to 
proceed), this situation cannot be compared to other sorts of situations in which an expert 
in another field presents an opinion. The sheer power of the institutional authority granted 
to doctors because of their standing in the medical field prevents this analogizing. Defer-
ence to medical authority and the knowledge and truth held by doctors is often the unex-
amined norm. To cast a “layperson's” relationship to her doctor in terms of two people 
exercising individual autonomy is a fiction that ignores the impact of the power a doctor 
has simply by virtue of occupying the role of doctor and holding the place she does with-
in the medical institution. When a doctor speaks with her patients, she brings with her the 
full weight of her field. She speaks not only with her own authority, but with the authori-
ty of a (secularly) divine institution, with the presumed consensus of experts much like 
her, even if no explicit consensus has been garnered.	  
Ikemoto points to the ways that the deference to institutional power and institu-
tional authority bestowed upon doctors restricts the patient’s supposed ability to exercise 
her autonomy. She explains the dangers of self-privileging institutional authority when 
she writes:	  
 	  
[B]y its status as a source of knowledge, medicine creates a presumption 
that there is a better choice to be made--the one that conforms with rea-
sonable medical practice standards. The presumption raises doubt about 
the authority of the person who chooses otherwise. It changes the decision 
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making process from an opportunity for self-definition to an obligation to 
meet other-defined expectations. The absence of a presumption would 
leave more room to understand the person’s choice as a moment of self-
actualization, rather than as evidence of unfitness. Second, by its dispro-
portional influence, if it does not actually coerce widespread consensus, it 
gives the appearance of consensus. Thus, the dominant culture, constituted 
largely of institutions, is largely authoritarian. Deference to authority, in-
stitutional or other, is expected. It has become a cultural practice (513).	  	  
In order for its effects to be mitigated, doctors need to be aware of the existence of insti-
tutional authority and the self-privileging nature of that authority. Without this awareness, 
writing off patients who do not defer to this authority as noncompliant, irrational, or hys-
terical can become standard procedure. Medicine and the medical knowledge doctors 
yield becomes the unacknowledged standard by which to judge the decisions made about 
a patient’s treatment, despite that patient’s individual circumstances and preferences. This 
standard is built into the foundations of the patient-physician relationship. If a patient re-
fuses or requests treatment on the basis of factors other than those defined by medicine as 
relevant, then it becomes easy to cast the patient as somehow lacking autonomy. Anyone 
who resists medical advice, unless they do so for reasons recognized as relevant by the 
medical establishment itself, risks being considered incapable of fully entering into the 
therapeutic relationship.	  
Social Conception of the Self	  	  
         The adoption of liberal individualism carries even more serious problems than the 
misconstrual of the therapeutic relationship or the failure to recognize institutional au-
thority. In fact, the other two effects I will explore belie the fact that there is a more foun-
dational issue at play here. There is an anthropological problem that comes with the 
adoption of a liberal framework. The issue is not just that relationships are being misun-
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derstood, nor simply that the weight of social realities is being miscalculated. The con-
ception of the self at work in all of this is distorted. The liberal individual is a political 
placeholder, not a full and complete description of personhood, and though bioethicists 
have filled in some of this conception of personhood by focusing on the exercise of au-
tonomy and the ability of a person to meet her interests, this understanding of personhood 
is too simplistic an understanding in light of the complex moral issues at play in bioethics. 
For the most part, persons do not function as atomistic individuals who weigh out how 
best to achieve and exercise their rights, especially when making decisions about their 
health and overall well-being.	  
         As Rosemarie Tong (1997) points out, feminists, “do not limit themselves to one 
ontology (i.e., to a single conception of the self and the self’s relationships to others)” 
(81), and likewise I will not attempt to choose or create a “correct” conception of the self 
here. I will look to one conception of a more social, less atomistic understanding of self-
hood, however, which might illuminate some of the problems with the abstracted and iso-
lated notion of persons at work in the bioethics literature. Again, this is not the strong 
claim that a conception of self that best describes the reality of the nature of selfhood has 
been found, but merely that a conception of selfhood has been found that might offer a 
much needed corrective to the hollow liberal individual spoken of by bioethicists.2	  
         Marilyn Friedman (1991) offers clues about what has been overlooked in the flat-
tening of subjectivity in bioethics, and offers us characteristics of a “self” that are im-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  There are a number of theories of what Tong (1997) calls “ontology” and what I would refer to as philo-
sophical anthropology, that I could draw from here (e.g., postmodern feminism, ecological feminism, psy-
choanalytic feminism, etc.). This dissertation draws heavily on Friedman’s social conception of the self not 
because it represents the best possible description of the human person, but because it is a helpful construct 
against which to juxtapose the liberal individual used by bioethicists.  
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portant to consider when considering the moral issues at stake in (bio)ethical debates. 
Friedman argues for a social conception of the self which takes seriously the fact that 
selves are always in community, and that a person’s identity and interests are influenced 
by this fact. She writes, “In [the self’s] identity, character, interests, and preferences, it is 
constituted by, and in the course of, relationships to particular others, including the net-
work of relationships that locate it as a member of certain communities or social groups. 
This is the social conception of the self” (164). When bioethicists “view ethical problems 
either dyadically as problems between individuals, or nationally as problems for the en-
tire society,” they run the risk of ignoring the ways in which the individuals spoken about 
either as individual moral actors or citizens are formed by more intermediate communi-
ties and various interpersonal relationships (Wolf 1996, 5). Too much focus on creating 
the conditions in which  a self can exercise its individual will overlooks the important 
fact that the self learned to make decisions based on values and decision-making criterion 
learned from social formation.	  
The social self identifies herself, at least in part, by her relationships to 
others, including the social groups of which she is a part. She is, for ex-
ample, someone's daughter, someone's sister, someone's aunt, she is Black, 
she is heterosexual, she is middle class, she's a Hoosier. Doubtless, she 
understands those relationships in terms of whatever, if any, social norms 
and conventions govern them (171).	  	  	  
A person’s decisions cannot be understood as totally removed from the influence of the 
communities that formed her. Without attention to this fact, bioethicists run the risk of 
forgetting that communities make selves. Relevant considerations in most processes of 
moral decision making, such as it’s effects on one’s significant others, the significant 
others’ feelings about decisions, and the impact of decisions on a person’s standing in a 
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community, run the risk of being understood as medically irrelevant if the patient is 
understood merely as rights bearer, rather than as social creature (c.f., Allen 2005, Baier 
1985, Brison 2005, Friedman 2005, Grimshaw 2005, Jaggar 1983, McLeod, C. and S. 
Sherwin 2000, Nedelsky 1989). 
Rationality Criteria Critiqued: Ability to Reason and Freedom	  
The very premise upon which rational suicide rests-- that is, the idea that if a per-
son and an act that person wishes to commit can be shown to be rational, then there is no 
moral reason to prevent that person from committing that act--requires that researchers 
understand the issue in terms of whether a rights bearing individual is entitled to receive 
assistance from another individual in procuring the means for his own death. Yet this 
wrongly assumes the very asocial, non-contextual self of which feminists like Friedman 
are critical. The debate traditionally hinges on the suitability of an individual’s desire to 
receive assistance in suicide, and this suitability is determined by criteria that are condi-
tioned by the liberal framework. Thus, rational suicide is constructed as a rights issue. 
The question is framed as being whether a patient has the right to ask a doctor for the 
means by which to kill herself and whether a doctor has the right to offer (or deny) the 
means by which a patient might kill herself.  As I will argue, framing the issue in this 
way mistakenly overlooks the social context within which the individual is making the 
request.	  
The general issue of the framing of the literature aside, I also find many problems 
in the way in which the specific criteria used to define rationality are spoken of and ex-
plained. Given the feminist critique I outline above, it should come as no surprise that 
individual criteria used by bioethicists to establish the rationality of the person wishing to 
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suicide and the rationality of the act of suicide also fall under the purview of the femi-
nist critiques I am exploring. I will examine two specific criteria in light of the sort of 
feminist critiques I have presented thus far: the criteria that the person looking to suicide 
have the ability to reason and that the decision-making process of the person wishing to 
suicide be free.	  
Ability to Reason	  
There are two reasons it is especially important to examine the criterion regarding 
a suicider’s ability to reason. First, the requirement that a person looking to receive assis-
tance in suicide be able to reason is the most common criterion used in the literature used 
to establish rationality. Second, one might convincingly argue that the ability to reason is 
what most people mean when they speak in colloquial terms about rationality. Given the 
attention paid in recent years to legalized physician assisted suicide in the United States, 
the strong identification of rationality with the ability to reason is an important considera-
tion. 	  
To reiterate from Chapter 1, the ability to reason is addressed in several ways in 
the bioethics literature. It is understood by some bioethicists in the strict logical sense of 
one’s being able to move from premises to conclusions in thinking without any logical 
errors (Battin 1992, Pipel and Amsel 2011, Slater 1980). This strict sense of the ability to 
reason causes no problems in light of the critiques made by feminist bioethicists. 	  
There is an issue, however, when bioethicists do not make explicit this logical 
definition or begin to deviate from logical definitions of the ability to reason. For instance, 
Cholbi (2011) requires that a person requesting assistance in suicide have the, “ability to 
reason about what she perceives, making appropriate inferences, etc...” (91). If the person 
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establishing whether this criterion is met knows that making appropriate inferences 
means something very specific to someone who has formally studied principles of rea-
soning, this would cause no complications. Yet to ask a doctor, who may not have any 
training in logic or philosophical reasoning, whether a patient is making appropriate in-
ferences, is to ask someone who has no frame of reference other than his medical training, 
or worse, appeals to “common sense,” by which to make that judgment. Given what fem-
inist bioethicists have pointed to regarding institutional authority, there is a real danger of 
doctors believing they have expertise in areas in which they are untrained. A doctor may 
judge her patient’s ability to reason as compromised simply because the patient has 
reached a conclusion with which the doctor disagrees, and may not take the time to un-
derstand the reasoning process behind the patient’s drawing that conclusion.	  
The danger of this is made clear in Werth’s (1999) and Werth and Cobia’s (1995) 
studies. Werth and Cobia draw the criteria necessary for establishing rational suicide 
from surveys on the opinions of practitioners, and not from philosophers with training 
that gives them the proper expertise to speak to what constitutes rationality. Both studies 
indicate that in order for doctors to consider granting assistance to a patient requesting 
assistance in suicide, that person must have, “engaged in a sound decision-making pro-
cess” (Werth 1999, 5). As any logician knows, the term “sound” is used to describe a val-
id deductive argument with true premises. This is obviously not what these doctors mean 
by soundness. Without recourse to strict logical terminology, “sound” used colloquially is 
a nebulous term often defined by the person using it. For instance, one of my online logic 
students considered her decision to throw her boyfriend’s possessions in the front yard 
“sound” because she thought he had cheated on her, and this is how her family members 
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and peers had dealt with similar issues in the past. Although this is not a particularly 
serious example, it does make clear the tendency to default to one’s own cultural under-
standings of appropriate behavior and reasoning when applying the term “sound” without 
reference to its logical denotation.	  
Moreover, the components of a “reasonable decision-making process” are numer-
ous and must be explicitly identified in order to be adequately judged. Edwards (1997), a 
psychiatrist who is influential in psychiatric ethics, begins to break these down. In addi-
tion to the formal components like, “avoiding logically contradictory beliefs,” Edwards 
lists, “having factual beliefs that are largely supported by empirical evidence, or at least 
avoiding factual beliefs which are plainly falsified by experience...”, “having and being 
able to give reasons for one’s behavior and beliefs,” “thinking clearly and intelligibly,” 
and “having and exhibiting a capacity for impartiality or fair-mindedness in judging and 
adopting beliefs” (55). Given the fact that doctors often have such different experience 
than their patients, and given the authority of doctors, not only because of their expertise, 
but because of the particular roles they occupy in the medical institution, one must exam-
ine how doctors might go about determining whether the components of a reasonable de-
cision-making process have been achieved by their patients. 	  
Having factual beliefs, avoiding beliefs that have been falsified by experience, 
and having reasons for one’s behavior and beliefs can be understood in very particular 
ways by doctors. The way in which facts are constituted by most people, versus how sci-
entific facts are established, can lead to a gulf between a doctor’s and a patient’s assess-
ment of what it is to establish facts. Additionally, thinking clearly and exhibiting a capac-
ity for fair-mindedness can easily be understood by doctors in light of their medical train-
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ing. If fair-mindedness and impartiality are judged in light of scientific training, then 
scientific reasoning becomes the only appropriate mode of thought. A patient who is 
more concerned with ethical or religious reasoning runs the risk of being labeled unable 
to reason, and hence irrational, only because doctors’ training does not teach them about 
other modes of reasoning. If these criteria are not applied by persons who understand that 
scientific and medical viewpoints are but particular ways to understand and approach re-
ality, that these viewpoints are not self-justifying, and that this is a period of history in 
which scientific standards of truth are often accepted as the standards of truth par excel-
lence without justifying this acceptance, then some patients will be unable to meet doc-
tors’ standards for the ability to reason despite a demonstrable capacity to do so.	  
Another way that the ability to reason is spoken of by bioethicists is in terms of a 
person’s ability to foresee the consequences of her actions. This means considering pos-
sibilities and the conditions that might affect decisions and consequences. This is not a 
problem unless a doctor or an ethicist has a very particular consequence in mind. For ex-
ample, Prado (2010) writes, “I make clear that to be rational, reasoning and enactment of 
suicide must be done in full understanding that death may be and most likely is personal 
annihilation” (10). In some sense, it is necessary to ensure that a patient is aware that 
death may be final. Asking that a patient have the ability to at least entertain the possibil-
ity that there is no afterlife is not at issue. The problem comes with Prado’s insistence 
that a patient admit that personal annihilation is the most likely outcome of death. How 
does he arrive at this belief? And what happens in the case of a patient who has strong 
religious belief? The belief in an afterlife, or the hopes of an afterlife, are not established 
by a logical reasoning process. Logic, as the study of the form of human thought and 
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components of reasoning, cannot be the standard used to pass judgment on principles 
of faith. If a doctor or ethicist is committed to an atheistic or materialistic viewpoint, then 
she runs the risk of allowing personal metaphysical commitments to affect her judgment 
of her patient’s ability to reason if she is not aware that she is not a proper authority to 
judge these commitments. Given what feminists have established about the self-
privileging nature of institutional authority and the dangers of a lack of reflection on 
moral and metaphysical assumptions made by doctors and bioethicists, special attention 
must be paid to the ways in which the non-medical commitments of doctors and ethicists 
might impinge upon their abilities to judge the reasoning processes of patients (c.f. 
Addelson 1984; Davis 1991; Engelhart 1986; Hunter 1996; Ikemoto 1992; Wendell 1997; 
Tsai 2014; Zola 1972). Additionally, given the flattened conception of the self appealed 
to by bioethicists, religious and moral commitments and the place of a patient in moral 
and religious communities may be written off as medically irrelevant, and thus denied an 
appropriate place in the decision-making process.	  
Even more concerning than specific definitions of reasoning found within the lit-
erature are the times in which “the ability to reason” is listed as a criterion for establish-
ing rational suicide without an attempt to define the term (e.g., Clarke 1999, Choron 1972, 
Hewitt 2010). In one extreme instance, physician Richard MacDonald, actually uses a 
dictionary definition of rationality which calls on the ability to reason (1999, 109). If doc-
tors and ethicists make no attempt to define this criterion or simply appeal to a “layper-
son’s” definition of reasoning, there is no longer a risk that doctors and ethicists will priv-
ilege their own reasoning processes over their patients’ reasoning processes -- they will 
have to do so. If all a doctor has to go on when judging the quality of a patient’s reason-
 	  
82 
ing is that a patient give “good reasons” for decisions or “be reasonable” when making 
decisions, what can they do but evaluate their patients’ reasons based on their own expe-
riences of giving good reasons?3 Again, given the concerns raised by feminists regarding 
the privileging of a very specific idea of the autonomous liberal individual, as well as the 
problems of unrecognized institutional authority and the undercutting of patient selfhood, 
there is reason to take issue with the idea that doctors can unproblematically apply this 
criterion to their patients (c.f., Ainsworth-Vaughn 1992 and 1995; Davis 1991; Fisher 
1986; Friedman 1991; Hunter 1996; Shim 2010; Tsai 2014).	  
Freedom	  
The next criterion that this chapter will look at is the demand that a person’s 
choice to suicide be freely made. Very specific ideas of freedom are going to be at work 
within a liberal individualist framework, and the effects of these ideas within the rational 
suicide debate are easily seen.	  
The requirement that a decision to suicide be freely made is spoken of both posi-
tively and negatively. It is defined positively insofar as bioethicists require that a person’s 
decision be an exercise of her free will and that her decision making process be free 
(Marker 1999, Diekstra 1986, Werth 1995). Additionally, freedom is defined negatively: 
a person must not be pressured or coerced into suicide (Werth 1995, Motto 1999, Prado 
2010, Lebacqz and Engelhardt 1997, Francis 1980, Motto 1981, Sullivan 1980). 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  An anecdote, but one that seems telling: I was a campaign manager for a reelection campaign to a council 
within the American Medical Association for a cardiothoracic surgeon a few years ago. This doctor knew 
of my background in philosophy and my training in ethics. When we had some downtime on “the campaign 
trail,” he took the opportunity to tell me that “as an ethicist” I would appreciate that he had lived a life in 
which he was always able to take the “moral high ground.” He proceeded to explain that he was in the “en-
viable” position of being able to “always” do the right thing. Again, this is entirely anecdotal, but interest-
ing.  
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Both the positive and negative descriptions lack nuance, however, and run the 
risk of failing to take into account the social nature of the self identified by feminists. 
Ideas about what it is for a person to make a decision freely vary widely depending on 
communal standards. If it is assumed that in order to be free, a liberal individual must 
have considerable liberty to exercise her interests, then a loved one’s insistence on being 
included in that individual’s deliberative process might be construed as coercive, espe-
cially if that loved one is upset about the individual’s desire to suicide. Given that one of 
the components of the ability to reason spoken of by bioethicists in the rational suicide 
literature is freedom from intense emotion, it is not a stretch to wonder whether some of 
these same bioethicists would question whether a mother (or any person with strong emo-
tional ties) could make a free decision regarding suicide. 	  
The freedom criterion must be examined in light of both the therapeutic relation-
ship and institutional authority. Can freedom in the sense of avoiding undue influence 
ever really be achieved by a person occupying the patient role? If a patient is under the 
care of a doctor, in reality, her freedom is curtailed. Her options for her freely made deci-
sion are limited to exercising one of the choices that her doctor presents her with and (in 
some cases) the refusal of treatment. In an ideal relationship between doctor and patient, 
the doctor works to give her patient as much freedom as possible. She presents her patient 
with treatment options without being overbearing and allows her patient to ask all the 
questions she needs to in order to be adequately informed. The doctor allows her patient 
time to discuss options with the patient’s significant others and offers treatment recom-
mendations at the request of the patient. These sorts of conditions would allow a patient 
to make a free decision about her health and treatment options. A patient’s free decision 
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is hard to imagine if she is only presented with the one or two options that the doctor 
wants her to explore or if a doctor believes that the option proven to be most effective is 
the only “real” option for the patient. Bioethicists probably did not have in mind the way 
in which a doctor might influence a patient and were more concerned with the influence 
of significant others when a patient is making a decision to end her life. Yet, given the 
centrality of the relationship of the doctor and patient in the life of a patient who is ill 
enough to be considering suicide, attention needs to be paid to the ways in which institu-
tional authority and the doctor-patient relationship might affect a patient’s decision mak-
ing possibilities. If bioethicists insist on a patient meeting this freedom criterion, what 
must be determined is not only the extent to which a patient is influenced by significant 
others, but also how much the patient role affects an individual’s ability to choose freely. 
Given the nature of the doctor-patient relationship described by feminists, a patient en-
gaging in a free decision making process as described by bioethicists might be difficult to 
imagine. 	  
Value Neutrality	  
The next critique feminists bring against bioethical reasoning regards claims of 
value neutrality on the part of doctors. Feminists take issue with the claim that value neu-
trality is both possible and desirable. As the quote from Wolf notes above, the starting 
point of much bioethical reasoning is the idea that doctors and patients come (or should 
come) to the table as rational, free, and unencumbered agents who enter into a contractual 
relationship aimed towards ensuring the health of the patient. This sets up the perfect 
conditions for bioethicists to claim that because this relationship is geared towards only 
the maintenance or improvement of the patient’s health, the doctor can put aside her own 
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individual values and focus strictly on this mutual aim. Sherwin explains that tradition-
al accounts of weak paternalism are often considered unproblematic because the doctor 
acts without self-interest. “To qualify as paternalism, the basis of the decision must be the 
patient’s well-being; thus it is distinguished from actions the doctor might take out of 
self-interest” (Sherwin 1992, 138). In the instances a doctor must “step in” and make de-
cisions for a patient, if the doctor is looking out for patient interest, she must be able to 
discount her own values.	  
  Yet even in the best cases of this sort of paternalism, ones in which doctors are 
wholly oriented toward the good of their patients without thought of themselves, there is 
a risk. Sherwin suggests, “Because paternalism aims for the patient’s good, it is recog-
nized as well-intentioned action, but its actual achievement in bringing about the best 
consequences is in doubt, because it is the physician’s--rather than the patient’s-- percep-
tion of the patient’s good that is decisive” (Sherwin 1992, 138). As Sherwin explains here, 
even when a doctor does her best to put aside her own values, the problem with this pa-
ternalistic impulse is that the patient’s vision of the good should be decisive when making 
treatment decisions. When she steps in for the patient, the doctor must operate from some 
notion of good, and if the doctor is making decisions for the patient, that notion of “good” 
will underlie those decisions. Most doctors are not in a position to be able to understand 
their patients’ notions of the good and the good life, and their training does not adequate-
ly prepare them to decide if a “good” treatment for a patient in terms of her physical 
health squares with the general good of the patient.	  
 The question of the right treatment for a patient is not a question that can 
be wholly answered by science, because it also involves weighing the pa-
tient’s own evaluations of the risks and benefits she may experience. It is a 
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medical mistake to believe that science can provide all the relevant infor-
mation for protecting or restoring the health of patients (Sherwin 1992, 
148).	  	  
The patient’s interests are thus almost always best served if the patient is the one making 
decisions. Only a patient herself is able to navigate making decisions oriented toward the 
satisfaction of her interests and values, and to decide whether physical health is the most 
important of those interests and values.	  
There is a larger assumption being made regarding the ability of doctors to be 
value neutral, however. It is not just that doctors can overcome or put aside their own 
values and interests because their patients’ health is their primary concern, but some be-
lieve that as long as the very scientific, technical training required to become a doctor has 
taken root, then doctors should be able to put aside personal interest and act the part of 
the objective scientist. This, again, is an effect of the institutional authority of medicine 
identified by Ikemoto. The influence of this institutional authority extends beyond the 
impact it has on how the relationship between doctor and patient is understood. The self-
privileging pointed out by Ikemoto also impacts the way in which the scope and power of 
medical training is conceptualized. The very specific training in medicine received by 
doctors is often assumed to make doctors capable of tremendous ethical feats. As Sher-
win explains, doctors are expected to bring with them, “the uniquely ‘objective’ perspec-
tive required by this scientific enterprise” (1992, 145). Even when ethicists recognize that 
physicians bring with them social and cultural values (and prejudices), there is an as-
sumption made that the physician, as an after effect of her scientific training, can some-
how “overcome” this influence when dealing with her patients. Dorothy Roberts ex-
pounds on this reasoning:	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Medical ethicists may recognize that doctors are influenced by social prej-
udices, but this is considered to be simply a distortion that should be cor-
rected in doctors’ quests to apply the principles to their practice. ‘Physi-
cians are subject to the same social constraints as others, but must learn 
from their training and experience to overcome them in the service of the 
sick.’ Thus, much of medical ethics proceeds by overlooking social prob-
lems and envisioning a generic physician who should resolve questions 
involving a generic patient by using general ethical notions (1996, 119).	  
 	  
The claim is that if the doctor’s goal is to heal the sick, and she has been well trained, any 
cultural prejudices she has are irrelevant. The primary task of the physician and her train-
ing trump cultural considerations because the doctor is trained to be an objective scientist 
and can apply the training in objectivity even to issues outside of the scientific, medical 
realm. This includes ethical decision making, despite most doctors’ lack of training in 
ethics.	  
But Sherwin points out that such claims actually ignore fundamental truths about 
the practice of medicine and ignore a set of values inherent in the scientific enterprise of 
medicine itself.	  
The appeal to technical measures lends an aura of objective truth to medi-
cal findings. In this way science supports physicians’ claims to dominance 
over other health care workers and patients. It is, however, unclear how 
much of their judgment really rests on a firm scientific foundation. Con-
temporary medical practice involves a great deal of uncertainty and intui-
tive reasoning, in addition to the aspects that are derived from well-
defined science. In claiming authority medicine presumes a degree of cer-
tainty and authority inappropriate to its actual level of knowledge (Sher-
win 1992, 147).	  
 	  
Not only medical training, but also claims of objective scientific training, support the in-
stitutional authority of medicine. Sherwin explains that because part of medicine is rooted 
in objective physical science, doctors see this scientific training as reason for claiming 
greater access to certainty than other healthcare workers. This claim to objective truth 
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also allows some doctors to ignore accounts of lived experiences of illness. Yet this 
claim that doctors work within the realm of objective science is problematic according to 
Sherwin. Medical doctors must use intuition in diagnosis and treatment. While this intui-
tion is certainly formed and guided by intensive training, some of which is in objective 
science, ultimately, doctors rely as much on intuition as they do objective science. If 
Sherwin is right, then doctors’ claims to objectivity are deeply problematic. 	  
This narrative of objectivity allows doctors to avoid any reflection on how their 
own beliefs and prejudices might impact the “private” relationships they have with their 
patients. It also allows doctors to avoid reflection about whether they are the best authori-
ty to judge what is best for their patients. Although their training might make them the 
best authority to inform patients about treatment options and to help patients evaluate 
these options, work must be done in order to argue that doctors are appropriate moral 
judges regarding the good of the patient (beyond “good” in the sense of physical health).	  
Rationality Criteria Critiqued: Realistic Worldview and Harm and Interest	  
Feminist critiques of the rational suicide literature are most evident in the criterion 
that a person wishing to suicide have a “realistic” worldview. Looking at this criterion 
through a feminist lens shows the inconsistency of the claims being made by bioethicists. 
What a “realistic worldview” is cannot be established without recourse to fundamental 
values. In light of the feminist critique explored above, requiring doctors to determine 
whether a patient’s worldview is realistic has the potential to require that doctors claim 
expertise where they have no specific expertise. 	  
This criterion is quite common in the rationality literature (c.f., Decker 1977, 
Francis 1980, Sullivan 1980, Graeber 1981, Kjervik 1984, Siegel 1986, Barry 1994, 
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Werth 1999, Cholbi 2011). How such a worldview is defined varies widely, however. 
As mentioned in the first chapter, some bioethicists understand a patient’s having a “real-
istic” worldview as simply meaning that she does not suffer the delusions or hallucina-
tions brought about by mental illness. Requiring a patient not be schizophrenic in order to 
consider her worldview realistic is unproblematic. However, when doctors start demand-
ing that their patients’ worldviews entail more specific things than the absence of delu-
sions and hallucinations, it becomes clear that doctors are forcing their own “realistic” 
worldview on their patients. For example, as addressed in Chapter 1, Carlos Prado (2010) 
requires that a person adopt a very particular metaphysical starting point in order to have 
a “realistic” worldview. The person wishing to receive assistance in dying must admit 
that death “most likely is personal annihilation” (10). A realistic worldview in this in-
stance is premised upon a person accepting or mimicking acceptance of a doctor’s belief 
regarding the non-existence of an afterlife. This requirement, however, is an overexten-
sion of Prado’s expertise. Prado, a trained philosopher, can make no absolute claims 
about the existence of an afterlife. How much more so is this true of a doctor? Writing off 
a patient’s religious beliefs and denying her access to services because of these religious 
beliefs is hardly a value neutral act. 	  
Prado’s requirement is an extreme, but even with less extreme requirements, there 
remains the danger of doctors not taking into account the cultures and subcultures to 
which a patient belongs and doctors’ own lack of knowledge about cultural difference. 
For example, a doctor would have to account for religious diversity among members of 
her culture, and be open to accepting decisions based on adoption of a set of religious 
principles wholly other than her own. Religious considerations are not based on logic, 
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and there is no way to say that a fully functional, non-delusional person’s religious 
worldview is not realistic. Also, it is highly inconsistent to start from a liberal framework 
when discussing moral issues in bioethics, but then to insist that a person who lives her 
life based on a set of moral and religious principles should be denied her rights because 
the person rendering judgment on her actions thinks her starting principles inappropriate. 	  
Some practitioners even admit that this criterion is particularly problematic. Mot-
to writes:	  
Some persons have a view of reality so different from mine that I do not 
hesitate to interfere with their right to suicide. Others’ perceptions are so 
like mine that I cannot intercede. The big problem is that large group in 
between.	  In the final analysis, then, when a decision has to be made, what 
a psychiatrist calls “realistic” is whatever looks realistic to him (1980, 
214). 	  	  
The psychiatrist has to determine whether the patient’s worldview is realistic, but Motto 
recognizes that the only perspective from which to do so is that individual doctor’s per-
spective. While psychiatrists receive specific training to render judgments about how re-
alistic the worldview of patients exhibiting certain pathologies are, any judgments about 
the beliefs of a patient that fall outside of the scope of the “pathological” are not appro-
priately judged by a psychiatrist. Not all doctors may be as aware as Motto of the ways in 
which their own limited perspectives affect their judgments regarding patients’ 
worldviews. As Sherwin explained, a doctor’s ability to put aside his own values is often 
assumed by patients and doctors alike. It is assumed, in part, because doctors are often 
understood to have undergone objective scientific training. Because of these factors, it 
seems possible, if not likely, that doctors may not recognize the ways in which they bring 
their personal values to their practice. It is even more likely that doctors do not recognize 
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the way in which their medical training has thoroughly enculturated them and affected 
their abilities to delimit the influence of the institutional authority of medicine in their 
own thinking.	  
Related to the idea that a doctor is able to determine what a realistic worldview is 
apart from his own views on the world is the idea that a doctor can readily establish what 
constitutes harm and interest in the case of an individual patient. These criteria play a 
pivotal role in the rational suicide literature. In order for rationality standards to be met, 
most bioethicists writing on rational suicide require that the act of suicide not cause more 
harm to the suicider than would staying alive and that the act of suicide be in the interests 
and/or allow the suicider to attain some of her interests. This is problematic because harm 
and interest are inherently subjective and must be determined from the perspective of the 
person who is trying to avoid harm or attain interests. In light of feminist discussions 
about value neutrality, and given that these harm and interest criteria must be applied by 
doctors to their patients, ensuring that doctors’ values do not influence the application of 
these criteria is of paramount importance. 	  
The example of Donald “Dax” Cowart shows us the difficulty of this application 
and why applying these seemingly simple criteria is hard or impossible for doctors to do 
without recourse to their own values. Dax Cowart was twenty-five years old when he and 
his father experienced a propane explosion in his car. His father died, but Cowart sur-
vived and suffered extensive burns to 65% of his body. He spent the next fourteen 
months in the hospital, during which time he repeatedly refused treatment and asked to be 
allowed to die. Doctors and nurses treated him against his will, including daily Clorox 
baths that were so painful that despite his weighing only 85 pounds, it took several people 
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to restrain him. Cowart was left blind, unable to walk, and without most of his fingers 
(c.f., Arnold and Menzel 1998, Burton 1989, Gelwick 1992, Kliever 1989, and White 
1975). After release from the hospital, he tried to kill himself several times (Cowart 1994, 
744-745).	  
Despite Cowart’s persistent and lucid refusals of treatment and requests to be al-
lowed to die, treatment was forced on him. His doctors claimed it was in his own interest 
to be kept alive because they could see an end to his treatment and claimed that he would 
eventually recognize that they were serving his interests. Significantly, years later Cowart 
still maintains that his doctors were wrong to treat him, and that despite becoming happi-
ly married and having earned a law degree since his accident, he should never have been 
kept alive against his will. When asked what he would say to the doctors who forced 
treatment on him, Cowart explains, “I would say that if they were in the bed feeling the 
pain I was feeling and experiencing what I was experiencing, they would understand very 
well. In truth, I think they did understand very well and would just not accept it” (Cowart 
1994, 744). 	  
Dax Cowart’s situation exemplifies what Sherwin, Roberts, and other feminists 
are concerned about (c.f., DeVries and Subedi 1998; Friedman 1987, 1991, 2005; Grif-
fiths 1995; Grimshaw 2005; Kukla 2007; Shim 2010). His doctors felt they knew better, 
however, and ignored his explicit wishes. Those medical practitioners, accustomed to 
preserving life and often doing so at all costs, knew that they could give Cowart some 
quality of life and overrode his persistent wishes to be allowed to die in order that they 
might save him. In doing this, doctors imposed upon the patient their judgment of what 
constituted harm and interest. 	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Yet there is a more general risk. There is the risk that when speaking of inter-
ests and harm, instead of speaking to the interest and harm of a particular patient, re-
searchers are actually preserving a moral tradition that has very distinct notions about in-
terest and harm. There are two distinct ethics at work here-- an ethic found in the medical 
field (an ethic of vitalism) and the ethic of the liberal framework. It is impossible to con-
ceive of the interests of a liberal individual without that individual having life to begin 
with. Life is the good upon which all other values are based. The liberal individual is an 
individual who uses her life to maximize her interests and to avoid harm. The harm and 
interest criteria are thus value laden, and any patient who does not adopt these values can 
be written off as simply being irrational. 	  
Application of Rationality and the Exclusion of Voices	  
 In her book The Man of Reason, Genevieve Lloyd examines the way in which the 
concept of reason has been developed and used in philosophical history. Lloyd claims 
that the concept of reason, because of the way it was developed, is unnecessarily mascu-
line. This is not to say that reason has been culturally constructed or is an entirely useless 
concept, but that the way in which philosophers have spoken about the concept has dis-
torted philosophers’ understanding of reason. Philosophers have unnecessarily empha-
sized typically masculine traits when developing conceptions of reason, and the historical 
exclusion of women from philosophical discussions of reason has exacerbated the distor-
tion. Worse, this distorted version of reason was often the very concept used to ground 
the justification of the explicit exclusion of women from the philosophical enterprise. 	  
Feminist bioethicists have built upon Lloyd’s critique and applied it to specific 
discussions in the bioethics literature. They have noted similar ways in which the exclu-
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sion of women, minority, and disabled voices from bioethical discussions have distort-
ed ethical conversations happening in the field. The claim of this section is that a similar 
exclusion happens in the literature on rational suicide and that this exclusion has laid the 
conditions for the distortion of the very concept which the literature claims to describe. 
Presenting evidence for this is difficult, however, because the evidence for the claim is 
the lack of attention paid to accounts of the suicidal in the literature. The literature on ra-
tional suicide is almost exclusively devoted to exploring doctors’ and ethicists’ reasoning 
about the possibility of rational suicide. The rational suicide literature has not allowed the 
stories, or as Hilde Lindemann phrases it, counterstories, of the suicidal to be heard. In-
stead, the medical world has constructed a narrative for and about suicidal persons that 
ignores the narratives offered by the suicidal themselves (Lindemann Nelson 2001). My 
next chapter will argue for the importance of the inclusion of this counterstory and for  
examination of the suicidal persons’ perspectives in the rationality literature.	  
I am persuaded by Genevieve Lloyd’s claim that unnecessarily gendered notions 
of reason have been used to marginalize women in philosophical discussion. Lloyd offers 
an historical account of the development of the concept of reason throughout Western 
philosophy, starting with an explanation of reason in Plato and working through modern 
conceptions of reason, to show the ways in which feminine characteristics have been sys-
tematically identified with a lesser (or “complementary”) form of reason. She uses this 
historical exploration to argue that the concept of reason has been made unnecessarily 
masculine and has been put to political purposes. These political purposes have included 
denying women a place in philosophical discussions, as well as denying women full po-
litical rights and the recognition as full moral persons. Her concern is not the outright 
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claim that women are not able to reason; instead, it is the claim that women have ac-
cess to a lesser form of reason and that historically, this claim has prevented women from 
achieving full moral personhood in the eyes of men and from being awarded full rights. 
Reason here is not understood simply as the cognitive capability that allows people to 
make judgments. Lloyd explains that bound up in most descriptions of reason are also 
gendered characteristics. As she states, “It is not a question simply of the applicability to 
women of neutrally specified ideals of rationality but rather of the genderization of the 
ideals themselves. An exclusion or transcending of the feminine is built into the past ide-
as of Reason as the sovereign human character trait” (37). It is not just that women are 
unable to achieve the ideal reason spoken of by philosophers, but that this ideal has been 
designed in such a way that anyone of a particularly “feminine” nature will not be able to 
achieve this ideal. Lloyd argues that philosophers have not developed a conception of 
human reason that captures a wide variety of human experience. Instead, the focus of 
Western philosophers on the perspective of white males has bound the concept of reason 
to that perspective; as a result, what has been presented for centuries as the universal and 
“objective” ideal of reason is actually a very limited and perspectival view of reason.	  
This masculine conception of reason has had considerable influence. Lloyd cata-
logues this influence and explains the way in which this deeply gendered conception of 
reason has impacted philosophical history. It has also had practical effects that Lloyd 
enumerates. She explains, for example, that  it has allowed philosophers to, “believe that 
women are less rational than men,” and to, “formulate their ideas of rationality with male 
paradigms in mind” (103). Lloyd’s concern is that reason is not just the measure of true 
and right judgment, but also that it is incorporated into the understanding of the “proper 
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relations between our status as knowers and the rest of our lives” (ix). The effect gen-
dered reason has had on the ascription of rationality and the status of certain groups of 
knowers is interesting for my purposes. When a person’s rational nature and status as a 
knower come into question, it becomes easier to justify restricting the control she has 
over her own life for her “own good.” If feminine personality characteristics are associat-
ed with a “diminished” form of reason and thus a lessened rationality, and many or most 
women display these characteristics, then barring women from certain realms (political, 
moral, etc.) becomes not only possible, but right.	  
 Feminist bioethicists use Lloyd’s research to uncover and explore similar move-
ments in the bioethical and health care fields, pointing to a marginalization that is similar 
to the field of philosophy (c.f., Antony and Witt 1993; Bordo 1986; Code 1991; Harding 
1982; Nagl-Docekal 1999; Rooney 1991; Walker 1992). Just as a very particular perspec-
tive was privileged during the creation and development of the concept of reason, a simi-
lar privileging happens in discussions regarding issues in bioethics and there is a similar 
tendency to marginalize women and other underrepresented populations in those discus-
sions.	  
 As feminist bioethicists have indicated, in many areas of health care marginalized 
populations are negatively affected by a gendered conception of autonomy. For example, 
Roberts argues that women, and specifically pregnant women of color, have experienced 
dismissal as a marginalized class (1996). She writes	  
Judges and doctors describe women who refuse medical treatment as an-
gry, irrational, fearful, stubborn, selfish, and uncooperative. They dismiss 
these women’s reasons for rejecting doctor’s recommendations, reasons 
which are not expressed in scientific terms, as unfounded and illegitimate 
(134).	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In this article, Roberts catalogues legal cases in which forced medical intervention is used 
on pregnant women of color, and uses these cases to argue that the voices of women of 
color are systematically ignored and dismissed by the medical and legal establishments. 
The problem is not just that doctors use their cultural capital and the institutional authori-
ty of their field to dismiss the concerns and desires of individual patients and to label the-
se patients irrational, but that there are patterns of dismissing the desires and interests of 
particular groups that are supported by the medical and legal establishments.	  
          It is not only women of color whose voices are being marginalized. In her article 
“Deciding on Death: Conventions and Contestations in the Context of Disability,” 
Margrit Shildrick (2008) explains how conventional conceptions of autonomy developed 
by bioethicists have limited the range of disabled voices that are heard in bioethical de-
bates, specifically in debates over physician assisted suicide. Autonomy, notably consti-
tuted by freedom and rationality according to Shildrick (2008, 210), has become the 
standard by which to establish that a person can fully participate in making decisions 
about her care. Shildrick echoes both Wolf’s and Ikemoto’s concerns about bioethics un-
derstanding moral dilemmas only in terms of conflicting rights of individuals (or individ-
uals and the state). Resolution of moral dilemmas thus becomes premised upon maximiz-
ing a person’s ability to exercise her autonomy. Shildrick points to the fact that main-
stream bioethical standards of autonomy are premised upon the assumption of atomistic 
individuals, and she explores how the demand for a person to meet rigorous and specific 
conceptions of autonomous personhood plays out in the context of end of life decision 
making:	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In terms of the ethical delivery of health care, the multifarious variations 
demand on a pragmatic level sometimes more sophisticated than a single 
category approach can encompass. The difficulty, then, with the vigorous 
pursuit of any absolutist rights discourse, which inevitably speaks to a 
commonality of human interests, is that in the context of deciding on death, 
it covers over the complexity, as though everyone desires the same ends or 
enjoyed their form of embodiment in the same way (214).	  
 	  
While Ikemoto pointed out the way institutionalized medical authority constructs a fic-
tionalized doctor-patient relationship in terms of autonomous actors, Shildrick looks 
more closely at the patient half of this relationship. The problem is not only that unrecog-
nized institutional authority causes an imbalance in a relationship that is cast as a rela-
tionship between two equal actors, but that the patient role has been wrongly conceptual-
ized to begin with. Even if the scales in this relationship were balanced somehow, and the 
institutional authority of the doctor could be mitigated, requiring patients to meet the 
standards of autonomy assumed by bioethicists is problematic.	  
 The very specific idea of autonomy assumed by many bioethicists distorts the re-
ality experienced by most patients, and this is especially true in the context of end of life 
decision making. The disabled are not able to exercise their autonomy fully because of 
physical limitations, and this has led to the discounting of their perspective in bioethics 
debates surrounding end of life issues. A particular vision of the sovereign liberal indi-
vidual is put forth by philosophers and bioethicists, and a person who fulfills this vision is 
capable of moving herself through the world by her own power, of being embodied in a 
particular way. Persons with disabilities do not meet those standards, and thus are, im-
plicitly or explicitly, denied full moral agency because they cannot exercise their auton-
omy fully (c.f., DeVries and Subedi 1998; Friedman 1987, 1991, 2005; Grimshaw 2005; 
Hollway 1998; Kukla 2007; Sherwin 2005).	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     Yet this is not an issue that is limited to the disabled community. As both 
Sherwin’s and Robert’s research show, minorities and women are often understood as 
incapable of meeting the standards necessary for achieving full moral recognition and are 
rarely heard from in bioethical debates. In addition to the lack of visibility of marginal-
ized groups supported by sexism, racism, and ableism, there is the self-privileging and 
justifying nature of medical knowing to consider as well.	  
Significantly, either subjective experiences of illness nor health care expe-
riences from allied professions are recognized as providing the appropriate 
training in the art of medicine, because neither one begins with rigorous 
grounding in science (Sherwin 1992, 147).	  
 	  
It is not only that particular groups of people are ignored, but that experiences of illness 
and the experiences of non-doctors are devalued. This consideration is interesting for any 
discussion in which a particular population is being spoken about, but is not being spoken 
with. How does one justify talking about, but not with, a population? As Sherwin points 
out, narrative accounts of illness are not considered appropriate sources of information 
when speaking to medical issues or developing medical knowledge.  When you justify 
the exclusion of a minority group from discussions that impact that group, and you use a 
concept developed by a dominant group, there is a reasonable chance that the dominant 
group is privileging its own understanding of the minority group without proper justifica-
tion. The institutional authority granted to medicine often allows for the unreflective self-
privileging of medical knowledge.	  
In the case of the rational suicide literature, doctors and bioethicists not only ques-
tion doctors’ willingness to aid in death, but also the conditions under which extending 
this service is morally justifiable. Building off of the juxtaposition explained by Sherwin, 
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the question of the moral permissibility of these services is seen in light of a conflict 
between individual rights and paternalistic impulses. The literature looks to identify the 
circumstances under which those wishing to receive aid in suicide can be understood as 
capable of exercising individual rights, that is, when a person meets the standards of full 
moral personhood. On the face of it, this seems unproblematic. Yet when this movement 
is considered next to similar movements, such as the discussion of the disabled by bioeth-
icists without inclusion of disabled voices in that discussion, or the discussion of women 
and their appropriate place in political and moral spheres without the inclusion of wom-
en’s voices, a disturbing parallel is evident.	  
Similarly, the fact that very little, if anything at all, is heard from the suicidal in 
much of the rational suicide literature should at least make us cautious about conclusions 
drawn about the suicidal in that literature. Since doctors are being asked to provide the 
means of death for their patients, the need to understand doctors’ beliefs about assisted 
suicide is an incredibly important task when speaking to the moral permissibility of as-
sisted suicide. Yet if the focus remains only on this “half” of the assisted suicide equation, 
the other half is ignored and researchers run the risk of unthinkingly marginalizing the 
very population the literature looks to address. Spellman and Lugones’ (1983) insistence 
that marginalized voices be given full audience must be taken seriously here. As they 
state,	  
To put the same point slightly differently, part of the human life, human 
living, is talking about it, and we can be sure that being silenced in one’s 
own account of one’s life is a kind of amputation that signals oppression. 
Another reason for not divorcing life from the telling of it or talking about 
it is that as humans our experiences are deeply influenced by what is said 
about them, by ourselves or powerful (as opposed to significant) others 
(573).	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The next chapter will look closely at a sustained account of suicidality and will ask what 
this account might add to the literature on rational suicide. Any theory or account of a 
way of life developed without reference to the people experiencing that way of life runs 
the risk of misconstruing the phenomenon the account looks to describe. As Spellman 
and Lugones (1983) write: “No account can do this if it doesn’t get the parts right to 
begin with and this cannot happen if the concepts used to describe a life are utterly for-
eign” (578). The next chapter is dedicated to listening to a suicidal voice that offers sus-
tained reflection on suicidality and to apply it to bioethical debates surrounding rational 
and assisted suicide.	  
What the next chapter will uncover is that in the process of trying to define ra-
tional suicide, bioethicists have focused too much on the first half of that phrase, rational, 
to the detriment of their understanding of the second half of that phrase, suicide. This is 
in part because of the exclusion of the suicidal from the rational suicide debate. Just as 
reason became a distorted and overly masculine concept because of the exclusion of 
women, the concept of rational suicide has become distorted because of the lack of atten-
tion paid to the suicidal.	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CHAPTER THREE 
LIVED SUICIDALITY 
 There is something odd about this dissertation so far. For a dissertation on suicide, 
I have said very little about the phenomenon of suicide itself. Suicide is arguably the 
most unique and extreme action a person is capable of performing. The act of suicide 
takes away the possibility of other acts and uses the power of the actor to destroy the pos-
sibility of power and action. Suicide cuts off all possibilities, shuts down community, and 
ends all projects. Given the uniquely individual nature of suicidality and the radical na-
ture of the act of suicide, any attempt at offering a description of how suiciders should be 
dealt with, or moral judgments regarding the act or assisting in the act, should involve 
considerable attention to the individuals most affected by these discussions and judg-
ments: the suicidal themselves. 
Although suiciders have been talked about, few voices of people struggling with 
suicidality have been heard in the preceding chapters. The academic work addressed in 
this project has been written from the perspective of academics and healthcare profes-
sionals about the particular decisions and considerations clinicians must make when con-
fronted with suicidal people. Moreover, most of this work has aimed to answer the very 
specific question, “What are the conditions a professional must see met by the person re-
questing assistance in dying in order to extend assistance in dying?” These conditions 
have been defined exclusively from the perspective of those who are not suicidal and 
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have focused on rationality as the linchpin of moral argumentation in favor of provid-
ing assistance in suicide. While the concerns of health care providers and the ethical con-
cerns surrounding health care providers offering assistance in suicide to patients should 
be addressed, it is equally important that the voices of the suicidal factor into this debate. 
A full description and analysis of rational suicide requires that as much attention be paid 
to the suicidal as to healthcare professionals. Without making an attempt to understand 
the suicidal perspective, the ethical analysis of suicide and assisted suicide remains in-
complete. As I argued in the last chapter, the rational suicide literature has marginalized 
suicidal knowers due to the privileging of the liberal individual, the myth of value neu-
trality, and the marginalization of underrepresented populations.  
Yet there is a problem in the literature that runs deeper than even these, and one 
that finds its source in the fact that the literature, for the most part, has ignored the indi-
vidual experiences of those struggling with suicidality. This chapter looks to establish the 
ethical and practical necessity of consideration of the lived experience of suicidality and 
the effects that this consideration has on the concept of “rational suicide.” I will argue 
that when the experience of a person struggling with suicidality is considered, it will be 
found that those writing on “rational suicide” have operated from an inadequate under-
standing of the nature of suicidality, and that “rational suicide” is conceptually problem-
atic.  
 In what follows, I will present Jean Améry’s account of suicidality as offered in 
On Suicide: A Discourse on Voluntary Death. The importance of listening to Améry’s 
account of suicidality can be supported by Lindemann’s account of counterstories. Alt-
hough Améry, as a white educated European male, does not come from a particular popu-
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lation that Lindemann had in mind when writing about the necessity of counterstories 
for the empowerment of marginalized populations, a case can be made that counterstories 
of suiciders are needed. While Améry in many ways occupies a place of privilege, so 
much so that he was given the opportunity to present On Suicide as a series of lectures 
over south German radio, bioethicists have not listened to his story yet, and there is little 
acknowledgement of him in the rational suicide literature. I believe Améry’s account has 
not been considered in the assisted suicide literature because it takes a strange form. The 
description of suicidality he offers does not fit the mold of the usual stories of told about 
those wishing to receive assistance in suicide, and as I will suggest, his account should be 
understood as a counterstory.  
I will offer a brief account of Hilde Lindemann’s concept of counterstory and ex-
plain the function and importance of counterstories. I will then argue that Améry’s work 
meets Lindemann’s definition of a counterstory and explain why understanding On Sui-
cide as counterstory is important for its application to the rational suicide literature. After 
justifying On Suicide as counterstory, I will offer an exegesis of Améry’s writing in order 
to construct a fuller account of suicidality that references a suicider’s lived experience. 
Finally, I will argue that what this account demonstrates is that “rational suicide” as a 
concept is flawed because rationality cannot be ascribed to the lived experience of suicid-
ality. Instead, in talking of rational suicide, bioethicists impose a narrative on suiciders as 
a group that is not rooted in a full understanding of suicidality generally. 
Counterstory and Its Importance 
In order to apply the concept of counterstory to Améry’s On Suicide: A Discourse 
on Voluntary Death, I will answer three questions: What is a counterstory? Why is a 
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counterstory important and ethically relevant? And finally, how will my reading of 
the rational suicide literature benefit from understanding Améry’s account of his own su-
icidality as a counterstory? 
Lindemann gives a brief definition of counterstory in her 1995 article, “Resistance 
and Insubordination,” that will help orient an explanation of the concept of the counter-
story.  
I introduce the notion of the counterstory: a story that contributes to the 
moral self-definition of its teller by undermining a dominant story, undo-
ing it and retelling it in such a way as to invite new interpretations and 
conclusions. Counterstories can be told anywhere, but particularly when 
told within chosen communities, they permit their tellers to reenter, as full 
citizens, the communities of place whose goods have been only imperfect-
ly available to its marginalized members (1995, 23). 
 
Immediately, several definitive criteria for the counterstory are seen. A counterstory must 
allow its teller to add to her own moral self-definition to the story. This process of self-
definition must resist some other dominant narrative that has been placed upon the teller, 
and the teller must reinterpret that dominant narrative in light of her own counterstory. 
Finally, the counterstory must allow the teller to resist marginalization and to (re)enter 
the community she to which has been denied full access to as a result of the dominant 
narrative.  
The first criterion a counterstory must meet to be considered a counterstory is that 
it must be a story. In Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, Lindemann explains that 
there are four components of a story. First, it must be depictive, that is, describe human 
living and experience. Two, it must be selective. The teller must be particular in what she 
depicts and not merely chronicle all events that happen around a given topic. Third, it 
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must be interpretive. An author must characterize events and persons through a lens 
of meaning. This can also include the development of the person telling the story. Fourth, 
a story must be connective. Stories have to show some causal connections within the sto-
ry (2001, 12-14). 
Meeting the criteria necessary to be a story is not sufficient for a story to be a 
counterstory, though. Lindemann explains that while all counterstories are stories, not all 
stories are counterstories. What distinguishes counterstories from “plain” stories are the 
remaining criteria identified by Lindemann. A counterstory must be a story told by a per-
son in order to offer herself moral self-definition. Lindemann appeals to Margaret Urban 
Walker’s definition of strong moral self definition: “It is ‘the ability of morally developed 
persons to install and observe precedents for themselves which are both distinct of them 
and binding upon them morally’ (Walker 1987, 173)” (2001, 15-16). Counterstories al-
low a person to take stock of her own history, determine what moral values defined her 
history, to reevaluate those values to determine whether she still has the same values, and 
to commit to a set of values for the future.  
Consider, as an example, the story of a student told me about her first two years at 
college. She had a very different economic and cultural background from the majority of 
her peers. In her first two years at the college she tried to deny the differences between 
herself and her peers and tried to acclimate to her peers’ lifestyle. This involved a very 
particular way of dressing, a different speech pattern than she was used to, as well as 
“partying” which involved the use of drugs she would not have considered doing before 
coming to this institution. She sat in my office and told me this story, explaining to me, “I 
wanted to fit in, but I knew it wasn’t me. But this is what students who go here are like.” 
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When I asked her to tell me what the two years would have been like if she had been 
“her,” she told me a story of a studious woman who joined clubs, wore sweatpants to the 
cafeteria, spent more time with her family, but still went to a party every once in awhile. 
Through some discussion, the student admitted that what she valued was “doing right” by 
her family, doing well in academics, and enjoying the “college experience” in a safer 
way. She was a local student on scholarship and felt the “mark” of that when she was sur-
rounded by her affluent peers. She had come to realize in her third year, however, that 
she had acted out of a set of values that was not entirely her own, but those she assumed 
she would need to adopt to be part of the college community. Telling the story of her first 
two years at college allowed her to realize that she wanted to work from a slightly differ-
ent set of values going forward, and she did. The counterstory she told was of a different 
sort of student at the institution we were part of, and it allowed her to weave in elements 
of her moral identity, yet still remain part of the community.  
An additional criterion that a story must meet in order to be a proper counterstory 
is that this story allows a person to confront and resist some dominant narrative. In Dam-
aged Identities, Narrative Repair, Lindemann calls this a “master narrative.” 
Master narratives are often archetypal, consisting of stock plots and readi-
ly recognizable character types, and we use them not only to make sense 
of our experience but also to justify what we do. As the repositories of 
common norms, master narratives exercise a certain authority over our 
moral imaginations and play a role in informing our moral institutions 
(Lindemann 2001, 6). 
 
In the instance of the student above, the master narrative at work was the story of the 
“typical student” at the college. This master narrative is quite influential at the institution. 
It tells the story of a student who comes from a monied background, who cares little for 
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grades and academic achievement, who spends the majority of his energy on his so-
cial group at the school, and who looks to “party” as much as possible. This is a story told 
not only by students at the institution, but also by other members of the institution, as 
well as by members of the surrounding community. Although there are other characteri-
zations of students at this college, this narrative is certainly the dominant one. My stu-
dent’s reclamation of her own values in telling the story of her first two years at college, 
and then reinterpreting that story based on her own values and telling a new story about 
the sort of student she would become at that institution, is an excellent example of the 
way in which a counterstory can allow someone to resist a master narrative that does not 
align with her values. While my student did not reject the master narrative entirely -- for 
instance, she still wanted to go to parties and participate in college rituals -- her counter-
story allowed her to be selective about the strains of the master narrative she wove into 
her own story and to reenter the dominant community with a sense of her moral identity 
intact.  
 Thus, counterstories are stories marginalized groups or persons tell in order to re-
sist a master narrative and to reenter a community as full moral persons. This is of moral 
significance because, as Lindemann writes, “...the extent to which our moral agency is 
free or constrained is determined by our own--and other’s--conception of who we are” 
(2001, xi). Lindemann argues that personal identities are constituted in part by the stories 
a person tells herself about who she is, as well as the stories which are told about her. If 
this is the case, these stories change the scope of action available to that person and 
change the goods to which she has access. Lindemann appeals to Martha Minnow’s 
(1980) concept of the “dilemma of difference,” explaining that public policies often ig-
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nore the difference between dominant groups and less powerful groups; in so doing 
they “create a false neutrality that favors the dominant group: its characteristics are taken 
as the norm, while groups with other characteristics are marked as deviant” (1995, 28-
29). This dilemma of difference, if it goes unrecognized, can create serious problems for 
marginalized groups and persons. It can lead to the social isolation and oppression of 
people and groups. If a person (or group of persons) is marked as deviant, she will not be 
recognized as a full moral person. A marginalized group or person might take up this 
identity as deviant and submoral as their own, as well. Moreover, this oppression and 
marginalization is not problematic simply because of social isolation, but because these 
groups might be denied goods, services, and the ability to exercise rights because of the 
way in which they are labeled deviant through the master narrative that supports public 
policies (Lindemann 2001, 20-21). 
Telling stories about groups which display characteristics cast as “deviant” by 
master narratives helps call into question the privileging of the norms supported by those 
narratives. This begins to open up a space for those marginalized by labels of “deviant” to 
communicate with those who are the unknowing recipients of the privileges that come 
with the adoption of master narratives. Counterstories can allow marginalized groups or 
people to achieve recognition, to access goods which were previously denied, and, as in 
the case of my student, to reject the internalizing of aspects of the master narrative that do 
not fit with their own moral self-definition. Lindemann writes in “Sophie Doesn’t: Fami-
lies and Counterstories of Self-Trust,” 
To oppress a person or a group of people is precisely to force them to rec-
ognize you, but to be unwilling to extend recognition in turn. The point of 
many counterstories is to break up this pattern. The teller, no longer will-
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ing to be complicit in the system of knowing others but never being known in 
return, uses the story to elicit recognition from the community that has op-
pressed her. To do this, her story becomes, as it were, a pair of spectacles 
that she extends to the inhabitants of the normal moral context who can’t 
see her without them (1996, 101). 
 
Another important aspect of the counterstory, then, is that it allows the marginalized per-
son or group a way to become seen by those who are in a dominant group. It allows those 
in a dominant group access to an understanding of ways of life that may initially appear 
deviant to them, but that are in fact merely different ways of life and different ways of 
navigating the world. This is an important step for avoiding and correcting the access and 
alienation issues mentioned above.  
In some sense, the suicidal have been cast as an especially deviant group. Those 
who suicide reject life, and thus, reject belonging to groups and taking on societal pro-
jects entirely. One might consider suicide a kind of ontological deviance. Yet this is why 
it is especially important to listen to the counterstories of the suicidal. The suicidal have 
experienced a deprivation of opportunity because of the “deviant” label unthinkingly as-
signed to them. They have not had the opportunity to enter into a debate that speaks of 
them and greatly impacts them. The suicidal have been denied full moral recognition in 
the rational suicide literature insofar as bioethicists have spoken about them, but usually 
not with them. Lindeman writes,  
Counterstories, which root out the master narratives in the tissue of stories 
that constitute an oppressive identity and replace them with stories that 
depict the person as morally worthy, supply the necessary means of re-
sistance...Through their function of narrative repair, counterstories thus 
open up the possibility that the person could attain, regain, or extend her 
freedom of moral agency (2001, 150). 
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Not only must the suicidal be given a voice and the opportunity to come to the moral 
table to participate in discussions that directly impact them, but additionally it is equally 
important that those who take up the master narratives in this discussion attempt to take 
up the “spectacles” offered to them by the suicidal in telling their stories. Examination of 
Améry’s On Suicide: A Discourse on Voluntary Death will reveal that this essay fits the 
criteria and can do this work of counterstory needed desperately by the rational suicide 
literature. 
Améry as Counterstory 
The case can be made quite easily that Améry’s On Suicide meets the require-
ments necessary to be classified as a counterstory. Améry’s account is depictive insofar 
as it describes human living and experience, and a very particular sort of human experi-
ence--the experience of feeling the inclination toward death (1999, 7). He is selective in 
his depiction of suicidality in On Suicide. It is not a mere chronicle of his own experience 
of suicidality, and while he tells anecdotes about his personal experience, he does not list 
every suicidal thought he has ever had. The selective nature of On Suicide is further high-
lighted by the interpretive nature of his account of suicidality. He characterizes it through 
a lens that is not condemnatory by focusing on the meaning suicidality creates for those 
living through it. He casts the suicidal perspective as a totally “other” way of seeing the 
world (1999, 10). Finally, On Suicide is connective because causal connections are drawn 
between what Améry identifies as the roots of suicidality and the experiences that come 
with suicidality. He also draws causal connections between nonsuicidal persons’ under-
standings of normal or non-pathological ways of living in the world and nonsuicidal per-
sons’ ignoring or restricting the voices of the suicidal (1999, 59).  
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On Suicide also contributes to Améry’s moral self-definition. There are many 
examples of this in the text, and the exegetical portion of this chapter will look at several 
of them. The most striking example deserves note here, however, in addition to being dis-
discussed later. Améry tells one particular story that allows for strong moral self-
definition, the story that alerted me to problems in the bioethics literature in the first 
place. In this story, Améry wakes up in the hospital after his 1974 suicide attempt. He 
speaks of the ways in which he experienced the care provided by health care workers as 
degradation and the doctors’ assumptions of his gratitude as presumptuous. All Améry 
wanted was to be allowed to die (Améry 1999, 79). The inclination towards death that he 
experiences is described as an intimate, foundational part of his identity. The doctors and 
nurses, in assuming that he should be glad to have been “saved,” told a story that was 
other than Améry’s, one that was influenced by the idea of the deviant and wayward sui-
cider.  
This text also allows resistance of a master narrative. Améry explains that suicidal 
people are not heard in the literature written about them. Améry speaks in this text as a 
suicidal person and not just about suicidal people. Immediately and repeatedly, Améry 
makes explicit that research on suicide speaks on behalf of a very particular population--
those who research suicide and the dominant societies in which they live (c.f., 1999, 3, 5, 
59, 102). These researchers start their explorations from a very particular understanding 
of what it is to be in the world and the value of being in the world, without recognizing 
the implicit values assumed by their research. Améry rejects the characterization of all 
who are inclined towards death as mentally ill or deviant. In one point in the text, he 
draws a parallel between homosexuals and suicidal people, explaining that neither are 
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sick, but that the orientations each of the groups experience are similarly deep. As 
deeply as homosexuals experience their inclination toward the same sex, so suiciders ex-
perience the inclination toward death (1999, 56).  
Moreover, he very explicitly sets up a distinction between a dominant story and a 
nondominant story. Nonsuicidal people buy into a very particular narrative of what it is to 
live as a human being, and that story is dominant in society (c.f., 1999, 13, 18, 46, 57, 
79). The nonsuicidal story acts as the “repository of common norms” regarding suicide 
and shapes many people’s moral understanding of suicidality (Lindeman 2001, 6). Améry 
calls this the logic of life (1999, 5). Suicidal people, however, live with a different narra-
tive about the value of life of which Améry offers an account. In this account he resists 
the dominant narrative told about suicidality by those who are not suicidal and confronts 
the ways in which this dominant narrative has oppressed suicidal expression. 
This work certainly allowed Améry to enter more fully into dominant community, 
not only because of the content of the text, but because of the form the expression of the 
text took. On Suicide was originally broadcast as a series of radio lectures in south Ger-
many, and the written text has been translated into several different languages (Améry 
1999, xi). Although the work itself has not been taken up at large in mainstream suicidol-
ogy or bioethics literature, I will argue that the story Améry tells is one that demands to 
be taken seriously by both groups, as well as being a story that makes it hard to deny sui-
cidal people a place in discussion of the morality of assisted suicide. This work should be 
recognized by the community of researchers of suicide, and it is the work of this chapter 
to bring to light the revelations it has to teach those of us who occupy this dominant 
community. 
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In this work, Améry provides a perspective anyone interested in the relation-
ship between rationality and suicide cannot ignore. Here is a man whose life is an exam-
ple of the possibilities of rationality. Améry is often called “the philosopher of Ausch-
witz.” His unconventional training in philosophy and literature allowed him to begin to 
articulate the inarticulable: how being a victim of tremendous violence and torture and 
how seeing others similarly victimized changes a person, and moreover, how the exist-
ence of these sorts of experiences en masse changes (or should change) intellectuals’ un-
derstandings of how the history of thought should be approached. Améry cannot be writ-
ten off as irrational; his life serves as a concrete example of the pinnacle of rational dis-
course in the midst of that which seems beyond rationalization (c.f., Brudholm 2008, 
Heidelberger-Leonard 2010, McCann 2001, and Stark 2001). Améry’s life is the ultimate 
counterstory. He is in a unique position that renders him especially capable of offering 
bioethicists “spectacles.”  
But there is another reason it is important to cast Améry’s On Suicide as counter-
story. Methodologically, understanding it as counterstory offers a considerable benefit in 
that it offers a framework within which to make the text more approachable and more 
applicable to practical ethical situations. The unique form of Améry’s treatise might help 
explain why it has not been taken up by the literature. Like many of his other works, On 
Suicide has incredibly insightful moments, though it does not have the hallmarks of a tra-
ditional philosophical text. Because of this, it makes it hard to classify as a work, and 
even harder to work with in an applied way. Unlike most philosophical treatises, its goal 
is not to render a concept at hand as clear as possible. This is in part because Améry 
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thinks clarifying and attempting to universalize the concept of suicidality too much 
can distort the concept.  As Kramer explains,  
[Améry] adopted the essay as his own, thus cultivating a form that suited 
his aim for an interventionist thinking. The essayist, in the tradition of 
Montaigne, relies on the assumption that subjective experience needs to be 
taken as a pivotal point of reference wherever a philosopher seeks to attain 
novel perceptions. The essay, in the way Améry uses it, functions as a me-
dium that remains true to the singularity of each experience but at the 
same time charges each with reflexivity and insight. Every thought and 
every concept is linked to the subjectivity of the narrator (2004, 138). 
 
On Suicide is an essay that uses subjective exploration, description, and autobiography, 
and uses these as a base of non-traditional argumentation. This does justice to the subject 
matter of suicidality in a way that a traditional philosophical essay might not. Améry’s 
aim in this work is not to offer an argument for the fact that suicidality is not connected 
with rationality, or even an argument against preventionist measures. Instead, he offers as 
close a description as he is able of the lived experience of suicidality, sometimes proffer-
ing explicit philosophical analysis, other times merely reflecting on his own experience.1 
By using this form of the essay to walk the line between the researcher of a phenomenon 
and one of those affected by the researched phenomenon, Améry is uniquely qualified to 
offer comment and critique of the concept of suicidality as it is presented in research on 
suicidality. In doing this, he offers his reader the chance to rid herself of her own presup-
positions about how it is to live as suicidal. Even if it is not possible to “think” suicide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It might be tempting to refer to Améry’s work here as “phenomenological,” but Améry explicitly denies 
this explaining that he has, “dispensed with all concepts derived from the word logos and defined by disci-
plines of academic inquiry--out of modesty and with respect to positive research” (1999, xxiii). This disa-
vowal of the phenomenological method is fitting, as he does not offer a rigorous phenomenology, but mere-
ly a thorough description that tries to approach suicidality, a way of being in the world that eludes themati-
zation.  
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directly, Améry believes persons should think “toward” it with as few presuppositions 
as possible, as “it plagues what are perhaps the deepest levels of our existence” and is 
worthy of patient consideration (1999, 28). 
So the importance of understanding On Suicide  as counterstory is not only be-
cause it allows recourse to Lindemann’s arguments regarding the ethical importance of 
listening to counterstories, but also because understanding Améry’s work in terms of 
counterstory allows researchers to pull from it information and testimony against which 
to test the dominant narrative they have constructed. If On Suicide is understood as a sto-
ry that confronts a dominant narrative and does reparative work to the identity of the per-
son telling it, then it is easier to justify why a work that seems esoteric should have bear-
ing on an applied philosophical debate. 
 This is why On Suicide offers an appropriate and important counterstory to con-
sider. Améry explains that researchers in suicide speak on behalf of researchers, and they 
speak on behalf of those who take up societal projects. They do not speak to the concerns 
of suiciders, and in fact, they hardly listen to the suicidal. The description of the lived ex-
perience of suicidality provided by Améry is one that challenges the belief that suicidality 
can be talked about in terms of rationality at all. What this counterstory will show is that 
suicide is neither rational nor irrational, but is arational. Using Améry’s account of his 
experience, I will argue that because of the primordial nature of suicidality, suicidality is 
arational and cannot be classified in terms of rationality. Suicidality takes root in some-
one before rational concerns can be considered. In restricting the stories of the suicidal to 
those wishing to receive assistance in dying at the end of their lives for “rational” rea-
sons, the rational suicide literature has worked with a distorted and imbalanced concep-
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tion of suicidality. Thus, the theoretical foundations upon which the rational suicide 
debate are built are weak because there is an insurmountable difficulty with the concept 
of “rational suicide” itself.  
Exegesis of Améry 
The aim of this part of this chapter is to exegete the first two sections of Améry’s 
On Suicide. Améry’s work is not just the esoteric ponderings of a public intellectual, but 
is in fact an oppressed person’s attempt to bring light to the story of an oppressed group 
to which he belongs. Since Améry’s story has been established as a counterstory, we can 
call on Lindemann’s reasons for the ethical necessity of those in power listening to coun-
terstories that resist master narratives. Additionally, harkening back to Spellman and Lu-
gones’ claim referenced at the end of the last chapter, Améry’s counterstory also has the 
practical effect of helping theorists avoid unrealistic depictions of the lived experience of 
groups to which the theorists do not belong. 
In order to understand the counterstory that Améry offers, this work must be con-
sidered slowly and patiently. Although the form this work takes is not that of a traditional 
philosophical treatise, Améry’s work offers useful concepts and descriptions of lived ex-
perience that are applicable to the rational suicide debate. Although bringing one suicidal 
voice to this debate will not fully compensate for decades of ignoring these voices, it will 
allow some of the issues that have developed as a result of the lack of suicidal voices to 
come to the fore. Again, Améry is in a unique position to be this voice insofar as he has 
some philosophical training and considerable familiarity with suicide research. Before we 
discuss how the insights into suicidality Améry provides in On Suicide might be useful to 
the rational suicide debate, the text must first be examined. 
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Although I will look for insights that can be garnered from the work, insofar 
as it is possible, my exegesis will not attempt to resolve the ambiguities inherent in Amé-
ry’s essay.2 He writes of the exploration of suicide: 
This is an uncanny landscape I am entering when I try to substantiate this; 
a swampy area, a bog hung with mist, before which the essayist should 
protect himself. He doesn’t; he’s not accustomed to be concerned about 
himself. And so let’s say right here and let’s also offer a vulnerable flank 
to every kind of criticism: one can’t get through this with clear thinking 
(1999, 23). 
 
Améry explains ambiguities are an unavoidable pitfall of research on suicidality. Given 
the nature of suicidality, to resolve these ambiguities would amount to being unjust to the 
true nature of the phenomenon in question. Non-suicidal people might be able to see the 
outline and limits of suicidality, but the lived experience, the content, of suicidality will 
remain beyond their grasp because suicidality is intimately tied to a subjective experience 
of suicidality (1999, 8). Moreover, for reasons that will soon become apparent, the “con-
tent” of suicidality can only be spoken of obliquely.  
The “Logic” of Suicide 
 Améry begins On Suicide with the recognition that the distance between scientific 
suicidology and the world of the suicider is “measurable in light years” (1999, 23). All 
scientific study separates the lived experience of suicidality from the suicidal person. Sci-
entific study of suicide, in looking to help suicidal individuals, studies them as a class. It 
looks for what is true of most (or all) suicidal individuals, which depersonalizes the expe-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  I follow Brudholm’s lead here. As he explains in Resentment’s Virtue, ambiguities play an important role 
in Améry’s work. A large part of Brudholm’s book is devoted to offering careful and thorough exegesis of 
Améry’s essay “Ressentiments,” and Brudholm writes: “The thorough reading has…been motivated by my 
observation that the ambiguities of the essay have not been sufficiently recognized and discussed by Amé-
ry’s readers. I analyze both the essay’s most enigmatic and apparently self-explanatory passages while not 
explaining away the genuine puzzles and ambiguities of the reasoning under scrutiny” (79). 
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rience of suicide. Améry goes as far to say that all research done in suicide speaks on 
behalf of society: 
 
What I am aiming at is just the crucial point at which it becomes apparent 
that all suicide research, the psychological and sociological, speaks in the 
name of society--even when it most sharply criticizes the prevailing social 
order--instead of looking for potential suicides in the only place where 
they can be found: in each one’s own inalienable system (102-103). 
 
Améry’s criticism is applicable to bioethical research in suicide, as well. Although the 
aim of this research is often to lessen the suffering of suiciders and to determine how to 
respond appropriately and ethically to suicidality, it rarely includes the voices of sui-
ciders. While some research may pay lip service to the fact that suicidality isolates and 
individualizes the suicidal person, bioethics, in ignoring the experience of suiciders, runs 
roughshod over a potentially fruitful interaction between researchers and individual sui-
cidal people.  
Améry explains that this sort of study is not without purpose, but that it does miss 
the crucial fact that there are two perspectives from which to view and understand suicid-
ality. The separation of the suicidal person from suicide research has rendered researchers 
blind to the existence of a perspective other than their own. The perspective of the suicid-
al person, who finds himself facing an act that could separate him forever from human 
community, is identified by Améry as the “individual perspective.” This stands opposed 
to the perspective people most often understand suicide according to, what Améry calls 
the “societal perspective.” This is the perspective of scientists, doctors, and philosophers 
doing research on the suicidal, as well as anyone who thinks about the suicidal without 
having had experience of suicidality. These people discuss and study suicidality with 
very particular goals in mind, whether these goals are acknowledged or not. Each repre-
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sents the interests of his or her own discipline, yet, first and foremost, as a group they 
look implicitly or explicitly to promote and protect the interests of the society of people 
who are not suicidal. The vast majority of research into suicidality searches for ways to 
pull back the suicidal into nonsuicidal human community (1999, 45). As such, all suicide 
research speaks in the name of this society.  
Explaining the cause of this split in perspective regarding suicidality occupies the 
better portion of the first part of Améry’s essay. In order to explain how a part of the 
population can understand such a radical act so differently than the majority, Améry 
makes an equally radical claim: suicidal and nonsuicidal people live according to differ-
ent “logics.” Although Améry includes formal logics under the term “logic,” Améry also 
uses “logic” in the loose sense of a cognitive framework that governs a human being’s 
ability to make inferences and move meaningfully in the world, that which gives us “laws 
of a life worth living” (1999, 7). These logics provide the foundational, implicit premises 
that guide a human being’s actions in the world. Améry is offering the theory that suicid-
al and nonsuicidal people are not merely different because one group is made up of 
members who have a desire to kill themselves, but that the cognitive framework which 
suicidal people use to organize their interactions with the world is fundamentally differ-
ent. Améry is attempting to make explicit the implicit, primordial, pre-linguistic premises 
that guide both suicidal and nonsuicidal human beings’ lives (1999, 15). 
The first “logic” Améry introduces is the “logic of life,” which is the logic ac-
cording to which the majority function. The logic of life starts with the basic, brute fact 
that “I am alive.” “I therefore speak of a logic of life or a logic of being, then I mean that 
all logical conclusions that we draw in statements about life are constantly bound to the 
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fact of this life” (1999, 18). Any act a person commits, any conversation a person en-
gages in, any study a person undertakes begins in the fact that he is alive, that he has a 
living body capable of doing such things. This fact is so fundamental Améry also calls it 
the “logic of being” (1999, 15). Allegiance to this logic often goes unnoticed, as do the 
ways in which everyday actions promote and preserve the logic which begins with this 
fact of being alive. 
Although this logic of life is first grounded in the (often pre-conscious) intuition 
that I am alive and the actions that allow me to continue to live, this is only its most basic 
beginning. The logic of life is multi-leveled. Améry explains, 
 
Because we mean by the logic of life not only the immanent logic of be-
havior that preserves the self and the species, to which we are tributary, 
but also the logic gained from this logic as an abstraction of higher order, 
one that weighs being against being, sets one against the other, and there-
fore can come to the knowledge of the logical “true” and “false,” whereby 
true as much as false are tacitly accepted as categories of being because 
there is no bridge from being to nonbeing (1999, 19-20). 
 
The first level of this logic of life is so fundamental that Améry identifies it is a life-
preserving instinct experienced by most species that compels them to seek food, to repro-
duce, etc. The great majority of human beings and animals experience the impulses to eat 
and to reproduce. They are invested in their own preservation in the very basic ways of 
providing the subsistence necessary to support their continued existence, and also in ac-
tivities that will allow for the continuation of their genetic lines/memories/etc. through 
the creation of children. 
The second level of the logic of life is particular to human beings, “an abstraction 
of higher order.” Life, as life, becomes something that is valued. It is not merely blind 
impulse that propels most human beings to feed themselves and reproduce. For human 
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beings, subsistence and reproduction are caught up in planning and meaning-creation. 
Biological life is the condition for the possibility of another, more abstract and meaning-
infused “life” of the human being. People build “lives” with families, careers, religious 
lives, etc., and then declare these lives to be good. People do not just mate to reproduce, 
but get married and raise children, inventing elaborate rituals to celebrate and affirm 
landmark moments in the life of the family. Often times, people do not just feed them-
selves what is necessary for basic survival, but they make meals that they share with oth-
ers. Human beings are in the unique position of being able to reflect on this life-
preserving instinct and the continuation of individual lives and the species generally, and 
then develop ways to fulfill and satisfy this instinct. This development (and the basic lev-
el of the biological that allows for this development) is then called good; people look to 
live the “good” life. This affirmation of the goodness of life, of the value of life qua life, 
is the beginning of all other values, and serves as the ground of any other project in which 
a human being might engage. Before a person can decide to devote her life to a cause or 
another person, she must live as if her life is worth living.  
This particularly human dimension of the logic of life, then, is grounded on a per-
son’s affirming this valuation. A person accepts the starting premise of this logic: “Life is 
a good, and life is worth living.” For the most part, the logic of life is “prescribed” for us 
according to Améry. The adoption of this mindset need not be explicitly known by the 
adoptee, and often is accepted as fact without recognition of acceptance, in large part be-
cause it is accepted by the vast majority of the human beings. He explains that this posi-
tive valuation of existence unthinkingly invades everyday language. “‘In the long run, 
you’ve got to live,’ people say, excusing every miserable thing they have initiated” 
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(1999, 13). The idea that one must live, that one must continue to function in the face 
of anything, that one must cling to life (even if, in doing so, one faces an impossible mor-
al situation), is one of the effects of this logic of life. The assumption is that with rare ex-
ception all human beings will, and should, seek to continue their existence. The great ma-
jority of human beings’ actions, whether recognized as doing so or not, promote this logic 
and mindset. 
Even the societally approved “excusable” reasons for forfeiting one’s life actually 
preserve the very logic they seem to fly in the face of: the soldier who sacrifices herself 
for her comrades; the parent who saves his children from certain death, but only by giv-
ing his own life; the captured spy who actively takes her own life in order to stop herself 
from revealing secrets upon torture. All of these deaths serve to further the work of socie-
ty, to save other lives. In giving up one life, the value of life-in-general and societal pro-
ject are actually preserved and affirmed.  
Suicide, however, stands as the ultimate insult to societal projects and the implic-
itly and explicitly assumed value of life qua life, and as the ultimate challenge to the log-
ic of life that grounds these projects. The suicidal person spits in the face of the person 
that claims that, “One has to live, after all.” Suicide is the concrete instantiation of the 
failure of the logic of life to take hold. One does not have to live, and in fact, one can 
very easily die. The suicidal person, along with Schiller, claims that, 
 
‘Life is not the highest good of all.’...For what is this supposed to mean? 
There can only be goods in life, not in the negative nonentity of death; and 
therefore life must be the first, last, deepest and highest of such goods. But 
for anyone standing before the leap, the judgment contained in Schiller’s 
line, absurd and to be rejected by rigorous logic, contains good sense, a 
sense that is of course already beyond life and its logic; beyond all reason 
(which is only life’s subservient spirit), beyond everything that even the 
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most thorough researcher in the field of suicidology is capable of bringing 
forth (1999, 14). 
 
The logic of life is fundamentally incapable of offering a convincing response to the 
claim that “life is not the highest good of all,” and suicide is the one action that fully 
demonstrates this.  
 Yet why is it that the logic of life does not have a sufficient response to suicide? 
This is for two reasons. Logic, in any traditional (formal) sense, requires life as its start-
ing point. The statements of a formal logic are empty analytic judgments that say nothing 
about reality, but use reality at their base.  
For years, basic required reasoning on the fundamentals of logic have 
demonstrated conclusively, disregarding certain differences among the 
various camps of logicians, something that is, in my opinion, an irrefutable 
fact: the statements of logic are empty. They are, according to their nature, 
tautological; they are “analytic judgments” in Kant’s terminology, or they 
are rules for recasting thoughts. They express nothing about reality, or to 
put it another way, they never impart anything new to the knowledge of 
this reality. Nevertheless, reality is always their basis (1999, 18-19). 
 
Logics, as that which outline the forms of human thought, are empty and formal. Sub-
stantive conclusions reached through formal logics are always predicated upon the facts 
of this life. While the premise, “Life (that which exists, that which is) is not the highest 
good of all,” does not take away the formal validity of conclusions reached by these 
logics, it does take away their substantive base. It rejects the worth of the facts of life and 
rejects that upon which all traditional logics are built. If one were to say that life is not 
the highest of all goods, that life is ultimately a contingency, and that one need not live, 
one makes room for the possibility that it is best not to live, to be dead. Death, not being, 
makes no sense in the face of the logic of life, or as Améry explains, “Formal logic must 
exclude death” (1999, 19). Without life, logic, the formal rules of human thought, would 
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not be. Without the affirmation of the value of life, logic becomes a futile exercise. 
 The informal logic from above (logic as that which offers a framework that allows 
a person to operate meaningfully in the world), even more clearly requires the value of 
life as its starting point. A person must assume that life offers him the groundwork upon 
which to make or find meaning, and then want to make or find that meaning. If one were 
to step outside the logic of life and recognize it for what it is, a logic with a base that can 
only be affirmed circularly, then one might recognize that there is no way to argue 
against a logic that does not assert that life is the highest of all goods. One would recog-
nize that there is no unshakeable ground from which to declare that it is best to have been 
born. The framework of the logic of life has no ultimate claim to be the logic that should 
guide a person. No one can argue with Silenus convincingly because defense of the value 
of life always begins with the adoption of the logic of life that finds its beings in the im-
plicit premise, “Life is good.”  
That which stands opposed to this logic of life Améry calls the logic of death. 
Anyone trying to describe the logic of death faces immense difficulties, in part because 
attempts at description (and any project undertaken with the use of reason) assumes the 
logic of life opposed by the logic of death. For instance, the project that I am engaging in 
here, a dissertation, is so caught up within the logic of life that it is outside of the reach of 
the logic of death. This is the case because writing this dissertation is tied to hopes and 
goals for the future--getting a job, moving to a city, establishing a conventional life. The 
hope of writing a project like this is the hope to create meaning and to enter a community 
of scholars. But the logic of death rejects projects like these. It rejects attempts to codify 
and to read meaning into anything, but suicidality and the logic of death in particular. 
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Moreover, the logic of death evades language, which Améry claims is caught up in 
the logic of life. As Améry explains, “...it is not possible to convey sufficiently with lan-
guage things that per definitionem lie outside of language” (1999, 15). According to 
Améry, there is no way for this logic of life to “speak” to this logic of death because the 
logic of death is an incommunicable lived experience. 
For what it comes to for them is the total and unmistakable singularity of 
their situation, the situation vécue, (lived situation) that can never be com-
pletely communicated, so that therefore every time someone dies by his or 
her own and or even just tries to die, a veil falls that no one can life again, 
which in the best of cases can only be illuminated sharply enough for the 
eye to recognize a fleeting image (1999, 8). 
  
This poses a particular problem when it comes to trying to exegete Améry’s writings on 
the logic of death. There is no way to thematize the logic of death because reason and 
logic are but “life’s subservient spirit[s]” (1999, 14). Saying that the logic of death 
“stands opposed to” or “rejects” the logic of life is not quite right. Those who experience 
the logic of the death feel no impulse to oppose or stand for anything at all. One who ex-
periences the logic of death has a fundamentally different understanding of his being in 
the world from one who does not. Life is not necessarily good, and one does not need to 
be. In addition to this, one not need do anything, including justify one’s perspective. The 
ultimate outcome of this logic of death is the lack of the need to do or be anything, is sui-
cide, insofar as suicide is, “the act that breaks the fetters of pure and practical reason.” 
(1999, 28). 
Suicide as an act is not capable of being understood or contained by the terms of 
any logic that starts with the logic of life. This explains the difficulty someone who func-
tions according to the logic of life has in offering a response to a suicidal person or in un-
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derstanding a suicidal person’s impulse to die. The logic of life, which suicidologists 
ask the suicidal person to take up as her own logic, starts with the unprovable premise 
that life is a good. The truth of this premise cannot be proven within the logic of life, but 
must be accepted before one takes up the logic of life. There is a formal difficulty in ask-
ing someone who does not accept this logic of life to accept it based on a premise that she 
cannot affirm.  
Yet this is more than a formal difficulty. In some sense, Améry only uses the term 
logic of death because he is trying to make clear what is totally unclear to those who are 
not suicidal. This logic of death is no logic at all, but is in fact an “anti-logic.” Reason as 
that which grounds other logics is unvalued when one suicides -- the logic of death is 
nonsensical. The logic of death has its own peculiar “content” that stops one who inhabits 
the logic of life from offering a satisfactory response to Schiller’s claim. Death is the con-
tent of this logic, and death is nonsensical. This anti-logic is not a rejection of the logic of 
life, but is instead itself pure negation. It concerns itself not with possibility or valuation. 
The logic of death starts in the absurd, in the recognition that in the face of not being, of 
death, finding ultimate, grounded, unshakable meaning may be impossible. 
 
The logic of death is not a logic in the usual sense, upholding reason 
alone, for it allows no conclusions other than just one, again and again and 
again; not is the same as not, with which the statement of every logical 
(that is, analytic) judgment, already in itself containing no reality, loses its 
last tie to reality; that tie above all in which the equation of two categories 
of being that are symbolically recorded as in mathematics, or are rooted in 
everyday language, is now related to something that is nothing and is not--
a pure negation, an accursed inconceivability (1999, 19). 
 
The ground of the (anti)logic of death, the “not is the same as not,” does not allow for 
rational articulation or explanation. Although it is tempting as one who takes up the logic 
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of life to say that the logic of death can be explained as a person’s saying “no” to the 
logic of life, this is not adequate. The pure expression of the logic of death is the, “no, no, 
no, no,” but these “no’s” are attached to nothing, these “no’s” deny the possibility of 
comprehension and meaningful expression entirely, these “no’s” escape language and 
communication (1999, 15). Death stands as the “object” of this logic, but not death as 
witnessed by survivors and not death as the transition to an afterlife, but death as enigma 
and oblivion. Death in this sense is not an object at all; it is unseizable and ungraspable, 
yet it provides the orientation for this logic of death. Death is the unthinkable: non-being. 
This logic of death is experienced viscerally by suiciders. “Suicides or potential sui-
cides...beat with their heads a raging drum tattoo against the advancing walls and eventu-
ally break through the barrier with a skull beaten thin and already wounded” (1999, 8). 
There are not words or reasons which explain this individual experience.  
 Améry explains that one cannot live fully in this logic of death. The “not is the 
same as not” is impossible to bring into being, and as such, the suicider finds himself 
faced with the impossible contradiction that is being alive and taking up certain projects 
of living and finding himself obsessed with this anti-logic of death. Death and life cannot 
coexist. He writes that the suicidal person is, 
torn between the logic of life and the logic of death: in that consists the 
ontically murky singularity of their situation. They know the logic of death 
or the anti-logic of death, even if they have nothing to say about it even if 
no room remains for them in the system of psychological concepts and ex-
pressions (1999, 20). 
 
As long as someone is alive, even if they are suicidal, they cannot live strictly from the 
logic of death: suicidal people are those who live with a foot in both of these “logics.” 
The suicidal person finds himself in an unenviable position. He is torn between one sys-
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tem of valuation, one that urges him to live life and reject this other “sense” held by 
him. This “no, no, no,” this “raging drum tattoo of one’s head against the wall,” exists in 
tandem with the projects that the suicider takes up in his daily existence. As long as 
someone is alive, even if he is suicidal, he cannot live strictly from the logic of death, but 
he cannot ignore or argue himself out of this other logic, the one that tells him, “no, no, 
no.” 
This explains why suicidal people often seem “fine.” Before their suicides, sui-
cidal people have friends, raise families, go to work, and avoid being “caught” in their 
suicidality. The suicidal person, then, is not a person who fully inhabits the logic of death. 
Instead, the suicidal person is one who is not capable of fully taking on the logic of life, 
of affirming the goodness of his own existence, and is one who also lives in the shadow 
of the (anti)logic of death. 
Affect 
The logic of death is prelinguistic, cannot be described simply as opposing the 
ubiquitous logic of life, and is absurd in its content. Yet if we were stuck with only this 
discussion of the logic of death and Améry’s claim that psychological concepts fail to 
address it, one might wonder about the usefulness of Améry’s project. Many readers 
might reject the importance of talking about a phenomenon, or even call into question the 
existence of a phenomenon, that is so obscure that it cannot be spoken of directly. Améry 
admits as much. “Someone might wonder whether what I have been trying to say and am 
about to say is logically a demonstrable piece of nonsense and empirically not true” 
(1999, 27). Yet Améry stands fast to what he claimed at the very beginning of his work. 
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He wants to approach suicidality without forcing onto it “concepts not based on per-
ception” (1999, 27), and uses language of obligation regarding such a venture: 
Here we enter into an obligation none other than this: that under certain 
impossible conditions it is necessary to think ‘toward’ things that are dou-
bly unthinkable--just as when one begins to think or be concerned about 
anything, one moves mentally in that direction--and that, in proceeding, 
something unthinkable can be represented as something partly thinkable 
(1999, 28). 
 
But what recourse do the nonsuicidal have to even begin to understand suicidality? 
How are we supposed to represent the unthinkable as partly thinkable? Or is it the case 
that if one has not experienced the logic of death as Améry describes it, one will remain 
in the “bog”? If so, Améry’s project, his attempt to offer a window into the suicider’s 
world, will fail. There must be some common ground between the suicidal and the non-
suicidal, something else to which he can appeal to give nonsuicidal people more under-
standing of the experience of suicidality and their inability to fully appreciate what it is to 
live as suicidal. He begins to offer this ground in his discussion of two affects experi-
enced by all human beings: eros and la nausée. 
La nausée, one of the basic constituents of a human being. It is no more 
possible to ignore it than eros, with the distinction that the latter is recog-
nized by society because it is consistent with the logic of life, while the 
former, la nausée, is denied by civilization’s howling rabble set on pre-
serving the species (1999, 47). 
 
Those who experience the logic of life privilege one particular affect, the erotic, more so 
than this other experienced affect, la nausée. He translates la nausée as disgust, and ex-
plains that disgust is fundamental to what it is to be a human being. This disgust is as 
fundamental as the experience of the erotic, but one works to preserve the logic of life, 
the logic taken up unthinkingly by most and supported at a society-wide level. Disgust, 
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however, is avoided and denied. In order to understand disgust, it will be helpful to 
have the erotic against which to juxtapose this avoided affect. 
Améry characterizes the erotic as a fundamentally social affect. Eros is the drive 
to live and produce. The erotic impulse is the impulse of the lover--more life! more life! 
It is an impulse that more deeply entrenches a person in life and the work of life. It brings 
with it both work for the bettering of the life of a person and the multiplication of that 
person’s being, and involves a reaching out toward others. In a very basic sense, the erot-
ic drive is the drive to fuse with others and multiply through the reproductive act. It 
grounds sociality because it is the beginning of the creation of future generations and be-
cause the erotic pulls us into cooperation with others. 
Not only does the erotic impulse experienced as the reproductive drive go to sup-
port the first level of the logic of life discussed by Améry, but the erotic impulse also 
supports the second level of the logic of life, the abstraction of a higher order. The erotic 
brings about mating rituals, the familial life, and philosophical projects generally. Be-
cause this affect’s pull towards life, and more life, is one experienced by most people 
much of the time and supported by societal projects and expectations, this leads to a dis-
counting and downplaying of another affect experienced by human beings which is, 
Améry claims, as fundamental to human existence.  
This affect is la nausée, or disgust. It is important to speak of la nausée in terms 
of eros in part because the experience of eros has not only been experienced by most hu-
man beings in one form or another, but also because most human beings have recognized 
this experience. Since the experience of eros is a deep, visceral experience, so description 
of this in words falls short of completely describing the experience. Améry’s claim is the 
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other foundational affect, which has been denied in large part because it does not con-
tribute to the continuation of societal projects, is felt as deeply, is as much a part of hu-
man beings’ affective experience, and is juxtaposed to the pull of the erotic. Whereas the 
erotic is the beckoning towards life and more life, la nausée, which he translates disgust, 
is a repulsion from life.  
Améry makes clear from the start that disgust is not just taedium vitae, a mere 
weariness of existence or boredom with life (1999, 78). Disgust is one of the foundational 
attitudes a human being can have toward existence, despite its denial “by civilization's 
howling rabble set on preserving the species” (1999, 47). Although disgust is visceral and 
deep, because of the widespread denial of disgust, it can be harder to recognize those 
moments in existence. Améry spends significant time illustrating various moments of the 
experience of disgust that should resonate with most of his readers.  
Since disgust is as foundational an affect as the erotic, it is found in many mo-
ments of human experience. The first, most basic of these moments is the hatred of the 
flesh, the hatred of the materiality which sustains life (1999, 46). Who has not felt un-
comfortable in her body, or been frustrated with it when it was sick or injured? Disgust is 
the revulsion inspired by the too fat body in front of the mirror, or by the putrid body of 
severe illness, or the frustration felt over a simple cold. Even more than just showing up 
in the frustration felt toward the imperfect or ill body, disgust comes in everyday embod-
ied moments. Améry describes the moment in which a person stands in front of a mirror 
and is horrified at what he sees. He explains the ego of the person falling from “crag to 
crag,” observing the visage of his face, and not recognizing himself in that visage. Instead, 
he sees a body, a body that has been there before, but in different forms, and sees that 
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every one of those bodies was someone different that is no longer him (1999, 69-70). 
That which should be most familiar has become alien. It is in a moment like this that the 
flesh is wished away, that one experiences a very visceral sense of disgust. 
If one of the most common places disgust appears is alongside bodily “failings” 
(the sick body, the un-ideal body, the unrecognized body), other experiences of disgust 
are (often) much less corporeal, but also tied to failure (1999, 47). Améry distinguishes 
between two levels of failure when he speaks of disgust in this section: failures in life and 
the failure of life. The first is the failure of the person who does not pass a test or exam. 
People fail constantly in this first way. Confronted with the truth that many projects, big 
and small, will not be completed successfully at all, disgust appears. This is the disgust in 
the expressions of students who do not earn the grade they wanted. This disgust is felt the 
first time love fails or an important project stalls. The ubiquity of these failures can ob-
scure the disgust that comes alongside them, but if a person experiences enough of these 
failures at once, then disgust will make itself known. 
Deeper than this failure of project is the failure that is a structural part of every 
individual life: ultimately, surrenders to nothingness. Life will end, and in the face of 
death, life and the projects of life are absurd and meaningless. Améry explains this with 
reference to a familiar metaphor: life is a house that is ultimately doomed to collapse 
(1999, 51). No matter how well a house is built, no matter how well it is repaired and re-
stored, when parts of it start to decay, a house will fall. The work of life is like the work 
that is put into a house. The individual projects in which people engage may or may not 
succeed (the basement never quite finished, the leaky taps in the sink not replaced), but 
eventually, decay renders the project of having projects pointless and the house collapses. 
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Any work done is ultimately doomed to failure, whether individual projects are suc-
cessful or not. They will decay, just as the house will decay.  
More disturbingly, this decay does not only apply to projects, but also to relation-
ships. Friendships end, people die, and eventually all people will be forgotten, no matter 
how substantial their relationships or contributions to humanity were. Beyond eventual 
death, however, Améry recognizes another way in which relationships fail. There is no 
being totally “with” someone. Even if a person is not suicidal, his self is inalienable. 
There is no way to bridge the cognitive gaps between persons. These constitute the foun-
dations of an inescapable existential loneliness that Améry points to. You cannot feel my 
pain or my happiness. Even before death, people are alone; people fail at being together 
(1999, 114-115). 
This decay, this unavoidable failure built into the very structure of mortal exist-
ence renders work on/in existence absurd, that is to say, makes it impossible to offer a 
transcendent ground on which to base the claim that work has meaning. All work is done 
against the reality that one day one will cease to be, whether a person avoids that thought 
or not. Even for those who believe in an afterlife or place value in the memory of history, 
this disgust may appear. Disgust highlights the uncertainty of faith, whispers about the 
capriciousness of fate and memory. Moreover, no matter the strength of the belief in the 
afterlife or the hope in being remembered, this life will end and this life is all that is 
known. When this recognition of failure penetrates a person’s defenses, slithers in past 
the logic of life, disgust is very strong.  
In some sense, suicide can be understood as adding another level to these failures. 
On one hand, voluntary death as a response to and consequence of the recognition of fail-
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ure and disgust can be understood as another failure. When understood as a failure, 
voluntary death merely doubles failure, and takes away that which allows the possibility 
for success. The person who suicides willingly puts an end that to which an end will inev-
itably come anyhow. She intentionally gives up that which will allow her to correct the 
less profound sense of failure: failures in life. By her own hand, a person makes her own 
work meaningless.  Loved ones’ reactions to a suicide are often plagued with a deep 
sense of disgust. Use of the word “suicide” is avoided, survivors deny that their loved one 
would have taken his own life. Suicide is often interpreted as failure and met with disgust 
by those left behind. Améry identifies this with the societal view that is entrenched in the 
logic of life (1999, 45, 51). 
Seen in another light, however, the person who dies by her own hand can be un-
derstood as seizing the truth of these failures and this disgust, and as truly “belonging to 
herself” and restoring dignity (1999, 97). She meets the deeper failure of life, that she 
will die, head-on. Suicide is a way to escape failure (both failures in life and the failure of 
life), failures which one can only live through disgracefully (1999, 44). The understand-
ing of suicide as a failure comes only from those who are not suicidal. For those who 
have one foot in the logic of death, suicide may appear as a valid recourse for escaping 
from failures. Suicide can be the escape from an overwhelming sense of disgust toward 
the world and life. 
No matter the interpretation of the act of suicide, whether failure or an attempt to 
find freedom in failure, Améry very clearly ties the experience of disgust to the experi-
ence of failure that leads to voluntary death. “What I am driving at is simply this: that 
prior to the consciousness of the [failure] that leads to voluntary death...there must be the 
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feeling of disgust” (1999, 47). This is important because the affect of disgust is a 
foundational affect for human beings. Suicidality, at its beginnings, is caught up in the 
experience of disgust. Given this, although most nonsuicidal people flee from disgust ac-
cording to Améry, the common experience of disgust might be the ground upon which 
those skeptical of the worth or feasibility of Améry’s project, those thoroughly caught up 
in the projects of society and the logic of life, can find common experience with the sui-
cidal and the beginnings of empathy. 
Importantly, Améry points out that it is only those who hold that suicide is a 
“failure” and who fully embrace the logic of life that attempt to impose their understand-
ing on others. He explains that as someone who understands suicide as being other than a 
failure, “[m]y judgment, insofar as it does not call into question the totality of all experi-
ence, finally has to be recognized as a valid one” (1999, 57). Suicide is an instance of an 
individual recognizing the brute facts of his existence (disgust overwhelms the erotic and 
the logic of death has taken hold), and making a decision based on these facts. As an act, 
suicide might seem to those without a foot in the logic of death to be an affront to the log-
ic of life and the erotic impulse, but it is not: it is ultimately an individual response to an 
individual life. This response is rare, but its rarity does not make it any less valid.  
For the time being, we are only concerned with rehabilitating voluntary 
death as an act as natural or unnatural as every other kind of death. Above 
all socially, because death, voluntary or not, cannot be defended philo-
sophically. I am only trying to ensure that those who try to commit suicide 
and those who succeed, in spite of their situation as a minority, have the 
rights that every minority claims for itself (1999, 52). 
 
Although Améry does not valorize the act of killing oneself, he does argue that in the 
most important moments of a person’s life, that person belongs only to herself. In the 
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face of these moments, other people must be silent. Suicide, the voluntary ending of a 
life, is one of these moments. Due to the differing “proportions” of disgust and the erotic 
felt by different persons and the differing logic(s) persons may occupy, voluntary death is 
going to appear in very different ways to suicidal individuals and nonsuicidal individuals.  
Recognition of the fact that voluntary death will appear very differently to differ-
ent people is the beginning of stepping outside of the societal perspective. Persons who 
inhabit the societal perspective must understand that their particular view of voluntary 
death is not self-justifying. Recognizing that suicidal people start from a different logic 
and experience different levels of the affects fundamental to human existence is the first 
step in a person recognizing that her understanding of voluntary death, her recoiling from 
voluntary death, and her belief that suicide should be prevented at all costs, is her operat-
ing from a less than complete understanding of the phenomenon of suicidality (1999, 57). 
 Given their inadequate understanding of suicidality, those who occupy the social 
perspective must be especially careful of the ways in which they uncritically adopt the 
logic of life and embrace the erotic. In doing this, they privilege their own perspective 
over the perspective of those who are suicidal. Those who occupy the logic of life, who 
are immersed in the erotic impulse, have no solid, unquestionable ground from which to 
state, “You must stay alive. Life is better than death.” Yes, the suicidal person, standing 
with one foot in the logic of death, is in the minority, and that straddling of logics chang-
es his relationship to his world. Yet this does not necessarily make him “sick” and does 
not justify acting paternalistically. Améry writes movingly of his own “rescue” after his 
first suicide attempt in 1974:  
I still know very well how it was when I awoke after what was later re-
ported to me as a thirty-hour coma. Fettered, drilled-through with tubes, 
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fitted on both wrists with painful devices for my artificial nourishment. Deliv-
ered and surrendered to a couple of nurses who came and went, washed 
me, cleaned my bed, put thermometers in my mouth, and did everything 
quite matter-of-factly, as if I were already a thing, un chose. The earth did 
not have me yet: the world had me again and I had a world in which I was 
to project myself in order that I would once again be all world myself. I 
was full of a deep bitterness against all those who meant well who had 
done this disgrace to me. I became aggressive. I hated. And knew, I who 
had previously been intimately acquainted with death and its special forms 
of voluntary death, I knew better than ever before that I was inclined to die. 
And that rescue, about which the physician boasted, belonged to the worst 
that had ever been done to me--and that was not little (1999, 78-79). 
 
Though Améry feels obvious disdain for the doctors and nurses he speaks of who “saved” 
him after his 1974 suicide attempt, it is hard to label the intentions of the doctors and 
nurses bad. They were just misguided. The understanding of suicide had by the doctors 
and nurses was fundamentally different than Améry’s understanding. They could not un-
derstand how one might choose death over life. Suicide is such an affront to anyone who 
takes up the societal perspective, especially health care workers bent on preserving life, 
that their reaction to someone who suicides is utter denial of the validity of the suicider’s 
perspective (i.e., “You will thank us for saving you later when you are feeling better.”).  
Améry and Rational Suicide 
   
It has been established that Jean Améry provides what Lindemann would call a 
counterstory. The careful work of listening to that counterstory has been done. What is 
necessary before we draw conclusions from this listening to this story is a brief under-
standing of the master narrative that Améry’s work confronts. There is no doubt that 
Améry’s work is confronting some other narrative with which he disagrees. He writes of 
On Suicide in the preface, “What may appear to be an apologetic is only my reaction to a 
kind of research that pursues the subject of suicide without being acquainted with the 
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specific human beings in search of their own, freely chosen death” (1999, xxiv-xxv). 
He says several times throughout the text that a real account of suicidality begins when 
suicide research is not the starting point of investigation. In order to understand the 
strides that Améry’s work makes in helping advance our understanding of suicidality be-
yond the skeletal version presented in the bioethics literature, the narrative created in the 
bioethics literature must be explored. 
As the first half of this dissertation highlights, one of the purposes of the rational 
suicide literature is to establish that there are people who wish to suicide who are rational 
and for whom the act of suicide would be rational. If this can be shown, then “rational 
suicide” can be the ground upon which that the moral permissibility of assisted suicide 
can be established. The stories that are told in this literature follow a very similar formula, 
and the news stories discussed in the second chapter highlight this formula. A person is 
dying of a terminal illness (or, in rarer versions, has some sort of irreversible illness that 
will significantly diminish her capacities). She seeks assistance in dying not because of 
some inborn inclination toward death, but because of reasons identifiable from the socie-
tal perspective. For instance, she might look to preserve her “dignity,” to save her family 
from financial distress, or to maintain control of the narrative arch of her life that she has 
carefully constructed during her life. These reasons are all consistent with the logic of life 
as set out by Améry. The logic of life is used to justify the preservation of projects and 
the preservation of identity through almost any means necessary. She has set up her life, 
she has valued the way in which she has set up her life, now she looks to close her life in 
a way that remains consistent with her projects and values. The same thematic can be 
found in the sort of voluntary deaths that preserve the logic of life discussed in this chap-
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ter (the foxhole jumper, the parental sacrifice). These sorts of death support societal 
projects. 
What is strange about the bioethics narrative, however, is that it can be under-
stood as a counterstory itself. In the rational suicide literature, bioethicists attempt to pre-
sent the circumstances and characteristics of a person who might request assistance in 
dying, but who is not mentally ill. Bioethicists do this to explicitly combat the mental ill-
ness model of suicide presented by suicidologists. The central claim of this mental illness 
model of suicide is that suicide is a symptom of some sort of mental illness and a cry for 
help, rather than an action that can be taken by a rational individual (c.f., Biggar 2004, 
Edwards 1997, Litman 1996, Shneidman 1996 and 2004). Bioethicists present cases of 
terminally ill people who do not fit this mental illness narrative in order that these people 
might receive services that they were being denied (i.e., assistance in ending their lives), 
and to oppose a dominant characterization of those who were seeking assistance in dying. 
Not all suicides can be understood in terms of mental illness, thus bioethicists argue that 
we need to rethink the moral permissibility of assisted suicide because rational persons 
(i.e., a person without mental illness who meets the other criteria laid out by bioethicists) 
might desire such assistance. Given a liberal framework in which bioethics operates, de-
nial of assistance of this sort to rational persons is hard to justify. 
Yet there is a problem with the narrative provided by bioethicists. As Lindeman 
explains, a counterstory can only be a good counterstory if it does not automatically ex-
clude another population. She calls counterstories that do this hostage stories. “[T]he hos-
tage story unseats the master narrative at which it aims by reinforcing other oppressive 
master narratives” (2001, 179). Although the story told by bioethicists is a functional 
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counterstory for those who are looking to receive assistance in death when terminally 
ill, it reinforces the narrative of the mentally ill suicider. This hostage narrative has two 
effects. First, by restricting the group worthy to receive assistance in dying to people who 
meet standards of rationality, bioethicists have marginalized those who are suicidal in the 
way that Améry speaks of suicidality. By focusing exclusively on this subset of people, 
bioethicists have unwittingly excluded these sorts of suicidal people from the discussion 
surrounding the ethics of assisted suicide. If the person looking for assistance in suicide is 
cast as morally worthy only if suicide helps preserve the logic of life, then those who ex-
perience suicidality in the way described by Améry must be other than morally worthy. 
The story that is told is that the terminally ill should receive assistance in dying because 
their mental state is not “deviant” or abnormal like other sorts of suiciders, and that the 
terminally ill fit the mold of the rational liberal individual.  This counterstory plays into 
the ethics of vitalism adopted by the medical community, and those who experience sui-
cidality as Améry experiences it were disregarded and cut out of the conversation about 
the morality and legalization of assisted suicide.  
The second effect of this hostage narrative, and a result of this exclusion, is actu-
ally a conceptual difficulty at the heart of the rational suicide literature created by this 
exclusion, and lies at the heart of this chapter’s critique. Bioethicists have been working 
with an anemic conception of suicidality in the rational suicide literature because bioethi-
cists have not spoken with the “general” suicidal population, but have restricted their 
considerations to a subset of the terminally ill. If suicidality as a lived phenomenon in-
volves someone living with the pull of the logic of death and experiencing high levels of 
disgust in the face of life and failures in life, then the concept of rational suicide is prob-
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lematic. It is problematic because rationality, as defined by bioethicists, is inherently 
tied to the logic of life. If we look at the criteria for rationality in the bioethics literature, 
what is actually being preserved in this literature is the logic of life.  
As discussed in the last chapter, it is often taken for granted that insofar as doctors 
are working for the preservation of their patients’ lives, they come to the table as value 
neutral actors. Bioethicists, in looking to preserve the autonomy of rational, liberal indi-
viduals, are likewise understood as committed to value neutrality and avoid the imposi-
tion of personal values on research. Yet as was shown in the last chapter, this is not value 
neutral. What was called the ethics of vitalism in the last chapter, the unthinking embrace 
of life and long life, can now be understood in terms of Améry’s logic of life. The logic 
of life is that which flows out of the unsupported claim that life is the highest of all goods. 
The ethics of vitalism is perhaps the pinnacle of the embrace of the logic of life, insofar 
as it brings to bear all available medical resources to preserving life, the highest of all 
goods. 
The medical field is almost entirely defined by the ability to extend life and to 
make physical life better. Healing patients often allows patients to go back to living their 
lives as they would want to live them. In the vast majority of cases, the medical field as 
that which preserves and promotes life is helpful and exactly what best serves patients. If 
I have heart disease, I want my doctor to prescribe the medications that will allow me to 
live more comfortably and with less risk of death. If I break my leg, I want my doctor to 
set it and cast it so it will heal properly and I can eventually get back to my previous level 
of functioning.  
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End of life issues are more complicated, however. This is especially true with 
suicidality. The ethics of vitalism has caused doctors and bioethicists to think of suicide 
in terms of rationality, and to focus their exploration of rational suicide on rationality at 
the expense of a proper investigation of suicidality. When doctors, those who experience 
this ethics of vitalism and live out the logic of life in a very concrete way insofar as they 
preserve and protect patient life, and ethicists, those whose goal it is to maximize good-
ness in life, attempt to define the moral conditions under which suicide might be a 
“good,” there is an obvious conflict. Suicidality, as described by Améry, is defined by a 
person’s tenuous relationship with and to this logic of life. It is not as if the suicider does 
not embrace this logic of life at all, but there is this second logic that competes with the 
logic of life, that brings with it the inclination toward death, which is the hallmark of sui-
cidality. There is a revulsion and disgust at the heart of a suicider’s experience in the 
world. Although doctors and ethicists as individuals might be able to empathize with this 
experience of disgust, as professionals who are trained in particular ways and have par-
ticular goals (heavily defined by the logic of life), the logic of death cannot be at the heart 
of their thinking.  
Yet the problem with this is not just that the doctors are not able to remain value 
neutral. The application of the logic of life and an ethics of vitality to the issue of suicid-
ality is conceptually inappropriate. Given Améry’s description of the lived experience of 
suicidality and its inherent tie to the logic of death, if rationality, as defined by bioethi-
cists, can be shown to be entrenched in the logic of life and ethics of vitalism, then the 
applicability of the concept of rationality to suicidality comes into question. Brief exami-
nation of the ways in which bioethicists define rationality will show how several of the 
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criteria are tied up with the logic of life. Although many, if not all, of the criteria used 
to establish rationality could be shown to be grounded in the logic of life, only the four 
most prevalent criteria will be spoken of for the sake of brevity.  
Rationality Criteria Reexamined 
Realistic Worldview 
The criterion that a person must have a realistic worldview in order to be rational 
is held by the vast majority of bioethicists concerned with establishing the possibility of 
rational suicide (c.f., Barry 1994; Battin 1982, 1999; Cholbi 2011; Decker 1977; Devine 
1980 and 1998; Francis 1980; Graber 1981; Kjervik 1984; Martin 1980; Motto 1980, 
1981, 1999; Saunders and Valente 1988; Siegel 1986; Sullivan 1980; Werth 1996, 1999). 
However, this criterion was shown in the last chapter to be problematic. It is difficult to 
establish what a realistic worldview is without imbuing the concept of “realistic” with 
values that often remain unrecognized and unspoken. As the feminists referenced in the 
last chapter point out, if doctors are not immune to social prejudices and their “technical” 
training is not sufficient to teach them to fully bracket their own system of values (c.f. 
Sherwin 1992, Roberts 1996), then value neutrality is a myth. Yet with what has been 
discovered in studying Améry, it has become clear that problems with claims of value 
neutrality run much deeper than was indicated by the feminist critiques explored in the 
last chapter.  
Given Améry’s analysis of suicidality, in addition to questioning whether it is fea-
sible for a doctor to take into account and bracket how her values when working with pa-
tients, a doctor must also consider her affective stance towards her world and the sort of 
logic(s) she adopts. Has she experienced the inclination toward death? If not, is she aware 
 145 
of the ways in which this inclination can radically alter a person’s understanding of 
her place in the world and the value of her being in the world generally? Yet value neu-
trality of this sort might be too difficult a thing to ask of doctors, precisely because of 
their training. Doctors are indoctrinated into an ethics of vitalism. Doctors must save and 
repair lives, to do good for their patients in the form of offering their patients the means 
to the best possible physical health. The implicit premise which guides this work is what 
Améry claims as the starting point for the logic of life, “Life is good.” “My patient’s life 
is good, therefore, I must preserve that life.” This mission and its starting point cannot 
make room for death as a viable possibility--it can only be seen as a failure, or an inevita-
bility, but certainly not something toward which one should be inclined toward for its 
own sake (“for no reason”). That doctors should accept as nonpathological the worldview 
of a person for whom the inclination toward death and the experience of revulsion in the 
face of life and being embodied are strong might seem to some like medical heresy.  
The example of Dax Cowart comes to mind, once again. If health care workers, in 
a case where a patient was experiencing intense physical suffering because of treatments 
done to him, refused to accept that Cowart did not want treatment, it seems easy to imag-
ine a doctor writing off the requests of a person who lives out suicidality in the way that 
Améry describes it as irrational, and thus of diminished ability to make their own deci-
sions. The suicidal person, with one foot in the logic of life and one in the logic of death, 
has no recourse to make understandable to health care workers the nonsensical logic of 
death. If a patient was to come to a doctor and talk about the “raging drum tattoo” of his 
head against the wall when trying to describe what his lived experience was like, a diag-
nosis of some mental illness might not be far behind.  
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Ethicists, and philosophers generally, face a similar difficulty. The worldview 
of ethicists and philosophers is anything but neutral. Améry’s example of a logic profes-
sor who explains to his class that tells his students, “You can all be immortal my friends, 
it’s not impossible to think so,” begins to highlight this difficulty (1999, 40). For this lo-
gician, anything in thought is logically possible, any area of life capable of immense feats 
of imagination, including that death not be. This professor’s speech stands as an extreme 
example of ideas informed by the logic of life. The logical system this professor operates 
in allows him to deny death and proceed accordingly. This is not to say that this logician 
believes that he will not die, but that the discipline in which he operates allows for a 
bracketing of the inevitability of death.  
Although not all examples of the embrace of the logic of life are this extreme in 
philosophy, Colleen Clements in her article, “The Ethics of Not Being: Individual Op-
tions for Suicide,” argues that as a discipline, philosophy is in a unique position when it 
comes to the issues of suicidality. She explains that there are pretheoretical risks in phi-
losophers and philosophical ethicists studying suicidality. This risk is twofold.  
First, Clements explains, “A philosophic analysis of suicide poses a preanalytic 
risk which is rarely articulated because it is so closely tied to a major primitive assump-
tion in philosophy: that man is importantly a rational animal only” (1980, 104-105). Phi-
losophy, with its hammer of rationality, runs the risk of seeing everything as a nail. This 
is true about bioethicists, as well. As was thoroughly explored in the last chapter, the ra-
tional liberal individual was taken up as the moral lynchpin of the assisted suicide debate 
with little reflection. What Clements argues is that suicidality is not a nail. Suicidality is 
not something that can be described in terms of rationality at all. Clements’ general aim 
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in this article is to establish that rationality is not applicable to discussions of assis-
tance in suicide because suicide is neither rational nor irrational (1980, 104). Like Améry, 
Clements believes that suicidality is fundamentally grounded in a distinct attitude toward 
one’s being the world. This stance exists prior to rationality and affects a person’s rela-
tionship to rationality (1980, 107). The suicidal person says “no” to her existence (implic-
itly and/or explicitly, metaphorically and/or concretely) and adopts a “nay-saying” atti-
tude, while the non-sucidal person says “yes” to her existence and adopts a “yea-saying” 
attitude. Clements attempts to show that the unquestioned embrace of rationality can only 
be taken up by someone whose primary attitude toward her world is grounded in what 
she terms “yea-saying,” and as such, suicidal people do not participate in rationality in 
the same way as non-suicidal people. 
There is another risk philosophers face when studying suicidality. To do philoso-
phy at all “implies the acceptance of cognitive values which are based on an affirmative 
stance” (1980, 105). Clements explains this in terms of the yea-saying attitude, but I think 
we can bracket “translation” issues between Clements and Améry here.3 The critiques of 
philosophy and ethics provided by Clements apply as well when we consider philosophy 
and ethics in terms of Améry’s affects and logics. As Améry explains, the work of any 
disciplines must take the implicit premise of, “Life is that upon which this discipline can 
be built,” as their starting point. Although philosophers may question whether life is good, 
philosophers still must start with the brute fact that they are alive and that this is the con-
dition for them philosophizing at all. In participating in projects of philosophy, philoso-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I do not wish to make the claim that Clements’ yea-saying and nay-saying attitudes are simply different 
ways to describe the logics and affects spoken of by Améry. Although Clements’ attitudes and Améry’s 
logics and affects have much in common, establishing this is not necessary for use of Clements’ more gen-
eral ideas about philosophy and ethics.	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phers implicitly embrace the value of life. This implicit embrace of the value of life is 
more clearly seen in ethical projects. Ethics, in looking for good ways of life, has to as-
sume life is valuable, as it is the basic foundation upon which good(s) can be built.  
When we are talking about a realistic worldview, if doctors, philosophers, and 
ethicists take up this logic of life unthinkingly, there is nothing to stop them from missing 
the fact that there is this other affective stance, this other logic, that can dramatically alter 
what is realistic for a person. Neither of these logics are self-justifying, and as such, nei-
ther has claim to reality. A realistic view of the world and the place a person has in the 
world has been judged according to this ethics of vitalism, which leaves no room for the 
logic of death and the experience of more intense feelings of disgust. Yet as Clements 
explains (and Améry echos), claiming the suicidal perspective is invalid based on the 
logics and values of these disciplines is arbitrary and circular. “In a real sense, an indi-
vidual who does not value existence does not value anything at all, and to apply tools of 
cognitive values to this primary affect is to deny him his validity in a totally arbitrary 
fashion” (1980, 107). Suicide, as an act, is the absolute rejection of existence, including 
the need to justify decisions in light of the facts of this existence. Asking suiciders to take 
part in the process of giving reasons, of “rationalizing” a decision, indicates that one 
“buys into” the fact that one must give reasons why one decision is better than another. 
Rationalizing in this sense creates an implicit or explicit hierarchy of values. The “tools 
of cognitive values” only have value to those who believe in the necessity of valuation at 
all. 
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Harm and Interest 
The harm and interest criteria are open to similar critique here as well. By way of 
reminder, many bioethicists require that a suicide bring to less harm to the suicider than 
staying alive would, and that a suicide serve the interests of the suicider in a way that 
staying alive would not (c.f., Bogen 1980; Battin 1980, 1982, 1999, and 2005; Cholbi 
2011; Choron 1972; Davis 1998; Decker 1977; Dunshee 1994; Francis 1980; Hewitt 
2010; Humphry 1987; Jamison 1999; Lebacqz and Engelhardt 1977; Marker 1999; 
Maltsberger 1994; Motto 1980, 1994; Nelson 1984; Slater 1980; Werth 1999.) Yet the 
ways in which harm and interests are defined is thoroughly informed by the logic of life. 
In asking a suicider to justify his suicide based on the fact that suiciding will cause him 
less harm than staying alive and will promote his interests more than staying alive, bio-
ethicists ask that suicider to take part in a calculus that the logic of death cannot support. 
Calculating the benefits and costs of suicide is not part of suicidality. When a person does 
this, she operates from the logic of life. If a person wishes to receive assistance in dying 
because she has determined that having a terminal illness will alter the self image she has 
spent her life cultivating, or because the process of dying is undignified, or because she 
wants to protect her family’s interests, or because she wants to avoid pain, these are all 
reasons that start with a very particular attitude. This woman does not wish to die because 
she is inclined towards death, but because her love of life may be lessened if she stays 
alive, or because the family she has spent her life loving and protecting might be harmed, 
or the ideas she has had about the sort of life she has lived does not match the shape her 
death now takes. The harms that she is avoiding (the costs to her family, the loss of digni-
ty, the experience of pain) and the interests she is protecting (taking care of her family, 
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protecting the narrative arch of her life she has spent years forming, etc.) are thor-
oughly caught up in the projects of life. That this woman wanted to die because she expe-
riences “the power of emptiness” that is the inclination toward death would not be trans-
latable into terms of harm or interest in the sense in which bioethicists talk about them 
(Améry 1999, 77).  The suicider as characterized by Améry chooses death because of an 
inborn inclination toward death, because she has felt a pervasive and inescapable sense of 
disgust, not because she has weighed her options and has decided that there are more 
“checks” in the pro-suicide column. She is not interested in processes of valuation of this 
sort. 
Understandable According to Community 
One of the rationality criteria that is most problematic in light of Améry’s account 
of suicidality is the requirement that the act of suicide be understandable to the various 
communities to which a person belongs (c.f., Battin 1982; Choron 1972; Edwards 1997; 
Lebacqz and Englehardt 1997, Matthews 1998; Motto 19999; Prado 1990; Siegel 1986; 
Stack 1999; Werth 1996, 1999). Bioethicists require that the act of suicide be capable of 
being justified using community standards. Some even argue that the greater the cultural 
support given to certain suicides, the greater the presumed rationality of the act of suicide 
(Stack 1999, 41). The rationality of suicide hinges on members of the suicider’s commu-
nity finding justification for that suicide with which many of the members of community 
can identify and understand.  
In light of Améry’s description of the lived experience of suicidality, this might 
be an impossible standard. As described by Améry, suicidality is ultimately an experience 
radically rooted in individual subjectivity, and it cannot be understood apart from the ex-
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perience of individual suicidal people. The suicider finds herself in an “absurd and 
paradoxical situation” that may elude translation (1999, xxv). Making her suicidality un-
derstandable to the communities to which she belongs is a difficult, if not impossible, 
task for a suicider who finds herself surrounded by nonsuiciders. Améry’s work is an at-
tempt to begin to open up this sort of dialogue, to start on this translation work. His par-
ticular background and training have given him tools that may not be available to all sui-
ciders. Even if his project is successful, however, at the heart of it lies the recognition that 
suicidality is not “comprehensible” to those who are not suicidal. Because of this incom-
prehensibility, rendering suicide understandable to a community can only take the form 
of the community’s recognition of the different logics and affects experienced by the sui-
cider.  
Rationality Redux 
Once again, it has been shown that the criteria used by bioethicist to establish ra-
tionality are insufficient or problematic in some way. Again, many more of the criteria 
used by bioethicists to establish rationality could fall under the purview the critique re-
garding their foundations in the logic of life. Exploring the most common criteria in the 
literature has sufficiently established that these criteria are tied to the logic of life in a 
way that renders their applicability to suicidality generally questionable.  
Although the discussion of rationality has been piecemeal in this dissertation inso-
far as critiques have focused on particular aspects of the definition of rationality provided 
by bioethicists, a general critique remains. Given Clements’ and Améry’s discussions of 
the beginnings of suicidality in attitudes or logics and affects, the ascription of rationality 
to suicidality, no matter the particularities of the definition of rationality, is questionable. 
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In the way in which Améry and Clements characterize it, suicidality is neither rational 
nor irrational, and as such rationality is not ascribable to suicidality. Améry’s discussion 
of the lived experience of suicidality has shown that in some instances, the phenomenon 
of suicidality finds its foundations in a pretheoretical worldview highly informed by a 
foundational affect. That a suicidal person is rational or irrational has nothing to do with 
his experience of suicidality generally. The question of whether a suicider should offer 
reasons why their suicide is rational is an inappropriate consideration. Rationality has 
nothing to do with this sort of suicidality itself.4 
Bioethicists’ insistence on using rational suicide as the benchmark upon which to 
establish the moral permissibility of assisted suicide has thus committed the sin Spellman 
and Lugones warned theoreticians against. In trying to find a type of suicidality with 
which bioethicists were comfortable, they started with a concept comfortable to bioethi-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  A brief discussion of another conceptual difficulty in rational suicide is appropriate here. A critic of my 
use of Améry’s description of suicidality might claim that it is only in the case of a sort of extreme suicidal-
ity posited by Améry that rationality is not applicable. In addition to this claim requiring considerable ex-
amination of the lived experiences of different sorts of suicidality in order to be established (something 
bioethicists have yet to do), there another, deeper conceptual issue at the heart of the claim that rationality 
cannot be an appropriate descriptor of suicide or suicidality. As Améry explains, there is no bridge from 
being to nonbeing--because of all this, we are so helpless in thinking about death” (Améry 1999, 20). All 
logics assume the existence of the person using the logic, and cannot account for or handle the unknown of 
death. Because of the enigmatic nature of death, talking about it in terms of rationality is otiose. 	  
There are other scholars who make similar, though more philosophically oriented, arguments. For 
instance, Philip Devine (1980, 1998) argues that death is uncanny and cannot be chosen rationally because 
a precondition of rational choice is that know something about what one is choosing and the ability to com-
pare choices. This is especially the case in the instance of one’s own death. In instances of death, Devine 
explains that, “We are dealing, that is, not with a situation concerning which rational men will exhibit a 
range of estimates, but with a situation in which one man’s estimate is as good as another, because what is 
being done is a comparison with an unknown quality” (1980, 139).	  
Christopher Cowley (2006) takes aim at the claim that if a person’s decision to suicide could be 
appreciated as rational by both suicider and observers, than the decision to commit suicide should be re-
spected and it would be ethically permissible to provide assistance. Cowley argues that the concept of ra-
tionality is essentially future-oriented, and that since the suicider has no future after suicide, it makes no 
sense to call suicide rational or irrational (2006, 497). Additionally, Cowley argues that suicide as a phe-
nomenon can only be fully understood as a social phenomenon, which means taking into account the reac-
tions to suicide, as well as the suicider’s own desires and inclinations. Accounts of suicide that attempt to 
label a suicide rational or irrational circumvent the affective aspects of a suicide (and specifically, horror 
and pity felt by those who learn of the suicide) and thus offer an inadequate understanding of the concept of 
suicide (2006, 503). 	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cists. Given most bioethicists’ liberal starting point, establishing that a person is ra-
tional makes paternalism incredibly hard to justify. Therefore, so the reasoning goes, if 
conditions of voluntary death that meet rationality criteria can be found, these will estab-
lish the foundation upon which an ethical argument in support of assisted suicide can be 
made. The problem with this, however, is that “the concepts used to describe a life are 
utterly foreign” to that life (Spellman and Lugones 1983, 578). In considering rationality 
first, bioethicists did not stop to ask whether the concepts they were using to describe sui-
ciders’ lives were applicable to the experience of being suicidal.  
A suicider might be able to play the part he is asked to play by bioethicists and to 
meet the criteria established for rationality if he denies or does not talk about his experi-
ences of disgust and the logic of death. This suicider, however, would be recognizing the 
terms of the master narrative established by bioethicists, and working with a master nar-
rative he knows misrepresents his experience of suicidality and prevents him from being 
honest about his experiences, so that he may receive the benefits given to those who live 
out this master narrative.  
The next chapter will look at a possible set of different criteria that might be used 
to establish the moral permissibility of assisted suicide that avoids the imposition of the 
master narrative bioethicists have created regarding rational suicide. Instead, these new 
criteria encourage and make room for the hearing of the counterstories of the suicidal. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
APPROPRIATE DEATH 
 In the previous chapters I critiqued the concept of rational suicide for both its 
moral and conceptual failings. As I highlighted from a feminist perspective, rational 
suicide lacks the value neutrality to which it aspires, and it imports a liberal framework 
without justification; as a result, in their fervor to attain rights for terminally ill suiciders, 
bioethicists have thus marginalized non-terminally ill suiciders. This flawed moral 
framework has shaped the rational suicide literature and has limited most suiciders' 
participation in the shaping of this literature. 
In addition to these moral problems, I outlined conceptual difficulties with the 
notion of  “rational suicide” that my exegesis of Jean Améry’s On Suicide brought to 
light. Améry’s explanation of the suicidal perspective indicates why reason and 
rationality are not an appropriate way to speak to some types of suicidality. Whether 
Améry’s description of suicidality is at play in the experience of terminally ill suiciders 
has not been established; even if his description does not apply to this group, the larger 
conceptual difficulty of addressing death in terms of rationality is sufficient to call into 
question the appropriateness of doing so. 
I have argued that these moral and conceptual difficulties with the concept of 
rational suicide are great enough to require a new ground for establishing the moral 
permissibility of suicide and assistance in suicide. In this chapter, I will lay the 
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groundwork for a different conversation regarding suicide and assisted suicide that 
does not rely on rationality standards. While my work may relate to policy 
considerations, my primary concern in this chapter is to offer the foundations upon which 
a moral conversation can take place that gives consideration to all suiciders, not just those 
who are terminally ill and who meet the “rational suicide” criteria set forth by bioethicists 
and practitioners. To this end, in this chapter, I will introduce the concept of “appropriate 
death” originally developed by psychiatrists in the 1960s. I will offer an overview of 
literature on appropriate death and argue that suicide can be an appropriate death.  I will 
review several cases that highlight the way that “appropriate death” can be applied to a 
wider range of suiciders, and finally, explain the advantages appropriate death has over 
rational suicide. One might read this project as setting the groundwork for a radically 
individualistic claim regarding assisted suicide (something like Thomas Szasz’s argument 
in Suicide Prohibition: The Shame of Western Medicine (2011)). Given Améry’s account 
of suicidality, it might follow that in every instance suicidal people are the best judges of 
whether they should receive assistance in suicide, and thus, we do not have moral reason 
to restrict access to assistance in suicide. Améry himself claims that in the monumental 
moments of a person’s life, like the moment of suicide, a person belongs only to himself, 
and that others must remain silent (1999, 102-103). This is not my view since, as I have 
argued in previous chapters, humans are deeply relational and intersubjective beings: 
suicide is not merely a private individual choice, but one that requires social care and 
concern. Améry’s project is grounded in giving an account of and for the individual 
suicider who experiences suicidality in the way that Améry describes it. I have explained 
his work as counterstory in that he wants to provide voice for the voiceless, and to make 
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it clear to the nonsuicidal that suicide research tends to promote societal interests, and 
not the interests of the suicidal. Yet as Lindemann explains, there is a need for evaluation 
and balance in counterstory (Lindemann 1995, 37).  
The point of my project is not to argue for the privileging of the suicidal 
perspective over the societal perspective, nor is it to argue for a libertarian approach to 
end-of-life issues. Instead, I bring Améry into the rational suicide conversation in order to 
rectify a fundamental misstep made by bioethicists in the literature--considering only one 
sort of story of suicidality, that of the terminally ill person, when they approach the issue 
of the morality of suicide and assisted suicide. This story is an important one, but in 
focusing on this story and on rationality as the means by which to justify the moral 
permissibility of assisted suicide for this sort of suicidal person, bioethicists have ignored 
other sorts of suiciders. Using the work of Elizabeth Spelman and Maria Lugones, I have 
argued that focusing on one very particular type of suicidality, the type experienced by 
those who are terminally ill, is limiting and exclusionary. I have claimed that in 
restricting suicidality to the sort experienced by the terminally ill, bioethicists have 
artificially narrowed the discussion surrounding assisted suicide and done a disservice to 
those they claim to serve. As Spelman and Lugones point out, “part of the human life, 
human living, is talking about it, and we can be sure that being silenced in one’s own 
account of one’s life is a kind of amputation that signals oppression” (1983, 573). In not 
listening to the voices of different types of suiciders and considering only terminally ill 
suiciders, bioethicists have curtailed the participation of many other types of suiciders’ in 
the moral conversation. 
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My concluding interest in this project is to open up the moral conversation 
about suicide to all types of suiciders, as well as to offer a possible alternative standard 
by which to judge whether a person should be granted assistance in suicide. My concern 
here is developing a more empathetic, less individualistic approach to determining to 
which persons it is morally permissible to grant assistance in suicide, and an approach 
that does not silence the majority of the persons who might request such assistance.  
In order to discover this new ground, it is useful to recall the motivation behind 
the development of the rationality criteria. In “Can Suicide Be a Good Death?,” 
psychologist David Lester offers a helpful characterization of assisted suicide 
discussions. In this article, Lester explains that the debate about the moral permissibility 
of assisted suicide has been split into two questions handled by two different camps of 
scholars, but that both questions are different ways of asking what might constitute a 
good death (Barnard 1980, Doyal 2001, Engelhardt 1989, Lester 2006). As discussed in 
my first chapter, in the first camp, philosophers have asked whether suicide is or can be 
rational, and then used the characterization of rational suicide they develop to argue for 
the moral permissibility of assisted suicide.  
The concept of rational suicide is nothing if it is not an attempt to help people 
achieve good deaths. The discussions surrounding assisted suicide began because a 
particular problem was identified: because of rapid advances in medical technology over 
several decades, people were living with painful and debilitating diseases longer than 
they may have wanted (Battin 1982, 1994; Cholbi 2011; Fremon 1998; Kupfer 1998; 
Rachels 1986; Quill 2001). Rational suicide as a concept is an attempt to show that a 
person can meet very stringent criteria establishing autonomous rationality and that a 
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particular act of suicide might work to promote good and avoid harm. This is suicide 
as a death that promotes utility and preserves autonomy. Rationality is not the good that 
is pursued, but the capacity used to determine whether a person is capable of determining 
what her own good death might look like. 
The second question that Lester identifies, however, has not been explored in the 
philosophical bioethics literature. The question is, “Can suicide be an appropriate death?” 
This question has mostly been discussed in psychological and psychiatric literature, and 
even then, such discussion is limited. In this chapter, I will argue that a modified version 
of this second approach described by Lester, seeking appropriate death, can offer a new 
ground upon which to argue for the moral permissibility of assisted suicide. I will first 
review the literature on the concept of appropriate death and seek to define appropriate 
death. I will then ask whether a death by suicide might fit the criteria for appropriate 
death. Having established that a suicide may be an appropriate death, I will then suggest 
that the concept avoids the pitfalls associated with discussions of rational suicide and is 
superior ground for determining the moral permissibility of assisted suicide.  
The Concept of Appropriate Death 
            The concept of appropriate death is not new, but has an over forty-year history.  It 
was originally developed by psychiatrists Avery Weisman and Thomas Hackett in a 1961 
article, “Predilection to Death: Death and Dying as a Psychiatric Problem,” and further 
developed by Weisman throughout his career. Before looking at this concept’s historical 
development, let us consider some brief general descriptions of it to get a better idea of 
its scope and the purpose behind its development. 
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Weisman succinctly explains the concept of an appropriate death as putting 
“legs under the general notion of ‘good’” (1993, 101).  He uses the concept of 
appropriate death to ground the colloquial understanding of a “good death.” Weisman 
offers another general, though more fleshed-out, description of the concept in The 
Realization of Death: A Guide for the Psychological Autopsy: 
We take it as an ‘axiomatic truism’ that we want to live our own life. 
Since dying is a part of living, then we are obliged to die our own death. 
We can’t complain about the taboos surrounding death. Our task is to 
understand how a person’s characteristic life-style leads to a certain 
death-style. What is a ‘good death’? What kinds of death can we live 
with? Perhaps there are no ideal deaths, and I am reasonably sure that 
most people would prefer life over death. All of us fear something in 
dying and death. But die we must. Therefore, we want to know what 
kinds of death would be acceptable. Given a little choice and autonomy, 
what death would be best for us, the death most consistent with the values 
and aims we have followed throughout life? (Weisman 1974, 139). 
 
This quote offers insight into the motivation behind the concept of appropriate death, as 
well as the “character” of the concept itself. Weisman begins with the simple observation 
that individuals want to live their lives in ways that are fitting for them. Given the fact 
that every person faces death, it seems reasonable to extend this desire to allow for a 
“fitting death.” Weisman immediately connects style of death with style of life, and 
asserts that fitting and good deaths cannot be determined without an examination of 
styles of living. He thus strongly connects the appropriateness of a death to a person’s 
particular lifestyle, as well as to subjective acceptability of a type of death. 
In other brief descriptions he offers of the concept, Weisman connects appropriate 
death with an individually chosen death. As he claims, “An appropriate death, in brief, is 
a death that someone might choose for himself -- had he a choice” (1984, 34). In an 
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earlier article, he writes, “The best deaths are those that a person might have accepted 
and chosen, had there been a choice” (1979, 100). In both of these assertions, Weisman 
emphasizes the importance of the patient’s beliefs about and perceptions of his own 
death. In order for a death to be appropriate for an individual patient, that patient must be 
able to say that the death would have been one he would have chosen given the particular 
circumstances in which the patient finds himself. 
These “brief” descriptions are a helpful place to start our discussion for two 
reasons. First, we see through them the catalyst of the development of the concept in 
general, and possibly the most important distinction between rational suicide and 
appropriate death as concepts. The concept of rational suicide comes about because 
bioethicists are looking to find a set of conditions any patient might meet such that they 
would feel comfortable arguing for the moral permissibility of assistance in dying. The 
criteria are a result of hypotheticals. “If there is a situation in which assisted suicide is 
permissible, then the patient would look like X, Y, and Z and the patient would want to 
die for A, B, and C reasons.” The development of the concept of “appropriate death” is 
strikingly different, however. As we found in the brief descriptions above, the concept is 
rooted in the desires of existing, individual patients. In all quotes above, the starting point 
is, “Given the life a patient has lived, what would that individual want regarding his death 
if given a choice?” 
The concept of “appropriate death” stems from Weisman and Hackett’s direct 
experience with patients. They witnessed a phenomenon among a select group of surgical 
patients, and were struck by certain similarities among those patients’ experiences. 
Originally concerned with investigating the prevailing wisdom that patients who display 
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acute preoperative fear should be operated on as soon as possible, Weisman and 
Hackett noticed two seemingly similar, but actually distinct, groups of patients. The 
members of one group felt much fear and anxiety about their upcoming operations and 
facing the possibility of their own deaths, and expressed this fear and anxiety readily. Yet 
there was another group of patients who, while not displaying any signs of fear or 
anxiety, were convinced of their own impending deaths upon the operating table. The 
members of this group held this conviction without emotional distress. Weismann and 
Hackett originally built the concept of appropriate death around observations of this 
group of patients (1961, 232). They looked to describe a phenomenon they saw, not to 
create a concept that would then allow them to justify another clinical practice. 
The second reason that these descriptions “in brief” are a good philosophical 
starting place is because one can more easily see the uniting principles under the criteria 
Weisman uses to determine which deaths are appropriate. The principles are simple: they 
must establish that deaths are “good,” and “goodness” must, in large part, be determined 
by the patient himself.1 A closer look at the development of this concept will be helpful. 
In the article that introduces appropriate death, Weisman and Hackett discuss five 
case studies, garnered over three years of psychiatric consultations in a surgery ward, in 
which patients were convinced that they would die after their scheduled surgeries. The 
article's purpose is “to call attention to a group of patients who, without open conflict, 
suicidal intention, profound depression, or extreme panic, correctly anticipated their own 
deaths” (1961, 232). These patients were convinced that death was approaching and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It is important to note here that Weisman uses the words “appropriate” and “good” interchangeably. In all 
of the works I have encountered by him, he treats these words as synonyms. In one work, he comments that 
he does not mean good philosophically, but colloquially (1991, 101). 	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determined death was “desirable and appropriate” (1961, 232). Weisman and Hackett 
explore the commonalities between these patients who experience what they call the 
“predilection toward death,” and look to distinguish these patients from those patients 
who have a fear of death. 
In the case studies offered by Weisman and Hackett, the circumstances leading up 
to the patients’ hospitalization are radically different from each other. Moreover, none of 
the stories told by the patients were uncommon when considered in light of the general 
population. The five cases involve people of different genders, ages, prognoses, 
temperaments, and cultural backgrounds. The ways in which they died were varied, as 
well (1961, 234). 
What did these patients have in common, then? As these authors note, “Patients 
with a predilection to death are not a remarkable group, provided that a distinction is 
made between the fear of dying and the fact of death. It is their attitude toward death that 
is remarkable, not the reality of their death...Each patient shared the conviction that death 
was not only inevitable, but desirable” (240). These patients’ histories did not distinguish 
them from the general population in any particular way, and their illnesses were not rare 
or exotic, but their attitudes toward their own deaths were uncommon. One of the keys to 
understanding what makes one’s death appropriate is understanding the way in which a 
patient views and experiences death, and Weisman and Hackett’s original list of criteria 
for establishing an appropriate death reflects this: 
Our hypothesis is that, whatever its content, an appropriate death must 
satisfy four principal requirements: (1) conflict is reduced; (2) 
compatibility with the ego ideal is achieved; (3) continuity of important 
relationships is preserved or restored; (4) consummation of a wish is 
brought about (248). 
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Note the patient-centered nature of this list. First, death has to bring along with it a 
reduction of tension and conflict in a patient’s life. Death resolves issues in a patient’s 
life, whether it is the end of intense pain caused by illness, or bringing a fitting end to 
personal issues. Additionally, the patient must be able to recognize a continuity between 
the person she believed herself to be in life, and the person she sees in the dying process. 
Closely connected to this is the requirement that relationships she had remain intact, and 
if need be, relationships be repaired before death. Finally, the patient must want 
something that death brings along, or desire death itself. 
Over his career, Weisman continued to refine this list of principal requirements 
for an appropriate death, but he never strayed far from the tenor of the original list. For 
example, in a 1993 interview he provides a set of criteria that, at first glance, appears 
different, but is actually remarkably similar to the list provided by Weisman and Hackett 
in 1961. In this interview, Weisman explains that: 
There are four major qualities of a very good or appropriate death for a 
specific person, since what is appropriate for one person may not be for 
another. An appropriate death involves 1) Awareness, 2) Acceptance, and 
it is 3) Timely, and 4) Propitious... Propitious means to die a death one can 
live with in terms of the values one has supported, and in terms of the 
groups whose respect and regard matter most (1993, 100). 
 
He offers very similar lists in other works, as well (c.f. 1984, 1979). In appearance, this 
list is different from the list provided by Weisman and Hackett in 1961, but in application 
and intention, it is not. This point becomes clearer when we look at the application of the 
concept of appropriate death to a case study offered by Weisman in his 1979 book, The 
Realization of Death. As mentioned above, integral to the concept of appropriate death is 
that it is developed from clinical experience for clinical application. 
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In The Realization of Death, Weisman presents a case study of a middle aged 
recovered alcoholic who got sober through Alcoholics Anonymous. This man had a 
difficult childhood and adolescence, though managed some success before his alcoholism 
caused him to lose everything he had. This patient was diagnosed with myeloblastic 
leukemia in his middle age. The patient died in the hospital, alone except for the staff and 
some visitors from AA. He had been released briefly before his final admittance to the 
hospital, but was so anxious about the lack of company and a possible alcoholic relapse 
that he admitted himself back into the hospital. He died shortly after being readmitted 
(1974, 140-148). Weisman believes this man had an appropriate death. 
What makes this case study interesting for our purposes, however, are not the 
facts of the case itself, but the way in which Weisman discusses the case. As Weisman 
recounts: 
I’m wondering if his ‘religion,’ AA, helped him toward the end. Let’s try 
to piece things together; I’m trying to feel my way, too. Deciding that one 
death is appropriate and another not depends upon distinguishing between 
what would be appropriate for us and what would be appropriate for the 
other person. Step by step, now. Obviously, it was not an ‘ideal’ death---I 
don’t know what that would be. The death was expected by the patient and 
by the staff. It was untimely only in that he was still in middle years. But 
that was his life span or allotment, and we can’t do much about that. He 
had a lot of support, from the staff, from HSO, and from AA. In his final 
hours, he wept, spoke about his mother, not about anyone else. His 
daughters evidently belonged to a life he had already lived. He was a little 
afraid of dying, but had been spared the pain he feared. One day at a time. 
On his brief stay outside the hospital he went into a panic, and presumably 
now was reconciled to staying in the hospital until death. He was less 
alone, I think, and far more alive than he had been on that morning when 
he awakened on Skid Row. That would certainly have been an 
anonymous, John Doe death. Conquering alcoholism was a genuine 
victory. Like so many of our terminal patients, psychological and physical 
problems seem to fuse. For him, alcoholism was always a threat; he was 
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endangered from this and from his leukemia. And he was helpless in both 
instances (1974, 148). 
 
The application of the later criteria is clear. The patient was aware of his condition, and 
had time to learn about his prognosis. His death was timely, insofar as it allowed him to 
avoid relapse and as it was an expected end. The patient was accepting of his death. 
Finally, his death was propitious in that the patient was able to die sober, had been able to 
meet with AA members before death, and had died with the support of his community 
(the hospital staff and AA members constituted his community by the end of his life). 
         This case also meets Weisman’s criteria for appropriate death as set forth in his 
1961 article. Much of the recovering alcoholic's existence was directed toward staying 
sober and helping people through AA. Death stopped the conflict caused by addiction. 
His death allowed him to die sober, and sobriety was the ideal he had set for himself. 
This man had no significant others to consider, but the continuity of his relationships with 
the staff in the hospital and fellow members of AA, who had grown quite attached to him, 
was preserved. Finally, the patient died sober, which was his greatest wish. 
Yet this case is not only interesting insofar as both sets of criteria are applicable, 
but also because of the sort of discussion that Weisman offers in this case. Two very 
important things happen in this discussion. First, Weisman distinguishes between an 
appropriate and an “ideal” death, and admits that he does not know what an “ideal” death 
would look like. It is essential to one’s understanding of the concept of appropriate death 
that one not imagine that it is something achievable only in an ideal world. Weisman is 
working to fight against the unthinking, general feeling that death is never appropriate or 
acceptable (1979, 98). He explains that these standards might seem too high to be 
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achievable, but “our preconception that death can never be appropriate may be a self-
fulfilling idea” (1984, 33). Unlike ideal death, the concept of appropriate death allows the 
style of an individual’s life to dictate the interpretation of the criteria for appropriate 
death. Weisman’s concept of appropriate death recognizes that no one leads an ideal life, 
and as such, does not rely on defining an ideal death. He acknowledges that the death of 
the patient in the case study would seem a sad death to many people. Finding life 
satisfaction in being an active member of Alcoholics Anonymous, and experiencing death 
characterized by relative loneliness are things most people would seek to avoid. The issue 
at hand, however, is the fittingness of death, and the recognition that, “people’s attitudes 
toward death correspond to their attitudes toward life; how each person dies is 
determined by how he lives” (Weisman and Hackett 1961, 242). There is an attempt 
made by Weisman to incorporate the history of the patient in a substantial way into every 
aspect of his analysis of the situation. What constitutes an appropriate death cannot be 
wholly understood apart from the application of the concept itself, and this application 
requires coming to know the person to whom it is applied. The criteria for an appropriate 
death   also serve as a way for a doctor to help a patient process what a fitting end might 
look like for him, as the criteria offer a path for achieving the best death possible within 
an individual's unique circumstances. I thus argue that the concept of appropriate death is 
feminist in nature, as it presupposes both human relationship and knowledge of an 
individual's life story.  What the case study shows is that clinicians without significant 
understanding of their patients’ subjective experiences cannot apply criteria for an 
appropriate death. These lists of characteristics are as much about the patient’s attitude 
towards his own death as they are about objective circumstances that obtain in the world.  
 167 
Weisman explains why the person who is dying must play an integral role of 
deciding the appropriateness of her death, noting that: 
Obviously, appropriate death for one person might be unsuitable for 
another. Finally, what might seem appropriate from the outside, might be 
utterly meaningless to the dying person himself. Conversely, deaths that 
seem unacceptable to an outsider, might be desirable from the inner 
viewpoint of the patient (1984, 31-32). 
  
This is the most radical distinction between appropriate death and the concept of rational 
suicide. A clinician must be extremely sensitive when determining the appropriateness of 
a patient’s death, and must know a great deal about her patient’s life and desires. The 
goal of setting a list of criteria for appropriate death is to allow clinicians to determine 
ways to talk with patients and come to an understanding of appropriate death heavily 
informed by the point of view of the patient, and not to give clinicians a set of criteria to 
apply that requires little to no knowledge of anything beyond the patient’s diagnosis and 
prognosis. 
That Weisman’s criteria for appropriate death change somewhat over the years is 
unsurprising. The criteria, like the concept, are subject to revision and reinterpretation 
given the need for responsiveness and flexibility. Understanding whether a patient’s 
death is appropriate requires thought and interpretation, as well as significant 
conversation with the patient. It is made clear throughout all of Weisman’s works that 
operational criteria are to be refined in light of a patient’s perceptions about his own 
death. While there may be some signs that a doctor can look for in the patient’s reporting 
of his experience in order to establish appropriate death, there is a level of flexibility 
required in interpretation. What remains constant is the responsibility of the doctor to 
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help a patient achieve an appropriate end, the importance of a patient’s perceptions 
regarding his own end, and the struggle for fittingness. 
Clinicians must do more than just listen to patients, however. In his article, 
“Appropriate and Appropriated Death,” Weisman explains that there are clinical elements 
involved in appropriate death, including pain management, setting up conditions so that 
social isolation is avoided, and giving the patient the ability to “operate on as high and 
effective a level as possible” (1984, 33). Physicians have more control than anyone over 
many of the criteria for appropriate death, especially pain control and the ability to limit 
disability caused by illness.  
Given the literature I have presented thus far, the following list represents a 
synthesis of that provided by Weisman over the years of his scholarship. In order for a 
death to be appropriate: 
     -The patient’s pain and symptoms must be well-managed. 
     -Social and emotional conditions must be considered and measures should be taken to  
 limit social disability. 
     -The patient must collaborate in his care, or be comfortable with transferring to others  
  his decision making power. 
     -The patient must be well-informed about his condition. 
     -The patient must seek to resolve conflicts, or see his death as resolution to conflicts. 
     -The patient’s death must fit with his ideas of himself and not conflict with his values. 
     -The patient’s attitude toward death must be one of acceptance. 
     -The patient must feel death is well-timed. 
Suicide as Appropriate Death 
Before fully articulating the impact of appropriate death on the moral 
permissibility of suicide and assisted suicide, we must address a very basic question: is 
the concept of appropriate death even applicable to suicide? That is to say, can suicide 
ever be an appropriate death? 
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In “Appropriate and Appropriated Death” (1984) Weisman completely rejects 
suicide as an appropriate death. In this work, he makes the distinction between 
appropriate and appropriated death. Appropriated death is one in which the patient causes 
his own death by suicide. The negative connotation to the word “appropriated” is 
intentional here. The suicidal person takes what is not hers to take. Weisman asserts that 
this sort of death can never be appropriate, as suicide is not only something that should 
not be sought, but something that cannot be autonomous. He states that “In a sense, 
suicide is an external agency that victimizes; the option to destroy oneself is not an 
expression of freedom, but one of despair” (1984, 32).  Here Weisman adopts a 
traditional approach to suicidology: according to his view, there are no instances of 
suicidality that are not informed by some form of pathology. Only people with an 
inappropriate relationship to life would be inclined to take their own lives. 
Weisman claims that suicide cannot be an appropriate death since all suicidal 
people are victims to the external force of despair, and insofar as they are victim to this 
external force, suicide cannot be an expression or extension of patients’ views of 
themselves. Yet again, however, this is an instance of a problem identified in the second 
chapter in that he has marginalized a population without justifying the reasons for that 
marginalization. David Lester explains this well: 
Weisman is really telling us his opinion rather than arguing logically. The 
arbitrariness of such opinions is evidenced by the fact that some writers, 
such as Binswagner, believe that suicide, for example, can most certainly 
be an appropriate death (65). 
  
Lester points out the contradiction involved in having criteria that allow clinicians to 
apply the concept of appropriate death readily to almost any situation, but then arbitrarily 
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restricting the application of those criteria to one form of death. It is not just 
terminally ill people that Weisman believes can die appropriate deaths. He examines 
cases in which non-terminal patients undergoing surgery experience a predilection toward 
death.2 These patients’ calm demeanors and accepting attitudes, as well as the timing on 
their deaths, cause Weisman to label these deaths as being appropriate. Yet terminal 
illness is not a necessary condition for death to be considered appropriate. The 
appropriate “timing” of a death has everything to do with the circumstances of a patient’s 
life and how he feels about dying.  Lester explains in a later article that if one suicide can 
be found that meets the criteria for appropriate death, then Weisman’s insistence that 
suicide cannot be appropriate cannot stand (1993, 167).   
I argue that Weisman is correct that some suicides will not meet the conditions of 
appropriate death. This is especially the case when depression or other sorts of mental 
illness are the only factors motivating the wish to die. In these instances, suicide might 
not be in keeping with the life a person has lived. If a person experiences a bout of 
situational depression, for instance, or even bouts of clinical depression, if that person 
experiences the desire to die only in those bouts, but also has experiences of non-
depressed states in which he wants to live and enjoy the world, then suicide would not 
meet the criteria for appropriate death for this person. It would not be keeping with the 
style of his life, overall.3 In these sorts of instances, a person should be treated with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It is of interest to note that in the original article in which the concept of appropriate death was introduced, 
only in one of the five case studies was the patient diagnosed with a terminal condition (Weisman and 
Hackett 1961). It is incorrect to suggest, then, that having a terminal illness is a condition of dying an ap-
propriate death. 
 
3 This is not to say that the presence of mental illness on its own prevents a person’s death by suicide from 
being considered an appropriate death. For example, in the instance of a paranoid schizophrenic who 
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psychotherapy and pharmacological interventions, and attempts should be made to 
return him to the style of life he had before he was affected by mental illness. 
Yet although Weisman is correct that some cases of suicide will not be instances 
of appropriate death, this considerably different from the assertion that no suicide can be 
an appropriate death. As has been shown in the preceding chapter, exploration of 
suiciders’ lived experiences is absolutely essential to understanding suicidality generally. 
Suicidality cannot be appreciated abstractly. When speaking to the morality of suicide, 
individual instances of suicidality must be considered in their nuance. Moreover, the 
feminist concerns in this dissertation require the examination of the particularities of an 
individual’s life, as well as the relationships that shape that life, before engaging in moral 
judgment. While Weisman may have believed it sufficient to assume that in all particular 
instances, suicide is an inappropriate death, this is unacceptable from a feminist 
standpoint. His concept of appropriate death lays the groundwork to do the feminist work 
of exploring the particularities of cases, but his refusal to consider the cases of suiciders 
is wrong and is not in keeping with the tenor and purpose of the concept of appropriate 
death. Individual cases must be considered on their own in order to fully work out what 
would be an appropriate death for an individual. Also, given that appropriate death was 
originally developed because of doctors’ clinical experience with real patients and that a 
theoretical understanding of appropriate death must take into account in practical 
application, applying appropriate death to case studies will help enrich the discussion of 
the concept. With this in mind, I address some specific case studies to consider the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
experiences windows of lucidity during which she expresses the wish to take her own life (and perhaps 
even attempts to several times), one might make the argument that suicide could meet the criteria for 
appropriate death.  	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practical applicability of appropriate death, as well as to highlight the advantages of 
applying a concept of appropriate death rather than rational suicide.  
Case Studies 
I select the case studies below in order to address various types of suicidality. The 
first case I consider serves to disprove Weisman’s ungrounded assertions that suicide 
cannot be an appropriate death: I return to the case of Jean Améry.  The second case 
study I address involves the other “extreme” type of suicidality looked at extensively in 
the bioethics literature, the suicidality of a terminally ill patient. For this, I will look to 
the famous case of Timothy Quill’s patient “Diane” (Quill 1991). I choose this case 
because it is widely cited in the rational suicide literature, and is often presented as a 
prototypical case of rational suicide. Diane meets all of the rational suicide criteria, and I 
explore this case in light of appropriate death in order to show that appropriate death will 
do the same moral work that rational suicide does in this case. 
Finally, I will finish with two case studies that depict a more ambiguous type of 
suicidality. The extreme sorts of suicidality have been given considerable attention in my 
project, but beginning discussion of these “in between” cases is the next best step to show 
how the criteria for appropriate death will be useful for examining cases that exhibit 
different types of suicidality. For these cases I will look to the example of Dax Cowart 
and return to the case study that was introduced in the introduction. In neither case, is the 
person terminally ill, nor have they shown the extreme suicidality of Jean Améry 
unproblematically. Yet in both cases, these people wish to die.  
 What will be discovered in the study of these cases is not only the applicability of 
appropriate death to varied cases, but also that the criteria that define this concept allow 
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for different details in each of the cases to take on moral weight in a way unique to 
each case. Analyzing these cases in terms of appropriate death will allow me to highlight 
facts and relationships that are relevant for how each person lives or lived his or her life, 
as well as to consider what those facts and relationships meant to the person whose case 
is studied. The person whose death is being considered must be seen as a whole person, 
in the fullness of her, “identity, character, interests and preferences,” as well as in terms 
of her, “relations to particular others” (Friedman 1991, 164). Determining whether a 
death is appropriate is not to make a judgment regarding a static situation, but to attend to 
the nuance of lived experience. 
Jean Améry 
Given the time I spent on exegesis of Améry’s On Suicide, a brief biography will 
suffice. Jean Améry was born Hans Maier in Austria in 1912 to a Jewish father and 
Christian mother. Though little is known of his formal education after age 12, Améry was 
known to have attended lectures in philosophy and literature in Vienna. He was also an 
apprentice to a bookseller and moved in literary circles in Vienna before the war. In 
1938, he fled to Belgium and joined the resistance. In 1943, he was detained by the 
Gestapo, tortured by the SS, and was kept for three months in solitary confinement. 
Eventually, he was deported to Auschwitz, transferred to other concentration camps, and 
ended up in Bergen-Belsen, eventually liberated by British soldiers. Améry spent almost 
two years in these camps. After the war, he started publishing under his pen name and 
gained some international renown when he wrote At the Mind’s Limits. On Suicide was 
offered in 1976, sandwiched between an uncompleted suicide attempt in 1974 and his 
completed suicide in 1978 (c.f., Brudholm 2008, Heidelberger-Leonard 2010, McCann 
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2001, and Stark 2001). If it can be shown that Améry’s 1978 suicide meets the 
criteria for appropriate death, then I will be positioned to reject Weisman's claim that no 
suicide can represent an appropriate death. 
It must first be considered whether Améry’s pain and “symptoms” were well 
managed. Améry did not identify himself as suffering from a disease, and in fact, he 
strongly denied that he was ill. His suicidality was a fact of his existence, something 
foundational to his self-understanding. He had considered his physicians' diagnoses, as 
well as psychological and psychiatric treatment options available to him (1999, 5). He 
wrote a book that spent considerable space distinguishing suicidality and illness (1999, 
57). As for treatment options, Améry explains that they were either not effective or so 
extreme that they would fundamentally change who he was, denying him the capacity to 
“be himself” (1999, 5). This total change of personality brought on by some treatment 
options would contradict another of Weisman’s criterion, that the patient’s sense of self 
and his values be preserved in death. Forcing Améry to live through treatment he did not 
want would force him to give up his sense of self and values in life. Even in light of these 
considerations, given that he underwent treatment after his 1974 suicide attempt, and he 
was well informed about treatment options available to him, we can be confident that 
doctors did what they could to manage Améry’s “pain” and “symptoms” (so much so that 
Améry writes of his anger about such “management” in On Suicide (1999, 79)). 
 Related to Weisman's criterion that Améry’s symptoms be well managed is the 
criterion that a patient collaborates in his own care. In some ways, Améry did collaborate 
after he was “rescued” from his 1974 suicide attempt. He lived for two years longer, and 
though he was angry with those who revived him after his 1974 suicide attempt, there is 
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no indication he did not follow doctor’s orders. Despite Améry’s protestations, to 
achieve an “appropriate death” suicidal people who request assistance in dying may be 
obliged to cooperate with their care providers in order to receive it. Care providers need 
to be very thorough in their understanding of patients’ situations, which might require 
several meetings, as well as attempts at “symptom management” before granting 
assistance in dying (e.g., if the patient had not tried talk therapy or 
psychopharmacological intervention, a doctor could rightfully require such interventions 
in keeping with Weisman's first criterion). If the option of assistance in dying were 
extended to patients, it would be very reasonable to put preconditions on that assistance 
(waiting periods, required psychotherapy, or required drug therapy) in order to make sure 
that the person was not just reacting to a fleeting wish. In this case, the “patient” could 
collaborate with his caretakers without giving up the decision to die. In cases where 
suiciders achieve their own death without assistance, such as the case of Jean Améry, it is 
still possible to characterize them as “appropriate deaths.” This sort of death for someone 
like Améry is in keeping with the way in which he lived his life. Améry’s insistence in 
his written work that he was a being inclined toward death, that he felt the lure of death 
even when engaged in the projects of living, indicates that death by his own hand was not 
something he saw as surprising or unacceptable. To take his life with his own hand is that 
which he was inclined to do, that which allows a “departure in freedom” for those who 
are inclined toward suicide (1999, 153). 
This prior treatment, as well as Améry’s own scholarly work, certainly means his 
case meets the requirement that a patient be well informed. One would be hard pressed to 
find a man better informed that Jean Améry. He had familiarized himself with a large 
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portion of the psychiatric literature and considerable philosophical literature on 
suicide. He was reasonable, rational, and an accomplished writer. He understood what 
doctors and healthcare providers told him, and he not only leveled a critique against 
particular facts revolving around the treatment of the suicidal, but also against the 
societal-wide attitudes about the suicidal and forced treatment of the suicidal. 
 Social and emotional conditions must also be considered when determining 
whether a death will be an appropriate death, and if there are any impediments to social 
and emotional fulfillment, attempts must be made to remove those barriers. Améry’s 
death meets this stipulation. There was nothing restricting his social and emotional life at 
the time of his death. He was not hospital bound and was actively engaged in social life 
up until the time of his death (West 2014). 
 Appropriate death also requires that a patient must seek to resolve conflicts in his 
life, or see his death as resolution to conflicts. Améry’s suicide notes demonstrate the fact 
that he thought his very being was a conflict. His death would be a resolution to that 
conflict, and thus, his death was appropriate. He even took steps to see that his own death 
brought about as little conflict as possible. He wrote letters to the staff and management 
of the hotel in which he killed himself and left money to cover the “inconvenience.” He 
wrote to his editors, his friends, and his wife. He looked to die with as little conflict as 
possible, and to make sure his significant others (and strangers) experienced as little 
conflict as possible (West 2014). The steps Améry took were prescient of requirements 
Humphry writes of in “The Case for Rational Suicide” (1986, 173). Humphry requires 
that a person engage in “acts of politeness” such as leaving notes for hotel staff in order 
for a suicide to be considered rational. Although I agree with the idea that in order for a 
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suicide to be an appropriate death one must think about the consequences for those 
who are left behind, I would be remiss here if I did not speak to a need to more 
thoroughly consider the impact one’s death might have on those around him. Although 
these notes and leaving money were certainly thoughtful, I think in order for a suicide to 
be appropriate, conflicts must not be instrumentalized and must be thought of more 
robustly, and that the suicider must engage in conversation with those close to him about 
his inclination toward death in order to resolve conflict. Améry certainly did this. These 
notes were the final words he spoke about his death, not all of the words he spoke about 
his death. It is important for a suicider not to underestimate the impact his suicide will 
have on those around him. Just as Améry asks nonsuiciders to recognize that the societal 
perspective they take up is not self-justify, we nonsuiciders can ask that the suicidal give 
consideration to those who their deaths with impact, and to have conversation about their 
deaths with significant others. 
  As to the other patient-centered criteria used to establish appropriate death, 
Améry’s death clearly meets all of these. Améry wrote an entire manuscript, which he 
then read over the radio in south Germany, explaining how suicide fit both with his self-
image and values. It is hard to conceive of this criterion being more thoroughly, or 
publically, met. 
Moreover, it would be hard to make a case that Améry did not accept his death. 
He made multiple suicide attempts, wrote a book defending and explaining those 
attempts, and developed an account of suicidality to attempt to help non-suicidal people 
gain a glimpse into an otherwise opaque way of existing in the world. Améry had 
accepted that suicide was an appropriate death him, and acted on that acceptance. The 
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timing of his death was his choice as well: Améry chose when and where to die. He 
had been inclined toward death for years. This condition could not be more thoroughly 
met. 
I can only speculate what Weisman might say about a situation such as Améry’s 
suicide. It is hard to imagine that when confronted with someone like Améry, who was 
able to articulately express a history of suicidality and his own relationship to suicidality, 
Weisman would be able to explain why Améry’s death was not appropriate. Weisman’s 
repeatedly suggests that a patient’s understanding and acceptance of the fittingness of his 
own death are what lie at the heart of “appropriate death.” Améry had this understanding, 
and had been resigned to die by his own hand for years. One cannot help but think of 
Weisman’s concise definition of appropriate death from “Appropriate and Appropriated 
Death.” He writes, “An appropriate death, in brief, is a death that someone might choose 
for himself -- had he a choice” (1984, 34). After reading Améry’s works and his suicide 
notes, even Weisman would be hard pressed to explain why Améry could not be said to 
choose the circumstances of his own death. 
“Diane” 
The case of “Diane” is quite possibly the best known in the assisted suicide 
literature. Dr. Timothy Quill brought this case to the attention of the medical community 
in a 1991 article in The New England Journal of Medicine. Quill, an internist, admits in 
this article that Diane asked for his assistance in dying, and he granted it (Quill 1991). 
Diane survived early vaginal cancer and alcoholism to be diagnosed at the age of 45 with 
acute myelomonocytic leukemia. At the time of diagnosis, Quill had been Diane’s doctor 
for three years. Diane refused treatment after her oncologist explained that if a bone 
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marrow donor was found, she had a 25 percent chance of long-term survival 
following an intense, uncomfortable, and painful treatment, She came back several days 
later with her husband and son to discuss this decision further. Without treatment, Diane 
was told she would live anywhere from a few days to several months, but she remained 
steadfast in her decision.   
A few days later, Diane asked Quill to prescribe her barbiturates for help with 
sleeping, but through conversation, Quill realized Diane also wanted barbiturates for 
purposes of suicide. Quill ruled out depression, and worried that fear about a lingering 
death would not allow Diane to enjoy any of the time she had left. He prescribed the 
drugs. About three months later, after her illness “began to dominate her life,” Diane 
came to see Quill one last time. Quill explains that he knew she would use the 
barbiturates he had prescribed. He writes, 
When we met, it was clear that she knew what she was doing, that she was 
sad and frightened to be leaving, but that she would be even more terrified 
to stay and suffer. In our tearful goodbye, she promised a reunion in the 
future at her favorite spot on the edge of Lake Geneva, with dragons 
swimming in the sunset (1991, 693). 
 
Two days later, Diane’s husband told Quill that she had died. 
What is unique about this case particularly is that Diane and her suicide would 
meet the rationality requirements without question, especially the criterion that it be 
“understandable according the community.”  In fact, after the publication of his article, 
many wrote in support of Quill’s decision to prescribe Diane the barbiturates  (c.f. 
Bloomstone 1991, Freer 1991, Humphry 1991, King 1991, Lynn 1991). In addition to 
meeting the rationality requirements, however, I argue that Diane’s case also meets the 
stipulations for appropriate death.  
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 In Diane's situation, the first of Weisman’s criteria for appropriate death, that 
a patient’s pain and symptoms be well managed, was met. Diane had worked with Quill 
for years, and although she struggled with cancer during those years, there was no 
indication that she was not receiving proper treatment for pain, nor that her symptoms 
were not being managed in accordance with standards of practice (and since Quill was 
prosecuted for murder after publishing his article about Diane, but a grand jury did not 
indict him, we can be sure his records were thoroughly examined) (Pence 2004, 100). 
Also, the pain and symptoms she was experiencing would have been worsened had she 
made the decision to continue her treatment. 
 The social and emotional conditions Diane found herself in were such that had 
she lived longer than she did, they would have deteriorated considerably. In the months 
leading up to Diane’s death, her son left college to come live with her and her husband 
worked from home. Quill reports that during this time, Diane was able to spend time with 
her husband, son, and closest friends that had been important for her, and that this time 
allowed her to say things that “had not been said earlier” (1991, 692). But she also fought 
off infections during this time and weakness and fatigue began to impact her quality of 
life. Although she was not socially isolated, her dependence on her loved ones was 
difficult for Diane and she understood that her discomfort and her dependence would 
only increase. Her death by suicide allowed her to not only avoid personal pain and 
discomfort, but also to leave her husband and son while aware and in active relationship 
with them. Thus, Diane's suicide can also be seen to come from a deeply relational 
sensibility, which is also in keeping with my feminist concerns in this dissertation. 
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 Diane also met the requirement that a patient must collaborate in her care. 
Although she could have continued treatment but decided not to do so, Diane was 
cooperative during the years of treatment for vaginal cancer. It was only when she was 
diagnosed with a particularly terminal type of leukemia that would have required painful 
treatment with little promise of success that she decided to discontinue treatment. Even 
with this decision, however, it would be hasty to say Diane did not collaborate in her 
care. Quill’s article makes it clear that she was involved in the decision making process, 
and her decision to refuse care was not made hastily, but after consideration and 
conversation with doctors.  
 There is every indication that Diane was well informed about her condition. The 
article written by Quill makes it apparent that Quill and Diane had a fairly close 
relationship and that he had been her doctor for years. Additionally, Quill details 
conversations he and Diane had with her oncologist.  
 With regard to seeing death as resolution to conflicts, the ability to take her own 
life gave Diane the opportunity to resolve the conflict she most feared--dying a death that 
was painful and prolonged. Diane saw this earlier death by suicide as the resolution of the 
conflict of continued dependence and further debilitation. 
 With regard to the more “subjective” criteria for appropriate death, these are met 
without question in this case. Diane requested suicide because dying slowly of a painful 
and debilitating terminal illness did not fit with her sense of self. She was also accepting 
of her death, which is demonstrated not only by taking her own life, but also by Quill’s 
observation that although Diane was slightly fearful of death, that fear was vastly 
overshadowed by the fear of the sort of death she would die if she had lived longer. As 
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Quill prescribed the barbiturates three months prior to Diane’s suicide, the timing of 
Diane’s death was chosen by her, and thus her death meets the stipulation of being well 
timed. 
Dax Cowart 
Dax Cowart was twenty-five years old when he and his father experienced a 
propane explosion in his car. His father died, but Cowart survived and suffered extensive 
burns to 65% of his body. Over the next fourteen months, he was held in the hospital 
where he repeatedly refused treatment and asked to be allowed to die. Doctors and nurses 
treated him against his will, including daily Clorox baths that were so painful that despite 
his mere 85 pounds, it took several people to restrain him. Cowart was left blind, unable 
to walk, and without most of his fingers (c.f., Arnold and Menzel 1998, Burton 1989, 
Gelwick 1992, Kliever 1989, and White 1975). After release from the hospital, he tried to 
kill himself several times (Cowart 1994, 744-745). Over twenty years later, when asked 
what he would say to the doctors who forced treatment on him, Cowart explains, “I 
would say that if they were in the bed feeling the pain I was feeling and experiencing 
what I was experiencing, they would understand very well. In truth, I think they did 
understand very well and would just not accept it” (Cowart 1994, 744).  
Cowart’s case is an especially helpful one because it is perhaps the archetypal 
example of one of the problems with the rationality literature and the substituted 
judgment that can come with the application of rationality standards. As was discussed in 
the second chapter, Dax Cowart is still alive, and argues that he should have been 
allowed to die as he requested. If his doctors had let him die, or even provided him the 
means by which to suicide, his case would have met the standards for an appropriate 
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death. However, the treatment he received contradicted several of the standards for 
appropriate death, and displayed some of the problems with substituted judgment.4  
Dax’s pain and symptoms were not well managed. The pain of third degree burns 
over sixty five percent of one’s body is hardly easily “well-managed,” but even worse are 
the \excruciating treatments required to keep alive one burned so badly. It took months of 
incredibly painful clorox baths and abrading processes to keep him alive, which felt to 
Coward like, “being skinned alive” on a daily basis (Cowart 2002).  
The social and emotional conditions he was forced to endure were horrific. He 
needed to be isolated in order to recover because of the risk of infection, and he was 
denied all autonomy. Moreover, he refused treatment and did not collaborate in his care 
and was not comfortable with the transfer of this decision making process. If there was a 
conflict to be relieved through Cowart’s death, it would have been the tremendous and 
overwhelming pain he felt in treatment.  
Had Cowart wanted this treatment and desired to stay alive despite all of the pain 
his treatment caused, there would be no moral quandary to address. But since Cowart 
expressed the wish to die repeatedly (the first request coming moments after his accident 
and the others expressed throughout the remainder of treatment) and he repeatedly 
attempted to take his life after release from the hospital, there are tremendous ethical 
difficulties in this case. If appropriate death standards had been applied, it would have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Although one might question whether Cowart’s case is applicable here because he is still alive, I believe 
this is exactly why his case must be discussed. In ignoring Cowart’s explicit wishes, doctors denied him the 
opportunity to die what would have been an appropriate death. Cowart’s case shows the danger in using 
(explicit or implicit) standards to determine who is qualified to direct one's own care that do not seriously 
and explicitly take into account the patient’s own reports. 	  	  
 184 
been clear that allowing Cowart to die, or even providing him with the means by 
which to die, would have been morally acceptable. 
There was no way for doctors to reasonably manage Cowart’s pain and symptoms 
while treating him, nor to limit social and emotional disability during treatment. 
Moreover, it is clear that Cowart did not collaborate in his care, and that if his wishes had 
been taken into consideration at all, he would not have received care. The only way in 
which these criteria could have been met is if palliative care was given to Cowart, instead 
of treatment to save his life. 
The patient-centered criteria for appropriate death certainly would have been met 
if Cowart had been allowed to die. Cowart saw death as resolution to the conflict of his 
constant and excruciating pain. Death was also in keeping with his values and self-image, 
which he has asserted numerous times in interviews and articles since his treatment.5 
Cowart’s accepting attitude toward death and its timing is evidenced by his repeated 
requests to be allowed to die, as well as by the testimony he has provided in interviews 
and articles. Cowart's situation set the foundation for an appropriate death, a death he was 
denied due to the repeated and violent interventions of those who were supposed to care 
the most for him. 
“Cathy” 
Finally, I will analyze Cathy’s case, the case that started this dissertation, in light 
of appropriate death criteria. The case involves a 59-year-old woman who was 
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hospitalized for her first suicide attempt at 15. Although she experienced bouts of 
what would later be recognized as clinical depression and mania, with recurrent suicidal 
ideation, she did not attempt suicide again until over twenty years later. During that time, 
however, in addition to getting married and having children, she made suicidal gestures 
and experienced suicidal ideation. At 50, she was formally diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder and borderline personality disorder. She was diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia at 56. From the age of 45 until the present day, she has attempted suicide at 
least 6 times. In addition to her mental illnesses, Cathy is frequently hospitalized for 
physical aliments. During several hospitalizations, doctors ignored her DNR and AD. 
Cathy’s sister currently has guardianship of Cathy. Cathy, during a period of lucidity, has 
asked that her psychiatrist of 20 years provide the means by which to kill herself.  
 There is no question that this Cathy’s pain and symptoms are as well managed as 
possible. In addition to working with her psychiatrist of almost twenty years, she has a 
team of doctors that worked with her on all of her physical ailments as well. As difficult 
as it is to manage the symptoms of the mental illnesses and chronic illnesses Cathy has, 
her doctors control her symptoms well.  
 That steps have been taken to limit social and emotional disability is also without 
question. In addition to receiving at home care, Cathy has been given many opportunities 
to participate in daily out patient therapy, as well as in adult day care, but often quits 
these programs within days of joining them. Additionally, her sisters do their best to visit 
with her regularly, but Cathy’s mental illnesses often cause her to alienate those closest to 
her. The toll this caretaking has taken on her sisters is considerable, and both struggle 
with and are treated for depression they did not experience before they took over care of 
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their sister. Despite this, they still remain regular fixtures in her life. Turnover on in 
Cathy’s in-home care aids is frequent, as well, as she either demands new caretakers for 
various reasons or they quit because she is “demanding” and “rude,” but she has never 
been left without in-home care. Social and emotional conditions are as good as can be 
imagined in this particular instance. 
 Cathy gave over decision-making power to her elder sister several years ago, and 
did so readily. She also collaborates in her care to the best of her ability. That she is well 
informed is certainly the case. She has a team of doctors with whom she meets regularly. 
She also has a social worker who can explain treatment options and available therapies 
and programs.  
 The more patient-centered criteria for appropriate death are where this case 
becomes of great interest. That death would resolve conflict for Cathy is certainly met in 
this case. Before her last few suicide attempts, she wrote letters apologizing to family, but 
explaining that she was in immense psychological and physical pain. Death for this 
patient would clearly be a relief, and she has expressed this to her doctor.  
That the patient sees her death as fitting with her self-image is the case. She 
expresses to her doctor and family her fear of episodes of psychosis and experiences of 
other extreme symptoms of her mental illnesses, and recognizes that years of treatment 
have not been able to prevent these episodes. When she is lucid, she sees the way her 
illnesses cause her to drive away those who are closest to her, but is unable to modify her 
behavior. She understands death as a way to cease alienating her loved ones, and to leave 
her family at a time during which she is in good relationship with those who matter most 
to her. As she is seeking out assistance in dying, her attitude toward death is one of 
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acceptance. Her repeated attempts at suicide, several of which were only non-lethal 
because of unexpected visitors, indicated that Cathy has not only accepted her own death, 
but also actively worked towards it. Finally, the criteria that her death be well-timed 
would be met, if given the means to kill herself, the patient were able to chose the timing 
of her own death. I argue that suicide is thus an appropriate death for Cathy. 
Advantages to Appropriate Death 
 These case studies highlight the advantages of using “appropriate death” over the 
concept of rational suicide in discussions about the moral permissibility of suicide or 
assisted suicide. They make immediately clear one of the most important advantages 
appropriate death has over rational suicide -- appropriate death criteria allow for 
discussion of a much greater variety of cases with more sensitivity to case details. There 
are other advantages at work here as well. In the final section of this chapter, I will 
discuss the advantages of appropriate death more fully. Briefly, the advantages that come 
from the use of appropriate death are the ability to consider a wider variety of cases, the 
operational nature of the criteria for appropriate death, an increased focus on patient 
experience, an increased focus on doctor experience, an acknowledgement of the social 
nature of the self, and finally, the concept's applicability to death and the dying process.  
Consideration of All Patients 
One of the first advantages of appropriate death highlighted by these case studies 
is that this concept allows for the consideration of all patients. Appropriate death is a 
concept applicable to all persons, since it is a way of defining a good death. Because 
anyone can die an appropriate death, this concept can be used to evaluate the ways in 
which any person dies. One immediate advantage is that conversations about appropriate 
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death might lead to richer social and individual conversations about end of life issues, 
and make for a more comfortable discussion of how a patient envisions her best death. 
Also, since appropriate death is a concept that can be applied to all patients, and 
in some instances, suicide can be a good death, this allows for serious consideration of a 
patient’s request to suicide. We can see the potential effects of this consideration in the 
cases above. In the case of Dax Cowart, if appropriate death had been the concept used to 
determine Cowart’s course of treatment, it is hard to imagine that he would not have been 
allowed to die or have been granted assistance in dying. It is unclear whether assisted 
suicide would have been necessary given the extent of Cowart’s injuries and the medical 
problems he was facing, or whether palliative care would have sufficed, but Cowart’s 
death would have been appropriate in either instance. Cowart was accepting (and wishing 
for) his own death, and his death at that point would have met all of the criteria for 
appropriate death, whether he took his own life or not. The discussion of how to die an 
appropriate death, if it was to become a standard way of talking about end of life decision 
making, would require much more weight be given to patient perceptions of the sort of 
life they wish to live and the deaths they wish to die. This is especially true when cases 
involve patients requesting to be allowed to die or requesting assistance suicide. 
In the case of Cathy, appealing to appropriate death means that her case would 
receive consideration, which, given the patient's history of mental illnesses, would not 
otherwise be the case on a “rational suicide” approach. “Appropriate death” requires that 
even those who believe that the (severely) mentally ill are globally irrational would need 
to consider Cathy’s request for assistance in suicide. This has a distinct benefit, even if a 
patient is ultimately denied assistance.  In cases where a mentally ill patient might 
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approach her doctor about the possibility of suicide being an appropriate death, the 
discussion of appropriate death would be intimately tied to what her vision of the good 
life might look like. It allows for a conversation about what improvements in quality of 
life might make suicide seem like a less attractive option. In the particular case of the 
woman above, suicide would be an appropriate death, but even in cases in which it was 
not, speaking to appropriate death might make for conversations in which the full weight 
of a person’s suffering is acknowledged.6 Moreover, this consideration of all patients 
prevents the marginalization of people like Améry. If suicide is considered an appropriate 
death in some cases (granted, a very small percentage of cases), patient’s stories must be 
listened to and discussions must be had when patients request assistance in suicide.  
Operational Nature of the Criteria 
 The second advantage of using appropriate death to evaluate whether a suicide or 
assistance in suicide might be ethical is the “operational” nature of the criteria of 
appropriate death (Weisman 1974, 151). These criteria were developed in clinical 
practice, and determination of good living and dying  for individual patients is at the heart 
of this concept (Weisman 1984, 33). Weisman calls these “operational criteria” because 
the criteria for appropriate death were developed with an eye to their application, and 
with an awareness of the relational nature of many of the criteria. It is impossible to 
understand these criteria without understanding the purpose of these criteria -- that is, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 If appropriate death was adopted as the moral touchstone regarding assistance in suicide, I wonder if it 
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help patients in the process of determining what it is for them to live better lives and 
die better deaths. These criteria do not allow a doctor to make detached judgments about 
a patient’s good without some awareness of how the patient defines her or his good. This 
leads to a fuller, thicker understanding of the individuals involved. 
The effects of the operational nature of the criteria are seen in the cases I 
addressed above. In Diane’s case, establishing rationality would be relatively easy, but 
only because Quill was in relationship with Diane was it possible to know that the 
appropriate death criteria had been met. Quill spent a considerable amount of time with 
Diane, and his presentation of the case touches on the criteria of appropriate death, even 
if he does not directly reference the concept. Establishing that Diane’s suicide had been 
rational would have required much less detail, and much less understanding of her 
situation and her person. Because of the operational nature of the criteria, it is more 
difficult to establish what an appropriate death is, but this difficulty reflects the complex 
nature of end of life issues that the concept of rational suicide tends to overlook. Améry’s 
suicidality could have been written off as irrational or a “cry for help.” Yet if one of 
Améry’s doctors had been working with the concept of appropriate death, the fuller 
conversation that came from its application might have lead to a better understanding of 
the nature of the suicidality he experienced.  Améry might have been given a chance to 
explain to a doctor the way in which the unacknowledged pull of the societal perspective 
shaped the way she treated him. Although this may not have lead to her assisting with his 
suicide, at least she would have had a better understanding of the man she was treating. It 
also would have forced a conversation about ways to improve quality of life.  
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The operational nature of these criteria allow for the consideration of a 
person’s lived experience that concerns Maria Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman (1983). 
Cowart’s case shows the extremes of what is possible when a patient’s experience is 
ignored: his caretakers completely ignored his lived experience, despite the fact that what 
they were forcing on him was tantamount to torture. The same can be said of Cathy: the 
appropriate death approach requires that her whole life be taken into consideration, not 
just a particular time slice. This includes her internal torment, which can be understood as 
equally painful as Cowart’s treatment, but not as tangible or easily witnessed.  
Increased Focus on the Patient 
Increased focus on the patient is perhaps the very heart of the concept of 
appropriate death. Weisman makes it clear that the accounts given by a patient must be 
taken seriously. This makes a difference in the way in which all of the cases above are 
analyzed and in what gets to “count” as morally relevant. The focus on the patient allows 
for better navigation of the power dynamics in the doctor/patient relationship, as well as a 
check on the way in which an ethics of vitalism guides much of medical thought. Medical 
knowledge is still extremely important for establishing appropriate death, but it must be 
balanced by a patient’s self-knowledge. Although Timothy Quill does not initially 
support Diane’s decision to refuse treatment, he recognizes after conversation that he 
must respect her wishes. He does not substitute his judgment for her own, 
paternalistically claiming that at the end of all the treatment, she will have been glad to 
have undergone treatment. Instead, he recognizes the legitimacy of her stance and 
concerns. 
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Given the details of Cowart’s case and his testimony about his treatment, there 
is little doubt that a severe paternalistic stance informed the way his doctors determined 
his treatment. The effects of an unacknowledged ethics of vitalism are also clear. If 
appropriate death standards had been applied, the outcome of Cowart’s case may have 
been very different, and he may not have needed to endure what he steadfastly claims he 
should never have had to endure.  
In the case of Améry, appropriate death allows for the recognition of a 
fundamentally different worldview. Those who evaluate suicide’s moral permissibility in 
terms of rational suicide do not have a conceptual ground upon which to understand the 
claims made by Améry. As a concept, appropriate death at least leaves room for these 
sorts of revelations because of the way in which several of the criteria focus on the 
patient.  
Finally, for Cathy, appropriate death gives a doctor an opportunity to give 
substantial weight to the patient’s account of her suffering in his moral deliberations. The 
mental anguish of Cathy is able to be considered in discussions of appropriate death in a 
way it may not be considered in discussions of rational suicide. Even if a doctor believes 
in the global irrationality of those with severe mental illness, which the doctor in this case 
does not, a patient’s severe suffering might be of greater moral significance than 
determinations of her rationality.  
Increased Focus on the Doctor 
Another advantage of the appropriate death criteria is the way doctors were 
included as the concept was developed. As Weisman writes, “But as we go on, 
comparing the better with the worse, choices become more uncertain and dependent on 
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the values we hold. What ‘quality of life’ means and is measured against as a general 
proposition remains elusive” (Weisman 1979, 123). Appropriate death is geared towards 
allowing patients to achieve a good death that is in keeping with their own vision of the 
“good life” (or death). He recognizes, however, that “quality of life” considerations are 
elusive and the understanding a person has of quality of life is dependent on the values he 
or she holds (1979, 123). Because of this focus on fittingness of death for the individual 
patient according to the sort of life the patient lives, a doctor’s determination about the 
good life might be very different from his patient’s. Weisman stresses the importance of 
doctors recognizing the values they bring to the table when discussing appropriate death 
with patients. Dying is one of the most radical experiences in a human life, and as such, 
personal values are inherently caught up in any examination of dying.  
The way in which personal values can affect determinations surrounding dying is 
seen in Cowart’s case. His doctors assumed that being alive was better than being dead. 
There was little consideration given to quality of life, and they believed they knew 
Cowart would be better alive than dead. This is a remarkable, and remarkably cruel, 
display of the unthinking ethics of vitalism. Keeping a person alive no matter the cost to 
that person, whether it be physical pain, mental anguish, and/or a complete loss of 
autonomy, because a doctor is trained to keep a patient alive, is wrong. I assert that an 
appropriate death standard would simply not allow for this.  
Relatedly, much more emphasis is placed on a doctor’s duty to listen to patient 
reports. How a patient perceives his own treatment, his prognosis, and his death are 
important sources of information for determining whether a death is appropriate. 
Development of the “spectacles” Lindemann speaks to is encouraged by this duty. These 
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criteria set up the conditions under which a doctor might see the situation through a 
different set of lenses – those of the patient herself. It is this development of empathy that 
will help doctors begin to better understand their patients. A self-inventory of values on 
the part of doctors might be a good place to start this work, but ultimately, conversation 
with different others is going to be what allows a doctor to understand and respect the 
particularities of his patients’ lives.  
The case of Cathy is a case in which these “spectacles” are of the utmost 
importance. Life is prized above good life by some doctors, but appropriate death 
standards must lead doctors to question when it is appropriate to allow a patient to 
determine when the cost of living is too high. This is not to say that a mentally ill person 
should be allowed to suicide whenever she wishes because her immediate desire is to do 
so, but instead a recognition that in some very rare and difficult cases, suicide is 
appropriate. Appropriate death criteria do not allow for the abandonment of these 
patients, but instead foster the sort of conversation and relationship between patients and 
doctors in which empathetic listening can flourish. This flourishing can only happen if 
doctors adopt the role required by appropriate death.  
Complex Conception of Self 
All of the advantages spoken to so far point to one of the most beneficial 
advantages of appropriate death. A more complex vision of the self is allowed to surface 
and be at work in discussions of appropriate death than in discussions of rational suicide. 
People are no longer most importantly rational animals, but complex social beings. There 
is more consideration of relationship, more acknowledgment of the varied particularities 
of individual lives, more opportunities for these particularities to be considered and 
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understood as morally relevant, and finally, there is a different relationship between 
death and an individual’s life at play in this concept. Consideration of death and the dying 
process is seen as an important way to understand what the good life is for someone. 
Death is not to be avoided at all costs, but is to be understood in terms of the arc of a 
person’s life in total. This more complex vision of self, as well as this different attitude 
towards death, leads to an understanding that deaths can be better and worse and that a 
good death is worth striving for.  
This more complex vision of self can be seen above in the cases, specifically in 
the details that count as worthy of consideration. In the case of Cowart, doctors' values 
are brought to light and shown to affect the case. With regard to Améry, his philosophical 
understanding of suicidality and his understanding of his own history become morally 
appropriate to discuss. With Diane, the timing of her death becomes germane. That how 
she feels about her own death becomes morally relevant to this situation is an important 
step forward from rational suicide considerations. For Cathy, the lack of her doctors’ 
ability to totally control her symptoms and the devastating effects these symptoms have 
on her life are recognized fully, as is the fact that dying well might bend the arc of 
Cathy’s life for the better.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that appropriate death, unlike rational suicide, is the 
best ground by which to establish a “good death.” I have further claimed that, in some 
cases, suicide can be an appropriate death. As a concept, its application permits 
subjective experience to be taken into account without advocating a reckless and cold 
radical individualism. Appropriate death also leaves room for consideration of the impact 
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of social realities on end of life considerations, including the impact of the particular 
values of individual doctors and the values inherent in medical training, as well as patient 
values. Finally, appropriate death criteria give license to all patients to discuss with their 
doctor, as well as require doctors to listen to, a patient’s account of his understanding of 
what a good death might look like for him.   
Moreover, beyond my more narrow concern regarding how suicide is presented 
and spoken of in the bioethics literature, the adoption of appropriate death criteria for 
discussions at end of life also has larger cultural ramifications. Considerations of 
appropriate death force citizens to rethink cultural attitudes toward death and dying, and 
they offer a conceptual framework that allows for discussion of end of life issues. If this 
concept was to become more common in end of life discussions, towns like La Crosse, 
Wisconsin, where 96% of residents have advanced directives or similar documentation, 
might become more common (Joffe-Walt 2014). Appropriate death as a concept opens up 
conversations about living and dying well, and could render such discussions less 
threatening to both patients and their caregivers. It forces the recognition that there are 
better and worse ways to die. As I have suggested in this dissertation, part of living a 
good life is dying a good death, and that is a social—not just a personal—issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the demonstrated oddity of the term “rational suicide,” bioethics literature 
uses it as the guiding concept for establishing the moral permissibility of committing sui-
cide or assisting in suicide. In this dissertation, I have developed an argument against the 
use of this concept. As my dissertation has shown, rational suicide is a problematic con-
cept that requires more scholarly consideration and critique.  
After offering an overview of the criteria bioethicists used to define rational sui-
cide, my second chapter began the critical work of my project. Through the scholarship 
of Susan Sherwin, Susan Wolf, Rosemarie Tong, Lisa Ikemoto, and others, I outlined 
general feminist critiques of bioethics and applied them to the rational suicide literature. 
These critiques address the uncritical embrace of a liberal framework in bioethics and the 
assumption of physicians’ value neutrality. These assumptions have distinctly informed 
and directed writings in bioethics. The uncritical embrace of liberal individualism causes 
distortions in the understanding of the doctor/patient relationship. It allows bioethicists to 
ignore certain social realities, including the cultural capital given to doctors by virtue of 
their social and educational position and the effects of the institutional authority of medi-
cine generally. Furthermore, this embrace of liberal individualism causes many bioethi-
cists to miss the more social nature of the self at play in medical relationships. I explored 
the impact of this uncritical embrace of liberal individualism and the three effects caused 
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by it in my discussion of the “ability to reason” and the “freedom” criteria in the rational 
suicide literature. 
I also explored feminist critiques of how the bioethics literature assumes value 
neutrality on the part of doctors. This assumption veils their social biases and obscures 
the impact medical training has on their social, cultural, and ethical values. I addressed 
the effects these assumptions have on the rational suicide literature by considering the 
criteria that a patient must have a “realistic worldview,” as well as the “harm” and “inter-
est” criteria currently used to determine rationality in suicide decisions.  
At the close of chapter two, relying especially on the work of Genevieve Lloyd, I 
looked at feminist explorations of the ways in which rationality has been used to margin-
alize certain vulnerable populations, including women and minorities. I argued that a sim-
ilar marginalization occurs in the rational suicide literature and that rationality has been 
used to marginalize certain types of suiciders and to exclude them from discussions on 
suicide.  
In the third chapter, I addressed this marginalization by looking to Jean Améry’s 
account of what I called “extreme suicidality.” Through an exegesis of Améry’s On Sui-
cide, I discovered that one possible version of the lived experience of suicidality cannot 
be discussed in terms of rationality because it is premised upon an affective stance toward 
a suicider’s being in the world that takes hold before rational deliberation even begins. 
People are either yea-saying or nay-saying in light of the fact of their existence, and ex-
treme suiciders are fundamentally nay-saying.  The application of the concept of rational-
ity to suicide, and to death generally, has been shown to be problematic, because as Amé-
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ry points out, “there is no bridge from being to nonbeing--because of all this, we are so 
helpless in thinking about death” (Améry 1999, 20). All logics assume the existence of 
the person using the logic, and cannot account for, or handle, the unknown of death. Be-
cause of the enigmatic nature of death, talking about it in terms of rationality is otiose.  
Finally, in my last chapter, I suggested “appropriate death” as a possible new con-
cept to establish the moral permissibility of suicide using different criteria to determine to 
whom it is morally permissible to grant assistance in suicide. I argued that the concept of 
appropriate death avoids the moral problems to which the concept of rational suicide falls 
prey. I also argued that appropriate death avoids the conceptual errors committed by a 
notion of rational suicide. Furthermore, there is an added benefit in that appropriate death 
can be applied to all sorts of deaths, and not just to cases of suicide. Enlarging the con-
versation around assistance in suicide to consider the appropriateness of someone’s death 
allows for open conversation about what an appropriate death might look like, even if the 
conclusion to that conversation is that suicide itself would not be appropriate. While the 
concept of appropriate death should include a wider range of individuals in the conversa-
tion about assisted suicide, it would not necessarily increase the number of people who 
are granted assistance with their deaths.  
My research immediately brings into question the supremacy of rational suicide. 
Given how much of the assisted suicide literature references rationality as the benchmark 
for requesting assistance in suicide, I hope that my research will also impact future bio-
ethics literature on assisted suicide. As I pointed out, it is often assumed that if it can be 
shown that a rational person might want to suicide and that the circumstances surround-
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ing a suicide might be rational, then there is neither moral reason to prohibit someone 
from suiciding, nor to prohibit someone from assisting in someone’s suicide. If rational 
suicide is not an appropriate concept morally or conceptually, this assumption that condi-
tions much of the assisted suicide literature needs to be reviewed.  
My dissertation also addresses the limited group of suiciders that are considered 
in the rational suicide literature. I deny that only those suiciders who meet the rationality 
criteria should be considered as worthy candidates for receiving assistance in death. If 
instead of the rationality criteria, the concept of appropriate death is used to determine 
when suicide is morally apprpriate, then suiciders other than the terminally ill who wish 
to end their lives need to be considered. It may be the case that for some individuals 
struggling with chronic physical or mental illness or even extreme suicidality, suicide 
may be an appropriate death.  
My dissertation has brought the concept of appropriate death further into philo-
sophical conversation. This opens new ground upon which to talk about the moral per-
missibility of assisted suicide. My discussion of appropriate death has given philosophers 
additional ways to approach moral discussions regarding suicidal persons. Moreover, ap-
propriate death might be a new way to generally address end of life considerations in bio-
ethics. 
Finally, my research reinforces the importance of including individuals’ lived ex-
periences when one is talking about it for purposes of moral theory. While the rational 
suicide literature does discuss some cases, awareness of the ways in which case studies 
are chosen and the limited groups from which they are chosen is important for suicide 
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research. Without conversation with a wide variety of those who experience suicidality, 
and not simply those who experience suicidality in a very particular instance, the margin-
alization of suiciders will continue to occur and conceptual issues will be left unacknowl-
edged and unresolved. 
In terms of future research, a project that might be taken up regards the effects my 
research might have on policy considerations regarding assisted suicide. One would need 
to do work on establishing the relationship of the rationality literature to written policy 
and then begin to untangle what this means for policies. Given the recent legalization of 
physician assisted suicide in Vermont, and the push to legalize assisted suicide in other 
states, this is certainly timely work. 
In addition to investigating these applications to policy, I am interested in taking 
my future research in a few directions. For example, I would like to further explore what 
research on the lived experience of suicidality might tell us about the limits and contours 
of the concept of suicide. There are a number of questions about this brought up in my 
dissertation, but which I was unable to explore in full detail. Though Améry’s countersto-
ry has done a lot to fill in some holes in the bioethics literature, more work should be 
done with the “in between” cases spoken of in the introduction and chapter four of my 
dissertation. A thorough conceptual analysis of suicide and suicidality grounded in an 
exploration of the lived experiences of suicidality would do much to help orient the moral 
discussions surrounding suicide and assisted suicide.  
Furthermore, I would like to develop the concept of appropriate death. I believe 
that narrative ethics and virtue ethics could be used to flesh out the concept of appropriate 
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death in a more philosophically grounded way than Weisman was able to do as a psy-
chologist. Again, one of the benefits of appropriate death is that it was developed for clin-
ical use, but it has not been explored rigorously as an ethical concept beyond practice. 
Although Weisman speaks to the fact that appropriate death gives “legs” to the notion of 
a good death, there is little ethical theory involved in his development of appropriate 
death. Offering a more stable theoretical grounding for the concept could be interesting 
theoretically and useful clinically.  
 Finally, my immediate future research interests are inspired by the cultivation of 
an understanding of the social nature of suicide and assisted suicide. My research has in-
directly suggested that suicide cannot be understood in terms of an isolated, rational actor 
taking his life. There is a social component to all suicidality, even for the most socially 
isolated of human beings. I am interested not only in the experience of suiciders, but also 
of those who survive their significant others’ suicidality and their suicides. It is my belief 
that a thorough understanding of both these “primary” and “secondary” experiences will 
add to the moral conversation around, as well as to conceptual understanding of, suicidal-
ity. I hope my research will contribute to both the bioethical and “popular” suicidology 
spheres to offer a more thorough conceptual grounding to the literature in suicidology.	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